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Conservation science applies research in the natural and social sciences to 
practical problems of nature conservation, thus presupposing various goals and values. 
This dissertation examines normative roles for the decision sciences in biological 
conservation. I am primarily concerned with two philosophical problems that arise in 
applications of the decision sciences to biological conservation problems: 
commensurability of multiple values and cooperation between multiple agents. I argue 
that models from decision analysis should be used to construct preferences over complex 
tradeoffs, and game theoretical models should be used to identify situations in which 
multiple agents pursuing their own interests cause outcomes that are worse for everyone. 
While these models allow values to be made explicit for decision-making, in other 
situations conservationists’ goals and values are obscure. I discuss this distinct problem 
in the context of conservation biology, where the central concept of biodiversity is 
analyzed and shown to necessarily reflect the values of its users. The multiplicity of 
meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity raise risks for 
conservation biology and motivate multi-criteria approaches to conservation decision-
making. Finally, the goals and values of conservation scientists and landscape managers 
may or may not reflect those of people who are affected by conservation policies. I argue 
that while decision science can aid in making values of various stakeholder groups 
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explicit, facilitating reflection and learning, it cannot resolve ethical dilemmas on its own 
without input from normative and applied ethics, particularly in identifying legitimate 
stakeholders and weighing multiple biological concerns against concerns for rights, 
welfare, and social justice. 
 viii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ....................................................................................................... xiii	  
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... xv	  
Chapter 0:  Values and Decisions in Biological Conservation: Introduction and 
Overview ........................................................................................................ 1	  
0.1. Philosophy of Conservation Science and Environmental Ethics ..................... 1	  
0.2. ‘Values’ and ‘Decisions’ .................................................................................. 2	  
0.2.1. Values .................................................................................................. 3	  
0.2.2. Decisions .............................................................................................. 4	  
0.3. Overview .......................................................................................................... 6	  
Chapter 1:  Definitional Risk and ‘Biodiversity’: Values in Conceptual Engineering 
at the Edge of Biology and Policy .................................................................. 9	  
1.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 9	  
1.2. Inductive and Definitional Risk ..................................................................... 10	  
1.2.1. Two Kinds of Risks in Applied Science ............................................ 10	  
1.2.2. Inductive Risk .................................................................................... 11	  
1.2.3. Definitional Risk ................................................................................ 14	  
1.3. Biodiversity Pluralism and Definitional Risk ................................................ 19	  
1.3.1. Historical Context .............................................................................. 19	  
1.3.2. Biological Diversities ......................................................................... 19	  
1.3.3. Definitional Risks and ‘Biodiversity’ ................................................ 23	  
1.4. Case Study: Weitzman’s Axioms .................................................................. 30	  
1.5. Biological Diversity and Biological Composition ......................................... 33	  
1.5.1. ‘Biodiversity’: Science or Politics? ................................................... 33	  
1.5.2. Is Biodiversity’s Value Dependent on Biological Composition? ...... 35	  
 ix 
1.6. Overview and Transition ................................................................................ 36	  
Chapter 2:  Constructing Commensurability: Tradeoffs, Practical Rationality, and 
Common Scales of Value ............................................................................. 38	  
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 38	  
2.1.1. Conservation Decisions with Multiple Values .................................. 38	  
2.1.2. Multiple Values and Constructing Commensurability ...................... 41	  
2.1.3. Outline ................................................................................................ 43	  
2.2. Comparability and Commensurability in Multi-criteria Decisions ............... 43	  
2.2.1 Comparability ..................................................................................... 43	  
2.2.2. Comparability of Criteria ................................................................... 46	  
2.2.3. Cardinal Value Functions and Commensurability Between Criteria . 49	  
2.3. Multi-attribute Value Theory (MAVT): the Construction of a Common Scale52	  
2.3.1. The Additive Model ........................................................................... 52	  
2.3.2. Ethical Assumptions: Trading, Trading Off, and Incommensurability52	  
2.3.3. Independence Assumptions ............................................................... 56	  
2.3.4. Constructing an Additive Value Function ......................................... 59	  
2.3.5. Review ............................................................................................... 62	  
2.4. Interpreting MAVT: the Construction of Tradeoff Preferences .................... 62	  
2.4.1. Preferences: Revealed, Elicited, and Constructed ............................. 62	  
2.4.2. Constructed Preferences and Non-normative Biases ......................... 65	  
2.5. Practical Rationality and Constructing Commensurability ............................ 68	  
2.5.1. Considered Preferences and Practical Rationality ............................. 68	  
2.5.2. Constructed Preferences and Constructing Commensurability ......... 69	  
 x 
 
2.6. Conclusion and Transition ............................................................................. 72	  
Chapter 3:  The Land Acquisition Priority System (LAPS): A Case Study in 
Constructing Commensurability for Conservation Prioritization ............... 73	  
3.1. Introduction and Overview ............................................................................ 73	  
3.2. LAPS: Prioritizing National Wildlife Refuges .............................................. 74	  
3.2.1. Background: FWS and LAPS ............................................................ 74	  
3.2.2. Methodology ...................................................................................... 76	  
3.3. Analysis of LAPS Criteria and Attributes ..................................................... 81	  
3.3.1. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ....................................................... 81	  
3.3.1.1. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Declared Values and Objectives
 .................................................................................................... 81	  
3.3.1.2. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Sub-criteria ....................... 81	  
3.3.1.3. Discussion: Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ........................ 84	  
3.3.2. Endangered and Threatened Species ................................................. 87	  
3.3.2.1. Endangered and Threatened Species Declared Values and 
Objectives .................................................................................. 87	  
3.3.2.2. Endangered and Threatened Species Sub-criteria .................. 87	  
3.3.2.3. Discussion: Endangered and Threatened Species .................. 92	  
3.3.3. Bird Conservation .............................................................................. 93	  
3.3.3.1. Bird Conservation Declared Values and Objectives .............. 93	  
3.3.3.2. Bird Conservation Sub-criteria .............................................. 94	  
3.3.3.3. Discussion: Bird Conservation .............................................. 96	  
3.3.4. Ecosystem Conservation .................................................................... 97	  
3.3.4.1. Ecosystem Conservation Declared Values and Objectives ... 97	  
3.3.4.2. Ecosystem Conservation Sub-criteria .................................... 97	  
3.3.4.3. Discussion: Ecosystem Conservation .................................. 100	  
3.3.5. Project Summary .............................................................................. 102	  
3.3.6. LAPS Criteria General Discussion .................................................. 102	  
3.3.6.1. Additive Independence ........................................................ 102	  
3.3.6.2. Management and Non-management Attributes ................... 103	  
 xi 
3.3.6.3. Variability in Species’ Value ............................................... 103	  
3.3.6.4. Population Trends ................................................................ 104	  
3.4. Normative Criticisms of LAPS .................................................................... 104	  
3.4.1. Criteria and Point Values ................................................................. 104	  
3.4.2. No Complementarity ........................................................................ 105	  
3.3.2. Well-roundedness ............................................................................ 106	  
3.4.4. LAPS and Portfolio Selection .......................................................... 107	  
3.4.5. No Social Scientific Data ................................................................. 108	  
3.5. Conclusions and Transition .......................................................................... 108	  
3.5.1. LAPS and Constructing Commensurability ..................................... 108	  
3.5.2. From Decisions with Multiple Values to Decisions with Multiple Agents
 ........................................................................................................... 110	  
Chapter 4: Conservation Dilemmas: Game Theory, Group Decisions, and the Limits 
of Mechanism Design ................................................................................. 111	  
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 111	  
4.1.1. A Normative Role for Game Theory ............................................... 111	  
4.1.2. Outline and Overview ...................................................................... 112	  
4.2. Conservation Dilemmas ............................................................................... 113	  
4.2.1. Wild Dogs and Local Villagers in South Africa .............................. 113	  
4.2.1.1. Background .......................................................................... 113	  
4.2.1.2. Game Theoretical Analysis .................................................. 114	  
4.2.1.3. Discussion ............................................................................ 116	  
4.2.2. Raptors and Red Grouse in Scotland ............................................... 117	  
4.2.2.1. Background .......................................................................... 117	  
4.2.2.2. Agents and Goals ................................................................. 118	  
4.2.2.3. Preference Analysis ............................................................. 120	  
4.2.2.4. Game Theoretical Analysis .................................................. 122	  
4.2.2.5. Discussion: Raptors and Red Grouse ................................... 124	  
4.2.3. The n-Agent Dilemma: Reef Fishermen in the Philippines ............. 126	  
 xii 
4.2.3.1. Background .......................................................................... 126	  
4.2.3.2. Game Theoretical Analysis. ................................................. 128	  
4.2.3.3. Discussion: Fish and Corals in Southeast Asia. ................... 131	  
4.3. Cooperation and The Limits of Mechanism Design .................................... 132	  
4.3.1. Cooperation in Conservation Dilemmas .......................................... 132	  
4.3.2. The Behavioral Game Theory of Dilemmas .................................... 134	  
4.3.2.1. One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) ..................................... 135	  
4.3.2.2. Public Goods Game ............................................................. 136	  
4.3.2.3. Public Goods Game with Targeted, Costly Punishment ...... 137	  
4.3.2.4. Public Goods Game with Targeted, Costly Punishment and 
Intergroup Conflict ................................................................... 137	  
4.3.3. The Limits of Mechanism Design .................................................... 138	  
4.4. Concluding Discussion: Norton’s Critique .................................................. 140	  
Chapter 5: Ethical Dilemmas in Biological Conservation and the Limits of Decision 
Science ....................................................................................................... 146	  
5.1. Introduction: Connecting Commensurability and Cooperation ................... 146	  
5.2. Normative Problems for Stakeholder Methodologies .................................. 148	  
5.2.1. Legitimate Stakeholders and Social Justice ..................................... 148	  
5.2.2. Moral Status, Stakeholders, and Rights Holders ............................. 152	  
5.3. Weighing Multiple Values: Ethics and Difficult Tradeoffs in Biological 
Conservation .............................................................................................. 155	  
5.3.1. Tradeoffs in Conservation Planning ................................................ 155	  
5.3.2. Beavers and Ecological Tradeoffs in Navarino Island, Chile .......... 157	  
5.3.2.1. Background and Multiple Values ........................................ 157	  
5.3.2.2. Ethical Aspects ..................................................................... 159	  
5.3. Concluding Discussion: The Value and Limits of Decision Science .......... 162	  
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions ................................................................ 166	  
References ........................................................................................................... 169	  
 xiii 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1. Difficult Decision Problem .................................................................. 45	  
Table 3.1. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Summary ......................................... 83	  
Table 3.2. Endangered and Threatened Species Summary (x = number of endangered 
and threatened species; y = number of other listed species targeted for 
reintroduction; z = number of candidates for listing.) ...................... 89	  
Table 3.3. Bird Conservation Summary ............................................................... 94	  
Table 3.4. Ecosystem Conservation Sub-criteria Summary (a = number of critically 
endangered ecosystems; b = number of endangered ecosystems; c = 
number of threatened ecosystems). .................................................. 99	  
Table 3.5. Project Summary ................................................................................ 102	  
Table 4.1. Two-Agent Game with Pareto-inefficient Nash Equilibrium ............ 115	  
Table 4.2.  Preference Structure .......................................................................... 120	  
Table 4.3.  Nash Equilibrium Analysis ............................................................... 123	  
Table 4.4.  Pareto-efficiency Analysis (I: Pareto-inefficient; E: Pareto-efficient)124	  
Table 4.5. Open-access n-agent Game. Agents: n fishers in an open-access fishery. 
Strategies: D: Harvest as much as possible now; C: restrain harvesting 
effort to maximum sustainable yield levels. ND: number of agents who 
play D. t is tipping point where harvesting effort exceeds maximum 
sustainable yield levels. It is assumed that T > R > P > S for each fisher.
 ........................................................................................................ 128	  
 xiv 
Table 4.6. Closed-access n-agent Game. Agents: n fishers in a closed-access fishery. 
Strategies: MSY: harvest at maximum sustainable yield levels. NM: 
number of agents who play MSY; t is tipping point where harvesting 
effort leads to eventual decline in yield due to ecological interaction with 
species of conservation value. It is assumed that T > R > P > S for each 
fisher. ............................................................................................. 130	  
Table 4.7. One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. ‘C’ is the cooperative action, ‘D’ is 
defection. Payoffs are for row player; see text for preferences (same for 
row and column). ........................................................................... 135	  
 xv 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1. Geographical Regions of Sepiid Diversity and Disparity. From Neige 
(2003, 1126). Used with permission of Wiley-Blackwell. .............. 27	  
Figure 1.2. Species Richness vs. Total Morphological Variance of Sepiids from 
Biogeographical Regions A-Q in Fig. 1. From Neige (2003, 1134). Used 
with permission of Wiley-Blackwell. .............................................. 28	  
Figure 2.1. Incomplete Objectives Hierarchy for a Hypothetical Conservation 
Decision ........................................................................................... 40	  
Figure 3.1. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources . 84	  
Figure 3.2.a. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Endangered and Threatened Species.
 .......................................................................................................... 90	  
Figure 3.2.b. Sub-objectives and Attributes Related to Improve Population Status and 
Improve Management Status. .......................................................... 91	  
Figure 3.3. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Bird Conservation ........................ 95	  
Figure 3.4. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Ecosystem Conservation ............ 100	  




Chapter 0:  Values and Decisions in Biological Conservation: 
Introduction and Overview 
0.1. Philosophy of Conservation Science and Environmental Ethics 
The chapters of this dissertation fall within the philosophy of conservation science 
and environmental ethics. In their recent introductory textbook on conservation science, 
Kareiva and Marvier (2011, 1) state: 
Conservation is both a scientific enterprise and a social movement that seeks to 
protect nature, including the Earth’s animals, plants, and ecosystems. 
Conservation science applies principles from ecology, population genetics, 
economics, political science, and other natural and social sciences to manage and 
protect the natural world. Effective conservation requires a clear understanding of 
how people impact the planet and how they make decisions about their use of 
natural resources and their choice of lifestyle. 
As characterized here, conservation science applies research in the natural and 
social sciences to practical problems of nature conservation, thus presupposing various 
goals and values. This dissertation will focus on problems of biological conservation, 
where the human goals and values at stake involve biological and ecological entities, like 
genes, organisms, populations, species, and ecological assemblages and communities. 
Often the goals and values of conservation scientists are made explicit, for 
example in decision analyses of conservation problems where the values of human agents 
are specified. Part of this dissertation is concerned with philosophical issues that arise in 
prescriptive applications of the decision sciences to biological conservation problems, in 
particular the problems of the commensurability of multiple values (chapters 2-3, and 5) 
and cooperation amongst multiple agents (chapters 4-5). 
Sometimes the goals and values implicit in biological conservation practice are 
obscure, whether to the producers or the consumers of conservation science, or both. 
Chapter 1 discusses this distinct problem in the context of conservation biology, where 
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the central concept of biodiversity is analyzed and shown to necessarily reflect the values 
of its users. 
Additionally, the goals and values of conservation scientists and managers may or 
may not reflect those of people who are affected by conservation policies. Chapter 5 
discusses ethical aspects of this problem in the implementation of conservation, focusing 
on norms that ought to constrain tradeoffs and stakeholder analysis that go beyond the 
decision models discussed in chapters 2-4. 
While Kareiva and Marvier do not explicitly include environmental ethics in their 
characterization of conservation science, it has been a primary goal of environmental 
ethics to articulate and defend an underlying justification for the goals and values that fall 
under the broad umbrella of “nature conservation” (Norton 1987, Sarkar 2005, Jamieson 
2008). This dissertation will not contribute to this project. Rather its focus is more on the 
ethical aspects of practical problems. Thus I will assume throughout that investment of 
societal resources in biological conservation is justified to some extent. The chapters on 
normative applications of the decision sciences bring out ethical considerations 
characteristic of the problems of commensurability and cooperation. The final chapter 
deals with the ethics of commensurability and cooperation in the implementation of 
biological conservation by ethical reflection and examination of case studies. 
0.2. ‘Values’ and ‘Decisions’ 
In the title, and throughout, I use the terms ‘values’ and ‘decisions.’ Before I 





There are many ways to define ‘values’ and measure people’s values. Here I will 
not be engaged with first-order normative questions of what is valuable, but rather on the 
implications of what humans value, as measured by the psychological, behavioral, and 
social sciences. Thus values here are necessarily tied to human valuation, or valuing, the 
verb. In the broadest sense used here, to value something, whether a particular thing, a 
class of things, or something more abstract like friendship or the diversity of species in a 
biota, is to care about it positively, and to be disposed in one’s attitudes and behaviors to 
exhibit this concern or interest. 
Economists usually measure people’s values by measuring their preferences. 
Preferences can be measured by observing consistent choice behavior. If I consistently 
choose x over y, I am said to prefer x to y, a statement which may be used to predict my 
behavior in similar circumstances. Cardinal utilities that include information about how 
much I prefer x to y may also be constructed from choices between uncertain gambles. 
Preferences may also be measured by simply asking or surveying people, or via more 
complicated techniques to construct a model of an agent’s preferences, one of which will 
be surveyed in chapter 2. For expositions of the elementary decision and game theory that 
will be used in this dissertation, see Resnik (1987), Gintis (2009), and Keeney and Raiffa 
(1993). 
Philosophers sometimes identify valuations with reflectively endorsed or 
“considered” preferences (Norton 1984) or preferences given full information (Gauthier 
1986, Railton 1986). Others have defended views of value (that is, what is valuable) 
based on the idea that some valuations may be more justified than others in ways that go 
beyond requirements of full information or reflective endorsement. Anderson (1993) and 
others have argued that valuable things are the objects of merited or appropriate pro-
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attitudes, where the pro-attitude could be pleasure or desire but also respect, awe, love, 
etc. Here valuations may be quite distinct in their psychological properties depending on 
the pro-attitudes involved; the economic notion of preference clearly abstracts away from 
this kind of psychological detail. Other accounts also involve second-order normative 
judgments as to the reasonableness of valuations. For example, Scanlon (2000) proposed 
the so-called “buck passing” account of values such that to value something is to take 
oneself to have reasons to have certain attitudes. 
In the chapters that follow I will usually use economic models of valuation as 
preference; however in chapter 2 I distinguish between revealed, elicited, and constructed 
preferences. There I will also rely on a normative claim that considered or reflectively 
endorsed preferences should be the basis of rational choice, particularly in high-stakes 
decisions. 
There remain further questions about whether we may construct a philosophical 
or ethical account of unreasonable or pathological valuations or preferences. Such an 
account would be necessary to flesh out an account of value like Anderson’s such that 
valuable things are appropriate objects of valuation. However we do not need to construct 
such a general account to make progress on the problems considered here. 
0.2.2. DECISIONS 
Identifying valuation with preference allows this often-amorphous concept to be 
specified with some precision and to play its standard role in decision theory. A decision 
is a situation where an agent must choose between multiple (>1) alternative courses of 
action. According to decision theory, agents choose (or, should choose) on the basis of 
their valuation of potential outcomes and the probabilities of various states of the world 
that, along with the agent’s action, determine the outcome (Resnik 1987). Decisions may 
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be complicated with multiple agents, leading to game theory (see chapter 4) and social 
choice theory, or with multiple criteria of evaluation, leading to multi-criteria approaches 
including multi-attribute utility theory (see chapter 2). 
As Bermúdez (2009) points out, there are at least three “projects” for which 
decision theory has proven useful: guiding action, normatively assessing action, and 
explaining/predicting action. Economists have had some success using decision theoretic 
models to predict aggregate behavior in markets, as have behavioral ecologists and 
neuroeconomists modeling animal behavior (Glimcher 2011). Despite well-known 
anomalies and behavioral counterexamples to decision theoretic optimality, this research 
continues to identify situations in which we can expect humans and other animals to act 
as consistent maximizers. However, this dissertation will be concerned primarily with the 
other two projects, which are normative. Chapter 2 argues that decision theoretic tools of 
multi-attribute value theory can aid in guiding action by structuring our thinking about 
tradeoffs, and chapter 4 identifies a normative role for game theory. 
Sarkar (2012a, ch. 4) has argued that decision theory can serve an important role 
bringing values and ethical considerations explicitly into the policy process. By 
specifying our valuations in decision theoretic analyses, we make those valuations and 
their consequences transparent. Besides the political benefits of transparency, this 
facilitates clear thinking (do you know what the consequences of your valuations are?) 
and reflection (are these really your considered valuations?). The idea that decision and 
game theory may serve as tools for ethical reflection will be a significant theme in the 
chapters to come. At the same time, decision theory does not provide a global theory of 
practical reason or a way to algorithmically bypass informal deliberation or political 
processes. They are tools, useful for particular purposes notwithstanding their limitations 
(Norton 2005, Norton and Noonan 2007). 
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Furthermore, as Hempel (1965) points out, the choice of decision models and 
decision rules also reflect the values of their users. To take a simple example, 
maximization of expected value or minimization of the risk of the worst outcome are two 
decision rules that will, in many cases, conflict in their recommendations. The decision-
maker’s “attitude toward risk,” presumably dependent on all kinds of beliefs, valuations, 
and contextual factors, will non-trivially determine which decision rule is more 
appropriate. Chapter 2 discusses the philosophical and ethical assumptions necessary to 
use particular models in multi-criteria decision theory. Knowing when to use such 
techniques is as important as knowing how to use them. 
0.3. Overview 
Chapter 1 presents a critique of what has become the central concept of 
conservation biology, namely biodiversity. Consideration of the variety of definitions of 
‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity entails that any particular definition or 
measure used will depend on the user’s goals and values. Empirical evidence that 
multiple measures of biological diversity can be non-concordant across landscapes and 
seascapes motivates multi-criteria approaches to biological conservation decisions. I call 
risks that arise in the context of conceptual engineering and operationalization for 
measurement “definitional risks,” and compare them to risks arising from the acceptance 
of uncertain hypotheses (so-called “inductive risks,” Hempel 1965, Douglas 2009). One 
axiomatic approach for constructing diversity functions over sets of pairwise differences 
serves as a case study of definitional risk. The chapter closes with the suggestion that the 
value of biological diversity may be dependent on facts about biological composition. 
Chapter 2 moves to the philosophy of multi-criteria decision-making, focusing on 
a technique to construct a common scale of value (to “construct commensurability”) 
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when there are multiple values at stake.  After presenting the technique, its scope, and 
limitations, I argue that constructing commensurability is a requirement of practical 
rationality for a certain class of decisions, namely those with high stakes and complex 
tradeoffs. This follows from the fact that it is implausible that decision-makers would 
even have considered preferences over complex tradeoffs without using such techniques, 
and the normative assumption mentioned above, that considered preferences are 
necessary for rational choice in high-stakes decisions. Chapter 3 presents a case study of 
constructing commensurability, the decision support system that the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service uses to rank National Wildlife Refuges for budgeting purposes. I argue 
that the system has several flaws, most crucially that it does not take into account the 
marginal benefit of new acquisitions themselves. 
Chapter 4 discusses a normative role for game theory in conservation contexts, 
specifically in identifying Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria: cases where agents’ pursuit 
of their own individual interests leaves everyone worse off than if they had cooperated or 
coordinated their behavior. Several case studies from the conservation biology literature 
are examined and modeled to show that such dilemmas are widespread. While several 
solutions to such dilemmas are available, particular attention is paid to the possibility of 
decentralized and community-based solutions. I appeal to behavioral game theory 
experiments that show that humans are often willing to enforce norms and cooperate, 
especially when there is opportunity for reciprocity over time. 
Chapter 5 discusses ethical aspects of the problem of tradeoffs between multiple 
values and cooperation between multiple stakeholders, examining ethical assumptions 
that must hold for the kinds of decision theoretic arguments discussed in chapters 2-4 to 
have normative force. Several case studies reveal situations where decision science 
cannot provide ethical guidance without norms that delimit reasonable tradeoffs and 
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identify legitimate stakeholders. Such approaches thus have significant limits when used 
in decisions that present ethical dilemmas. 
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Chapter 1:  Definitional Risk and ‘Biodiversity’: Values in Conceptual 
Engineering at the Edge of Biology and Policy 
1.1. Introduction 
Scientific measures and definitions used in applied contexts have non-epistemic 
consequences: their formulation is relevant to the utilities of decision-makers and 
stakeholders. Examples include measures and definitions of health and disease, poverty, 
economic welfare, the toxicity of regulated chemicals, and risk more generally.1 This 
chapter illustrates how non-epistemic values2 (hereafter, values) can affect scientific 
measures and definitions by examining their roles in defining ‘biodiversity’ and 
measuring biological diversity in conservation biology. 
Douglas (2000, 2009) and others have argued that the existence of “inductive 
risks,” non-epistemic risks associated with rejecting a true hypothesis or failing to reject a 
false hypothesis (type-I and type-II error, respectively), entails a necessary role for values 
in the appraisal of scientific hypotheses in applied contexts. This chapter makes a 
companion argument that the existence of definitional risks, non-epistemic risks 
associated with conceptual engineering and operationalization for measurement, entail 
distinct and equally necessary roles for values in applied science. Here I argue that the 
multiple ways of construing ‘biodiversity’ and measuring biological diversity raises the 
problem of definitional risk for conservation biology. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 distinguishes between inductive risks 
and definitional risks in applied science, shows why they are distinct, and gives examples 
                                                
1 Since risk is usually defined as the probability of disutility, or an expectation of disutility, how risk is 
measured and assessed will affect utilities when used in policy or decision-making. 
2 Epistemic or cognitive values include simplicity and explanatory/predictive power. Non-epistemic values 
(sometimes called “contextual values”) include social, ethical, and aesthetic values. See Douglas (2009, ch. 
5). 
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of both from conservation biology. Section 3 locates definitional risk in the context of 
defining ‘biodiversity’ and measuring biological diversity. Distinguishing concepts of 
richness, disparity, complementarity, evenness, and rarity across the biological hierarchy 
motivates pluralism about biodiversity concepts independent of pluralism in taxonomy. 
This shows that biodiversity cannot be captured by a single measure, raising the problem 
of definitional risk for single measures as well as composite indices that must make 
tradeoffs between several measures. Section 4 considers as a case study the axiomatic 
approach to constructing diversity functions from sets of pairwise differences of 
Weitzman (1992) and Gerber (2011). I argue that these axioms raise definitional risk in 
multiple ways and are consistent with many possible tradeoffs between richness and 
disparity. Section 5 closes by arguing that conservationists actually interested in 
biological composition should not appeal to the rhetoric of biodiversity. 
1.2. Inductive and Definitional Risk 
1.2.1. TWO KINDS OF RISKS IN APPLIED SCIENCE 
The arguments from inductive and definitional risk are meant to show that values 
play necessary roles in applied science. The argument from inductive risk (1.2.2.) shows 
that values are necessary in setting the burden of proof for uncertain hypotheses in the 
face of possible disutility. That is, risks of error in an applied context play a role in 
determining how much evidence we require for a scientific claim in that context. The 
argument from definitional risk (1.2.3.) shows that values are necessary for determining 
our choices of a conventional definition (e.g. who counts as sick or poor, what counts as 
toxic, which species count as endangered, etc.) in the face of possible disutility. That is, 
risks in an applied context play a role in determining a term’s conventional meaning. This 
 11 
section clarifies inductive and definitional risk, offers examples of both, and shows why 
they are distinct. 
1.2.2. INDUCTIVE RISK 
Douglas (2000, 2009) has argued, following Rudner (1953), Hempel (1965) and 
others, that if non-epistemic risks are associated with accepting a false hypothesis or 
rejecting a true hypothesis, values must play an indirect role in setting standards of 
acceptance and rejection. That is, in applying uncertain scientific claims to a decision 
(e.g. in making policy), the stakes of that decision should influence what we take to be 
sufficient evidence to believe a claim.3 The argument is best stated using an example. 
Douglas (2000) considers the case of a hypothesis about the toxicity of dioxins and the 
decision to regulate these chemicals. Here the focus will be an example from 
conservation biology, namely uncertain estimates of extinction probabilities of a species 
of conservation concern derived from a population viability analysis (PVA) and the 
decision to stop or continue resource extraction in an area of the species’ habitat.4 
As Boyce (1992), Ludwig (1999), and others have argued, there is massive 
uncertainty associated with the results of PVAs, which can be due to scarce or poor data, 
sensitivity of results to model parameters that are difficult to estimate, and sensitivity of 
results to model assumptions that abstract away the complexities of actual populations 
and environments. Such complexities may include, among others, high variance in 
mortality and reproductive rates, demographic structure, spatial structure, multi-species 
interactions, and genetic effects (e.g. the effects of inbreeding). Demographic or 
                                                
3 This argument parallels arguments for contextualism about knowledge (see, e.g. Stanley 2005). For a 
history of this argument in the philosophy of science literature, see Douglas (2009). 
4 For reviews of population viability analysis, see Boyce (1992) and the papers in Beissinger and 
McCollough (2002). Beissinger and Westphal (1998) review the use of PVAs in endangered species 
management. 
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environmental “catastrophes” and other low-probability events that may raise or lower 
extinction probabilities are also difficult to incorporate into PVA models. Such 
uncertainties led Ludwig (1999) to argue that PVA results are often meaningless due to 
large confidence intervals, although Fieberg and Ellner (2000) argue that PVA results 
may be meaningful over short timescales. Here we will assume that the timescale is short 
relative to the time series data available, but of course there is still uncertainty associated 
with the estimated extinction probabilities. 
Let us assume the statistical framework of classical hypothesis testing, and 
assume that our null hypothesis is that there is no difference between extinction 
probabilities in the conservation scenario in which the relevant area of habitat is left 
alone and the extraction scenario in which it is not. Such an analysis could be based on 
comparison of time series data from two different habitat patches, one that is intact and 
another where extraction takes place. An example of a similar analysis is found in 
Lindenmayer et al. (1993), where PVA is used to compare extinction probabilities for 
Leadbeater’s possum (Gymnobelideus leadbeateri) when carrying capacity is or is not 
reduced by forestry practices.5 We imagine that a one-sided statistical test tests whether 
greater extinction probability in the extraction scenario relative to the conservation 
scenario is merely due to chance. Our “significance level” α gives the upper threshold 
probability of our data were the null hypothesis true such that we reject the null 
hypothesis. Crucially, we assume that in this applied context, rejecting the null 
hypothesis constitutes a claim that extraction should be stopped. 
Setting α relatively high will lower the burden of proof for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, creating a higher probability of a false positive (type-I error), claiming that 
                                                
5 See also Newman and Pilson’s (1997) laboratory experiments on the plant Clarkia pulchella, where they 
established that decreased effective population size would lead to an increase in probability of extinction. 
Here they compared estimated extinction probabilities for two experimental populations. 
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extraction will raise extinction probability when it will not. Setting α relatively low will 
raise the burden of proof for rejecting the null hypothesis, creating a higher probability of 
a false negative (type-II error), claiming that extraction will not raise extinction 
probability when it will. Absent the prohibitively costly option of raising the statistical 
power of our experiment by increasing sample sizes, we must choose where to set the 
burden of proof. The claim is then that values must play a role in trading off type-I and 
type-II error in these cases. Not stopping extraction when it will be potentially disastrous 
for the endangered species risks species loss, while stopping extraction when it will not 
significantly affect extinction probability imposes an unnecessary cost on society. 
Responses seeking to quarantine the role of values are easy to anticipate. One 
might claim, following Jeffrey’s (1956) treatment, that we need not “accept” or “reject” 
this hypothesis at all, but merely hold it with degree of credence p, as the result of a 
Bayesian statistical analysis. This information can then be fed into a decision theoretic 
analysis, which would of course include values or utilities. One might respond to the 
classical hypothesis-testing example by claiming that as long as researchers report their 
p-values (the probability of the data were the null hypothesis true), they need not even 
engage in talk of statistical significance. 
One response to these arguments admits that non-epistemic values are 
epistemically silent in the “pure” scientific process, as opposed to the applied scientific 
process that interacts with policy and decision-making. As Douglas (2009) shows, this 
was a widespread and popular view among postwar philosophers of science. For 
example, Jeffrey (1956) argued that it was not a scientist’s job qua scientist to accept or 
reject hypotheses, but merely to hand over uninterpreted experimental results to decision-
makers. While Douglas argues against this “value-free” ideal of science by appealing to 
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ethical claims about the general responsibilities of scientists qua humans to consider the 
risks of error, it is not the purpose of this chapter to enter this particular ethical dispute.  
The important point that both sides should be able to agree on is that the argument 
from inductive risk shows that values play an indispensible role in applied science. 
Applied scientists work in a context in which their results will potentially be used in 
making policy. Whether the scientists themselves take up setting the burden of proof, or 
the task is handed over to policymakers, it requires appealing to the values at stake in the 
relevant decision. It is worth reiterating in this context that probabilities derived from 
PVAs are associated with uncertainty that is difficult to quantify due to the fact that they 
rely on idealized models. Thus the suggestion that we simply believe the relevant 
hypothesis with some indeterminate credence p and use this probability in a decision 
analysis oversimplifies the epistemic situation. The scientists or policymakers must make 
a decision about whether and how much to rely on the results of the PVA in the first 
place. This is an epistemic decision whose outcome will depend on the quality of the 
science and the stakes. 
1.2.3. DEFINITIONAL RISK 
The argument from definitional risk does not appeal to uncertainty in accepting or 
rejecting hypotheses, but rather to the conventionality of certain definitions and 
operationalizations for measurement in applied science. The argument is that if the use of 
different conventional applied scientific definitions or measures affects the utilities of 
decision-makers or stakeholders, these “definitional risks” should be taken into account 
in determining the definition or measure used in the applied context. The problem is 
particularly pronounced in medicine and psychiatry, as well as the social sciences. For 
example, governments may use economists’ definitions of poverty in distributing the 
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benefits of social programs.6 I will argue below that it is also a deep problem in the case 
of defining ‘biodiversity’ for conservation biology, which is taken by practitioners to be a 
“crisis discipline” analogous to medicine (Soulé 1985; Sarkar 2002). Before moving to 
the case of ‘biodiversity,’ I present three examples of definitional risks in conservation 
biology: risks defining ‘endangered’, ‘species range,’ and ‘evolutionarily significant unit’ 
in assessing the conservation status of populations. 
‘Endangered’: Biologists apply the term ‘endangered’ to species at risk of 
extinction during a particular time period. The U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973 
defines ‘endangered species’ as “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout 
all or a significant portion of its range.” (16 U.S.C. §1532 1973) Whether a particular 
species is in danger of extinction over a particular time frame is presumably a matter of 
fact that may depend on demographic, genetic, and environmental factors. However, the 
level of extinction risk that we deem acceptable for a particular species under the law is a 
normative matter, thus raising the problem of definitional risk for the term ‘endangered,’ 
whose determinate meaning must be established for any particular applied scientific 
context. 
This is distinct from the problem of inductive risk, which would arise if we have 
already specified a determinate meaning for the term ‘endangered’ and then have to 
decide in conditions of uncertainty whether we have sufficient evidence to accept the 
hypothesis that a species is endangered. The problem of deductive risk may arise even in 
the (practically impossible) case where we have complete information on a species’ risk 
of extinction. For example, say that know that a species has a 30% chance of extinction in 
the next 100 years. Whether that species should count as ‘endangered’ is a matter of 
                                                
6 The U.S. Federal Government’s Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) lists 32 federal 
programs that use HHS poverty guidelines to determine eligibility to receive benefits (See U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 2012). 
 16 
definitional convention that itself raises risks, for example that we may overcautiously 
waste resources protecting this species. 
‘Species range’: Generally biologists use the term ‘species range’ to refer to the 
geographic area where a species may be found. However, there are many ways ‘range’ 
can be construed: current range, historic range (at some point in history), native range 
(which would exclude captive or zoo populations), and potential range (suitable habitat 
that is not currently occupied but could potentially be colonized) are four examples. The 
Endangered Species Act uses the term in its definition of endangered species (see above), 
but does not specify which sense of ‘range’ is meant. 
Vucetich et al. (2006, 1387) discuss the risks of equating range with current 
range: by ignoring the fact that the ranges of many species have been massively reduced 
by human activities, species with relatively low risk of extinction on very small current 
ranges may be delisted. While this is true, the other senses of range also carry definitional 
risks in this context. Using historic range may lead to many non-endangered species 
being listed, since some species with large stable populations have already experienced 
local extinction on large swaths of their historic range, for example the gray wolf (Canis 
lupus). Using historic range also raises the problem of specifying a reasonable timescale, 
again raising the problem of definitional risk in an applied context. The point is that since 
risk of extinction on current vs. historical ranges may vary widely, the definition of 
‘range’ that is used in assessing risk of extinction will have downstream consequences for 
conservation resource allocation, raising the problem of definitional risk. 
‘Evolutionarily significant units’: A 1978 amendment to ESA allows listing 
“distinct population segments” of vertebrates, where these are local, geographically 
distinct populations that interbreed. The purpose of the amendment was to allow listing of 
locally endangered populations of species that are not globally endangered, for example 
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the bald eagle or the gray wolf in the lower 48 states, even though there were large, stable 
populations in Alaska. The concept of an “evolutionarily significant unit” within a 
species was introduced by Ryder (1986) to refer to groups within species that “represent 
significant adaptive variation.” It was later used by the U.S. National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) to categorize distinct population segments of Pacific salmon for 
protection under ESA (Waples 1991). Waples argued that in order to qualify as a distinct 
population segment, a population should be an evolutionarily significant unit; that is, it 
should be a reproductively isolated, geographically distinct group with unique 
adaptations. This later became official NMFS policy (Pennock and Dimmick 1997). 
Several definitions of ‘evolutionarily significant unit’ were subsequently proposed in the 
biological literature, including definitions that appealed to morphological, phylogenetic, 
and genetic criteria of distinctness. 
Pennock and Dimmick (1997) argue that the use of such definitions to identify 
distinct population segments for protection carries the risk that the original intent of the 
1978 amendment would be lost. For example, if populations of bald eagles in the lower 
48 states did not display unique adaptations, then they would not have counted as an 
evolutionarily significant unit. More importantly, while it is a matter of fact whether a 
particular population has adaptations that other conspecific populations do not, whether 
such adaptations should matter to conservation prioritization is a normative matter. Thus 
the applied use of any particular ‘evolutionarily significant unit’ concept, whether it relies 
on morphological, genetic, phylogenetic, or other criteria, implies definitional risk. 
These three examples illustrate that definitional risks arise throughout 
conservation biology, which as an applied science must deal with both facts (what is the 
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risk that the Bengal tiger will go extinct in the next 100 years?) and values (how should 
we prioritize Bengal tiger conservation?).7 
Inductive risks and definitional risks are distinct. Inductive risks arise when 
evaluating an uncertain hypothesis is relevant to a decision, and we appeal to values in 
setting the burden of proof. Definitional risks arise at the stages of concept determination 
and operationalization for measurement (e.g. a rule for classifying a particular individual 
as poor or not-poor, or a species as endangered or not-endangered), thus affecting data 
gathering, modeling, and the formulation of hypotheses themselves. Here, values are 
consulted at this distinct stage in the scientific process. 
While Douglas (2000) claims that systematic characterization of ambiguous data 
carries inductive risk (in her example, whether something should be counted as a tumor), 
I claim that they are better characterized as cases of definitional risk. Choosing a 
determinate extension or conventional meaning for a vague or general term raises distinct 
problems that should be kept separate from the argument from inductive risk, which 
relies on the role of values in setting the burden of proof or acceptance once a hypothesis 
is already formulated and tested. Similarly, in their wide-ranging discussion of what they 
call “methodological value judgments” in ecology, Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993) 
do not distinguish inductive risk from definitional risk. 
                                                
7 Elliott (2009) and Schiappa (1996) provide additional examples of definitional risks, although they do not 
use this terminology. Elliott focuses on cases from pollution research, arguing that linguistic and 
definitional choices surrounding the study of endocrine disruption, multiple chemical sensitivity, and 
chemical hormesis have downstream effects that are directly relevant to policy. For example, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency defines an endocrine disruptor as any agent that “interferes” with the 
endocrine system, whereas the World Health Organization and agencies in Europe require demonstration of 
harm due to interference in the endocrine system. The latter definition clearly creates a higher burden of 
proof for whether a chemical should count as an endocrine disruptor, potentially affecting regulatory 
policy. Schiappa shows how the U.S. Federal definition of the ecological term ‘wetland’ was intentionally 
shifted for political reasons. George H.W. Bush had made a campaign promise that there would be “no net 
loss of wetlands” during his administration. In 1991 the administration produced a document bearing the 
name of the agencies charged with protecting wetlands that reduced by roughly a third the acreage that 
would count as wetlands in the lower 48 states. 
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I now turn to definitions of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity in 
conservation biology, arguing that pluralism about biodiversity concepts raises the 
problem of definitional risk, particularly in the applied context of conservation 
prioritization. 
1.3. Biodiversity Pluralism and Definitional Risk 
1.3.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The term ‘biodiversity’ was coined in the 1980s as a portmanteau of ‘biological 
diversity’ in an explicitly political context by scientists worried about the largely 
anthropogenic loss of species and ecosystems in the 20th century (Wilson 1988, Tackacs 
1996).8 However, ‘biological diversity’ as a theoretical term in the life sciences had 
existed at least since the 1950s (Magurran 2004), and human interest in natural variety is 
arguably as old as biology, or perhaps even as old as our species’ cognitive capacities for 
classification (Oksanen 2004). ‘Biodiversity’ has since become a term used widely by life 
scientists, environmental philosophers, policymakers, journalists, and environmental 
activists. The conservation of biodiversity as such, as a more general objective distinct 
from the conservation of particular species, ecosystems, or landscape features, has 
become the stated goal of many conservation organizations, as well as signatory nations 
to the 1992 Rio Summit’s Convention on Biological Diversity.9 
1.3.2. BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITIES 
Here, biodiversity pluralism is the view that there are multiple, incompatible ways 
of defining ‘biodiversity’ and measuring biological diversity. Such pluralism may arise in 
at least three places: (i) in biological taxonomy, where there exist multiple species 
                                                
8 See also Janzen (1986) and Soulé (1985). 
9 See Glowka et al. (1996). 
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concepts and strategies of classification (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, 32-33); (ii) in 
concepts of biodiversity, where there are distinct measures of variety, difference, and the 
biological diversity of a particular area; and (iii) in the mathematical operationalizations 
or formulations of these biodiversity concepts. 
This section will focus primarily on type-(ii) pluralism, while the next section will 
focus on type-(ii) and type-(iii). While Koricheva and Siipi (2006) follow DeLong (1996) 
in stressing a strong distinction between conceptual definitions and operational measures 
of biodiversity, the two are clearly interrelated. Conceptualizations of biodiversity guide 
measurement strategies, and widely used metrics are often adopted as working 
definitions, for example species richness in Maclaurin and Sterelny’s (2008) discussion 
of biodiversity. The discussion below traces this relationship by extracting a family of 
central concepts from the variety of metrics used by conservation biologists to measure 
biodiversity. 
The most expansive—and, as Sarkar (2005) and others have pointed out, 
unhelpful—explicit definition of ‘biodiversity’ is that it is the variety of life at all levels 
of taxonomic and functional organization. This is particularly useless in the applied 
context since it is impossible to conserve all of life. Thus Sarkar and users of the 
systematic conservation planning framework (Margules and Sarkar 2007) take defining 
biodiversity in the applied context to involve identifying “constituents” of biodiversity: 
favored alleles, organisms, populations, species, or communities whose existence and 
persistence across space and time may be tracked for the purposes of conservation and 
management.10 It should not be controversial that the selection of biodiversity 
constituents in this sense depends on our values: we would not target disease organisms 
                                                
10 Biodiversity constituents should be distinguished from surrogates, which are biotic or abiotic measures 
putatively correlated with units of conservation concern. See Margules and Sarkar (2007). 
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for conservation management, for example. However, the focus here is not on the 
selection of constituents, but rather the way the diversity of a biota is measured given 
some background set of biological or ecological “units” or systems.11 
In this context, it is best to start with the practices of conservation biologists. 
Sarkar (2002) argued that we should take ‘biodiversity’ to be implicitly defined by the 
practices of conservation biologists, particularly the metrics and algorithms used by 
conservation biologists to prioritize areas for some variety of conservation management. 
Sarkar goes on to argue that these algorithms can be represented by a family of closely 
related concepts, captured by rarity and complementarity (a measure of the new units 
added to some background set of areas; see below). However he also admits that this 
view straightforwardly entails a kind of pluralism, since ‘biodiversity’ has been given 
countless definitions and operationalizations by conservation biologists and ecologists, 
and area prioritization algorithms used by planners are also many and varied. 
Putting aside prioritization algorithms, the technical surveys of biodiversity 
measurement found in Gaston (1996), Magurran (2004), and Magurran and McGill 
(2011), reveal a wide variety of measures and indices, including simple species counts 
(usually called species richness or α-diversity), relative abundance or evenness metrics, 
measures of commonness and rarity, indices of compositional differences between areas 
(β-diversity), and measures of functional, trait, and phylogenetic disparity. As mentioned 
                                                
11 This constituents-based approach is similar to the approach advocated by Maclaurin and Sterelny, where 
biodiversity is defined in terms of the number of biological units and the differences between them. While 
Maclaurin and Sterelny defend the common practice of using species as the core “unit” of biodiversity, 
units might in principle be taken at multiple scales. Some measure of difference or disparity between units 
(whether phylogenetic, functional/trait-based, etc.) is also necessary to capture the idea of biodiversity. 
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above, the pluralism runs deeper, since within most of these conceptual classes, many 
mathematical and statistical frameworks have been proposed.12 
For this analysis of definitional risk, we may follow Sarkar’s general approach, 
but focus more widely on the central concepts used by conservation biologists to define 
diversity. Given a particular taxonomic or functional unit of analysis (e.g. species or 
ecosystem), or a set of constituents, measuring the biodiversity of a particular area may 
take into account the following criteria, either individually or by combining measures in a 
composite index: 
1. Richness: the number of units. Other things being equal, an area with more units 
(e.g. more distinct species) is more diverse than an area with fewer units. 
2. Disparity: the differences between the units. Imagine two areas with the same 
species richness, but where the first area has many species that are closely related 
phylogenetically, while the second area has many species that are more 
phylogenetically disparate. Other things being equal, the second area is more 
biodiverse. While Faith (1992) and others advocate phylogenetic measures of 
disparity, other measures used include disparity of DNA sequence and 
morphological disparity, especially within a clade where a local “morphospace” 
may be constructed (Raup 1966; Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008, ch. 4; see the 
discussion of Neige 2003 below). 
                                                
12 For example, in a study of the concept of ecological diversity, which encompasses both the richness and 
relative abundance or evenness of species in an ecological community, Justus (2010) evaluates eleven 
distinct indices that take species richness and evenness into account. In their review of compositional 
similarity and β-diversity, Jost et al. (2011) list two incidence-based and eleven abundance-based similarity 
indices, which measure the similarity of two or more species assemblages. Velland et al. (2011) review 
indices of phylogenetic diversity, noting that conservation biologists and community ecologists have been 
using distinct types of measures with some overlap. For the first type of index (they list five in this class), a 
distinctness score is calculated for species in a superset phylogeny and then a function aggregates these 
scores for particular local subsets. The second type of index (of which they list four), distinctness scores 
depend only on these local phylogenies. 
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3. Complementarity: the number of new (distinct) units of an area relative to a 
background set. Other things being equal, an area with more distinct units adds 
more diversity to the total set than an area with less distinct units. Here related 
measures of the compositional difference between areas (β-diversity) are 
appropriate.13 
4. Evenness: uniformity of the relative abundance of units. Imagine two areas with 
the same number of species, but in one area a single species dominates the 
ecosystem. Other things being equal, the area with a more even distribution (e.g. 
40% species A, 30% species B, 30% species C) is more diverse than the area with 
a more skewed distribution (e.g. 90% species A, 9% species B, 1% species C). 
5. Rarity: how rare the units are. Different kinds of rarity include abundance rarity 
(when there are few organisms of a species left), geographical rarity (endemics 
with limited range), and temporal rarity (a biological event that only happens 
rarely). An area with rare or endemic species is more diverse than one without, 
other things being equal. 
1.3.3. DEFINITIONAL RISKS AND ‘BIODIVERSITY’ 
The above list of central concepts used in measuring biodiversity for its 
conservation shows that biodiversity cannot be fully captured by a single measure, 
although single measures are often convenient to use in practice. Most importantly, notice 
the consistent use of the phrase “other things being equal” above. For any single measure 
of biodiversity M(.), there may exist some other measure N(.) such that, for areas p and q, 
M(p) > M(q), but N(q) > N(p) such that we judge that overall, q is more biodiverse than 
                                                
13 For a history of complementarity in designing conservation areas, see Sarkar (2012b). 
 24 
p: O(q) > O(p). For example, p might have slightly higher species richness than q, but q 
contains many more rare species than p. 
Hughes et al. (2002) provide a more concrete example by showing that there is 
low concordance between species richness and centers of endemic fish and coral species 
in Indo-Pacific coral reefs. Analyzing a geographical database containing the ranges of 
727 species of Indo-Pacific scleractinin corals and 1766 species of reef fishes, Hughes et 
al. looked at the relationship between species richness and endemism at 65 localities 
across the Indo-Pacific region. Whether endemism was defined as the lowest 10th 
percentile of ranges in each major taxon, or in terms of an absolute area cutoff (they used 
500,000 km2, which identified 7% of corals and 28% of fishes as endemic), centers of 
high endemism and areas of high species richness were not found to be concordant for 
either corals or reef fishes. While they found strong correlation between overall species 
richness of corals and reef fishes, they found that lower diversity regions tended to have 
more endemics. This pattern is partly explained by the fact that the ranges of the most 
widespread corals and reef fishes tend to overlap near the equator, creating areas of high 
species richness where endemics are relatively less abundant. 
In general, then, for any particular landscape or seascape, it would be implausible 
to assume without taxa-specific evidence that these multiple measures of diversity would 
be correlated. While area-specific biological and ecological knowledge can ameliorate 
the problem, definitional risk will arise whenever a single measure (e.g. species richness) 
is used in an applied context, since that measure may not capture all the aspects of 
biodiversity we care about (e.g. endemic species). Indeed, Hughes et al. conclude that the 
results of their study of corals and fishes suggest a “two-pronged” approach to reef 
conservation that takes both endemism and species richness into account. 
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Whatever underlying justifications for conserving biodiversity we accept, whether 
a duty to current or future generations of humans or to other species themselves, and/or 
the maximization of option value,14 etc., there will be aspects of biodiversity that are 
more important than others. For example, efficiently maximizing option value may entail 
taking (at least) rarity, richness, and disparity into account. Thus a particular definition of 
‘biodiversity’ used to prioritize areas to maximize option value that took only richness 
into account would entail significant definitional risk. In the case of Indo-Pacific coral 
reefs, we have evidence that a richness measure used for prioritization would not capture 
geographical rarity or endemism. Whether our measure should prioritize endemics 
depends on what our goals and values are in the applied context: this is the problem of 
definitional risk. To be justified, any use of such a one-dimensional measure in an applied 
context would have to be accompanied by evidence that all other important or valued 
properties were, at least roughly, equal. 
Problems associated with using a single measure may motivate us to construct an 
index of biodiversity that takes multiple types of data into account, for example richness 
and disparity. Definitional risk arises here too, since defining quantitative indices 
involves making tradeoffs between the properties we wish to take into account. Making 
these tradeoffs will necessarily involve appealing to the values at stake in the applied 
context. 
Morgan (2010) points out this problem for Maclaurin and Sterelny’s units-and-
differences approach by considering the case of trading off units (richness) and 
differences (disparity). To illustrate, Morgan poses the following thought experiment. 
Which set of numbers is more diverse, {2, 5, 9, 13} or {3, 25, 27}? Assume the natural 
                                                
14 Option value is the value we attach to conserving a resource (in this case, biological resources) so that 
we might retain the option of using it later (whether for scientific, aesthetic, economic, or other purposes). 
See Randall (1986). 
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measure of the disparity of a single set of numbers is just the sum of the positive 
differences between all the members. On this definition, the first set has 37 differences 
and four units; while the second set has 46 differences but only three units. If we judge 
the first more diverse, then one extra unit is “worth” nine differences, whereas if the 
second is more diverse, nine differences are “worth” more than one new unit. As Morgan 
(2010, 618) writes, “Whichever way we go involves a value judgment.” 
Morgan’s argument is that if our overall assessments of biodiversity involve 
taking multiple criteria into account, any composite quantitative index intended to capture 
these judgments will involve trading off the multiple criteria. He does not present an 
argument that such tradeoffs will necessarily involve value judgments, but framing the 
problem in terms of definitional risk fills this gap. 
Consider again the example of conserving biodiversity to maximize option value. 
Perhaps disparity would have to be weighted heavily relative to rarity and richness, since 
we judge that a more disparate but less rich biota retains more option value than a richer 
but less disparate biota. Here we must appeal to our values, in this case the underlying 
justification of biodiversity conservation, to make judgments about tradeoffs. In the 
example of Indo-Pacific coral reefs, any operational definition of ‘biodiversity’ for 
prioritization that would attempt to take species richness and endemism into account 
would be forced to trade these off. 
Another empirical example of low concordance between multiple biodiversity 
criteria is provided by the dataset from Neige’s (2003) study of the biogeography of Old 
World Sepiids or cuttlefish (Cephalopoda). Neige compiled occurrence data on 111 
species of Sepiids from genera Metasepia, Sepia, and Sepiella, and arranged them into 
biogeographical units A-Q (see Figure 1) using as boundaries areas where multiple 
species’ ranges meet. Data on 102 specimens’ cuttlebone shape, representing 102 species, 
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were used to construct a theoretical morphospace of possible cuttlebone geometries, 
using landmark-based geometrical morphometrics (Rohlf and Marcus 1993). 
“Landmarks” here were 15 loci on the ventral view of the cuttlebone that describe its 
shape, chosen because they were either junctions between major parts of the cuttlebone, 
centroids, or intersections of curves with a plane of symmetry. Thus the raw data 
consisted of 30 variables (X and Y coordinates of 15 landmarks) for each of the 102 
species. Variations across landmark loci were represented in axes of a multidimensional 
“morphospace.” Figure 2 plots species richness against “total variance,” the sum of 
variances across axes in the morphospace, an index of morphological disparity. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Geographical Regions of Sepiid Diversity and Disparity. From Neige (2003, 




Figure 1.2. Species Richness vs. Total Morphological Variance of Sepiids from 
Biogeographical Regions A-Q in Fig. 1. From Neige (2003, 1134). Used 
with permission of Wiley-Blackwell. 
As Neige notes, there is no simple relationship between cuttlefish species richness 
and this measure of morphological disparity: richness simply does not predict disparity. 
Area C off of the southwestern coast of Africa has the highest total variance but low 
species richness. Area O off the northeast coast of Australia (from the Tropic of 
Capricorn to Exmouth Gulf including the south coast of New Guinea) has the highest 
species richness but ranks below five other areas in disparity. Thus if we were to attempt 
to construct a quantitative index of overall Sepiid biodiversity of a area that took richness 
and morphological disparity into account, this index would have to trade off richness and 
disparity. How these tradeoffs should be structured depends on what we intend to do with 
this index, necessitating an appeal to our goals and values. 
To summarize, this section has presented the following argument: 
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1. The practices of conservation biologists and our judgments about the relative 
biodiversity of areas entail pluralism about biodiversity, where the concepts of 
richness, complementarity, evenness, rarity, and disparity play important roles in 
defining ‘biodiversity’; 
2. Any applied definition of ‘biodiversity’ (e.g. for prioritization) may take one or 
more of these central concepts into account; 
a. If only one measure (e.g. species richness) is used in an applied context, 
definitional risks arise, since other measures may contain information 
relevant to the values at stake; 
b. If multiple measures are used or aggregated into a composite index in an 
applied context, definitional risks arise, since making tradeoffs between 
multiple measures must appeal to the values at stake; 
3. Therefore defining ‘biodiversity’ in an applied context carries definitional risk. 
To reiterate an important point from the previous section, I have not here argued 
that it is in principle impossible to measure biological diversity or define ‘biodiversity’ 
without appealing to non-epistemic values. The discussion here leaves open the 
possibility of value-neutral theories of biodiversity as specified in some way. For 
example, the correct explanation(s) for the latitudinal gradient in species richness will not 
depend on the values of the investigators. However, the social and political contexts of 
the study of biodiversity, particularly the use of biodiversity concepts in policy and in 
allocating scarce conservation resources, necessitates care in locating roles for values in 
the applied scientific process. This discussion has located a role for values in defining 
‘biodiversity’ and measuring biological diversity, since such definitions will entail 
definitional risk in applied contexts. The next section considers as a case study of 
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definitional risk the axiomatic approach to constructing diversity functions over sets of 
pairwise differences originally proposed by Weitzman (1992). 
1.4. Case Study: Weitzman’s Axioms 
This section considers in more detail the problem of definitional risk in defining 
biodiversity by considering axioms proposed by Weitzman (1992) for diversity functions 
that take sets of pairwise difference values and return a diversity value of the set. 
Definitional risk arises here due to the third type of pluralism described above, pluralism 
of mathematical operationalizations of biodiversity concepts. I first present the axioms 
and show how their acceptance leads to definitional risk. I also argue that many tradeoffs 
between units and differences are compatible with these axioms, a choice which also 
carries definitional risk in applied contexts. 
Gerber (2011), following Weitzman’s (1992) original treatment, takes the axioms 
below to be desiderata for diversity functions V(.) that take sets Q of pairwise distance 
values d(i, j), representing the difference between units i and j, and return a diversity 
value (where Q\i denotes the set Q without unit i). Gerber and Weitzman take the units to 
be species, where disparity values could be generated via DNA hybridization 
experiments, comparison of DNA sequences, comparison of location in a theoretical 
morphospace, etc.15 However, I present these axioms using the more general term ‘units.’ 
1. Montotonicity in units: When a new unit is added to the set, diversity should 
increase. ∀i, d(i, Q\i) > 0 → V(Q) > V(Q\i). 
2. Twin property: Diversity should not increase if the added unit is identical to one 
already in the set. i, j ∈ Q; k, l ∈ E; E ∩ Q = ∅; and E ! Q is the total set of 
                                                
15 It should be noted that the use of any of these methods of measuring disparity requires justification. 
Whether there are non-arbitrary ways of quantifying, for example, morphological or genetic differences 
between species in distant clades, is not a question I will attempt to answer here. 
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units. If d(i, k) = 0, d(i, j) = d(k, j) ∀j in Q and d(i, l) = d(k, l) ∀l in E, then V(Q 
! k) = V(Q). 
3. Continuity in distances: V(Q) is continuous in distances. Sets of units S and S′ 
contain N units each; S′ is a function of S, such that ψ(S) ≡ S′. Define ψ(Q) ≡ Q′, 
both containing N–k units. Then ∀ε > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that if ∑∑|d(i, j) − d(ψ(i), 
ψ(j))| < δ, then |V(Q)−V(Q′)| < ε. 
4. Monotonicity in distances: V(O) is monotonic in distances. For sets of units S and 
S′, and Q and Q′, with N − k ≥ 2 and ψ(.) as defined above. Then d(ψ(i), ψ(j)) ≥ 
d(i, j) ∀i, j ∈ Q and i ≠ j, entail that |V(Q′)| ≥ |V(Q)|. 
5. Favor the most distantly related units: If d(1, i) > d(2, i) ∀i∈Q\1\2 and 1, 2 ∈ Q, 
then V(Q\2) > V(Q\1). 
Acceptance of these axioms entails definitional risk, especially Axioms 1, 2, and 
5. The first axiom states that diversity should increase when a new unit is added to the 
set. We may want this axiom to fail of our measure depending on the unit (e.g. species) 
under consideration: in the applied context, not all new species will lead to greater 
diversity. For example, if the added species is extremely common, or if we have some 
evidence that the added species may lead to a decline in the biodiversity of the region 
over the long term (consider the introduction of domesticated cats or an invasive plant), 
our judgments of overall diversity may fail this axiom. If monotonicity in units fails, then 
monotonicity in distances will also fail, since the introduction of a new (distinct) unit i 
entails that there exists a j such that d(i,j) > 0. 
The second axiom entails definitional risk insofar as it formally rules out taking 
relative abundance data into account, since it states that adding the occurrence of an 
already-occurring species should not change the overall diversity value of the set. 
Common measures of ecological diversity (for example, those based on Shannon’s 
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entropy measure) that take richness and relative abundance into account are maximized 
as evenness is maximized. 
According to Axiom 5, disparity maximizes diversity. Gerber (2011, 2279-2280) 
notes that Axiom 5 “suggests a value judgment pertaining to the optimization problem at 
hand.” More than a suggestion, it is a value judgment when this measure is used in an 
applied context, namely the judgment that disparity is valuable. It is worth stressing here 
that disparity itself may be defined and measured in multiple ways, and the use of a 
particular disparity metric (e.g. phylogenetic disparity) will carry definitional risk, since it 
may or may not capture the property or properties we care about. In general, since these 
axioms apply to diversity functions over sets of pairwise differences, the use of other 
types of data (relative abundance or evenness data, or data on rarity, etc.) are formally 
ruled out from this type of analysis, entailing definitional risk when we have some 
valuation over variation in these properties.  
Because the order units are input into the function can change a set’s overall 
diversity value, Weitzman’s function VW() that he proves satisfies these axioms is 
recursively defined as the maximum for all i in Q of VW(Q\i) + d(i, Q\i), which is unique 
when VW(i) = d0 ∀i, where d0 = 0 or any other constant. While Weitzman’s function is 
plausible, any function (linear, exponential, logarithmic, hyperbolic, etc.) that is 
monotonic, continuous, and increasing in the addition of species and differences will 
satisfy these axioms. Since new units added to a set will have positive difference values 
paired with units already in the set, richness is also taken into account albeit indirectly. 
These various functions will represent different tradeoffs between adding new units and 
the differences between that new unit and the set. Insofar as a function satisfying these 
axioms does not satisfy other properties we may desire, for example decreasing marginal 
diversity of additional units added to a set, its use will entail definitional risk. 
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1.5. Biological Diversity and Biological Composition 
1.5.1. ‘BIODIVERSITY’: SCIENCE OR POLITICS? 
The scientists who originally introduced the term ‘biodiversity’ and its extremely 
catholic usage were almost certainly motivated more by political concerns than by 
scientific concerns. After all, if biodiversity is defined as the variety of life at all levels of 
organization, it becomes impossible to make scientific generalizations about biodiversity 
in general, as opposed to biological diversity as specified, for example in terms of species 
richness. Consider two descriptive studies, one that describes heterogeneity at a locus in a 
population of humans, and one that describes heterogeneity in species composition 
between habitat patches in tropical rainforest. According to the catholic usage (for 
example the consensus definition given in DeLong 1996),16 these two studies are 
describing the same thing, or perhaps “aspects” of the same thing, namely biodiversity. 
This seems bizarre, given that the two studies are clearly looking at heterogeneity of very 
distinct systems at vastly different scales. 
On the other hand, the introduction of the term could have had some heuristic 
value for biologists, since it focuses attention on heterogeneity as a central explanandum 
of the life sciences. Diversity properties have had limited success as explanantia, as the 
stalemate in the diversity-stability debate attests (Sarkar 2007). More often they figure as 
phenomena to be explained. For example, the increase in species diversity during the 
Cambrian explosion (500 mya) presents an explanatory challenge to macroevolutionists 
and paleontologists. In microevolutionary studies, the maintenance of genetic diversity 
                                                
16 DeLong’s definition, based on consulting more than 80 published definitions: “Biodiversity is a state or 
attribute of a site or area and specifically refers to the variety within and among living organisms, 
assemblages of living organisms, biotic communities, and biotic processes, whether naturally occurring or 
modified by humans. Biodiversity can be measured in terms of genetic diversity and the identity and 
number of different types of species, assemblages of species, biotic communities, and biotic processes, and 
the amount (e.g., abundance, biomass, cover, rate) and structure of each. It can be observed and measured 
at any spatial scale ranging from microsites and habitat patches to the entire biosphere.” 
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within populations became an explanatory problem after 20th century molecular 
techniques revealed more heterogeneity than many biologists had expected. As 
mentioned above, the latitudinal gradient in species richness also presents an interesting 
biogeographical explanandum. 
The main political purpose of the introduction of ‘biodiversity’ was to focus 
attention on the loss of variety of species and ecosystems in general, as opposed to loss 
of particularly useful or charismatic species. By focusing on the value of maintaining 
diversity in general, specific justifications for conserving particular units, for example 
preventing the extinction of a migratory songbird in central Texas, become less 
important. Taking the conservation of biodiversity as a general goal also provides 
justification for conserving areas that probably contain undiscovered and unstudied 
species, tropical rainforests being a striking example. 
One might argue that this strategy is problematic because no one believes it is 
either possible or desirable to conserve all species and ecosystems. Disease organisms 
and destructive “invasive” species are the best examples of species that we would not 
wish to conserve, at least in situ. But this argument will not work. Proponents of 
biodiversity as a value will respond that the conservation of biodiversity must be weighed 
against other social values such as economic welfare and public health. The analogous 
fact that public health should not be maximized at all costs does not vitiate the value of 
public health. However, there is still reason to doubt that biological conservation should 
be promoted only with reference to the value of biodiversity. This is because the value of 
biodiversity in some areas may be dependent on the value of the particular biological 
systems present in those areas. That is, this value would depend on the biological 
composition of those areas. 
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1.5.2. IS BIODIVERSITY’S VALUE DEPENDENT ON BIOLOGICAL COMPOSITION? 
Biological composition refers to the particular biological systems (genes, 
organisms, species, ecosystems, etc.) that occur in a given area. (Two areas with the same 
species richness may obviously have very different biological compositions.) Landscape 
or seascape managers interested in maintaining ecosystem services like nutrient cycling 
or pollination, or sustaining high biomass yields, or protecting endangered or threatened 
species are more likely to be interested in the biological composition of an area as 
opposed to abstract measures of diversity like species richness. Pollination is only carried 
out by particular species. Biomass yields depend on the particular properties of the 
species being harvested. Anyone interested in preventing the extinction of a particular 
endangered species in situ is interested in maintaining a particular biological 
composition. Measures of diversity might be indirectly relevant to some of these goals. 
For example maintaining a variety of grasses might increase biomass yields in variable 
environmental conditions. However the particular properties of the varieties of grasses, 
in this case their tolerance of various environmental conditions, are what is causally 
relevant to maintaining biomass yields in this case. If it is the particular species present 
and their properties that determine management outcomes, a focus on biodiversity as 
opposed to biological composition is likely to be irrelevant at best, risky at worst. 
Consider an analogy with the value of diversity in human institutions. The reason 
we may value diversity in a university setting, for example, is that people with diverse 
backgrounds and experiences can contribute to the culture of the university by exposing 
each other to different perspectives, preventing the potentially stultifying effects of 
intellectual and cultural homogeneity. However, we implicitly only consider cultures and 
viewpoints within a reasonable range: few would suggest that an undergraduate 
admissions committee always try to accept at least one neo-Nazi in order to maximize the 
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diversity of viewpoints. Thus the value of diversity in human institutions also seems to be 
dependent on facts about the composition of such institutions. We are implicitly 
assuming that people from particular cultural backgrounds can make unique and valuable 
contributions to those institutions. 
I am not making a general argument that maintaining heterogeneity or variety in 
some biological systems should not be one goal among many of conservationists. Indeed, 
the example of the value of undiscovered species, where we know very little about their 
particular properties, seems to show that we may also value biological diversity in ways 
that are only tenuously dependent on facts about biological composition. (The proponent 
of biological composition may argue that unless we know something about the 
undiscovered species, for example that it is a bird or amphibian, we have no reason to 
make any determination of its contribution to the biological value of an area.) Rather, I 
am arguing that when maintaining a particular biological composition is actually what is 
at stake, which seems to describe many cases of biological conservation, conservationists 
should not misleadingly appeal to the rhetoric of biodiversity. 
1.6. Overview and Transition 
This chapter has argued that definitional risk should be distinguished from 
inductive risk, and that definitional risk arises in defining ‘biodiversity’ and measuring 
biological diversity. Inductive risks arise in applied science when we have some 
intermediate degree of credence in a scientific hypothesis and we must set a burden of 
proof for that hypothesis when making a decision in the face of possible disutility. 
Definitional risks arise when definitions of terms used in applied science have 
downstream effects. I argued that definitional risk arises in defining ‘biodiversity’ due to 
its multifarious nature. I referred to empirical evidence that richness and endemism and 
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richness and disparity can come apart, necessitating tradeoffs in composite indices of 
biodiversity. Finally, I considered a case study of axioms proposed for diversity 
functions, arguing that their acceptance may entail definitional risk, and argued that in 
some cases biological composition should be more important to conservationists than 
biological diversity. 
The list of biodiversity criteria above, as well as the discussion of biological 
diversity and biological composition, both motivate multi-criteria approaches to 
biological conservation decisions. The next chapter discusses solutions to multi-criteria 




Chapter 2:  Constructing Commensurability: Tradeoffs, Practical 
Rationality, and Common Scales of Value 
 
An emphasis on trade-offs in domesticated nature shifts the message of 
conservation from “No growth” or “Keep humans out” to “Be thoughtful about 
how humans conduct their lives and livelihoods.” A key challenge for 
conservation science, then, is an accurate depiction of the many trade-offs that 
people face as they select and shape nature’s future. (Karieva and Marvier, 2011, 
22) 
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. CONSERVATION DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE VALUES 
Most important decisions in our personal and social lives have multiple values at 
stake. The last chapter motivated the use of multiple criteria in biological conservation 
decisions by showing that there are many conflicting ways to define ‘biodiversity’ and 
measure biological diversity. The definitions or measures used in a particular applied 
context depend on our goals and values, which may be many and varied. For example, 
while maintaining species richness might be desirable, additionally we may want to 
protect endemic species, where this goal may conflict with the goal of species richness. 
The problem of making decisions with multiple values at stake is even more difficult 
once we attempt to incorporate other societal goals, for example the minimization of 
economic opportunity costs. 
One method decision analysts17 have developed to begin structuring our thinking 
about multiple values for particular decisions is the objectives hierarchy (Keeney 1992, 
ch. 3). An objectives hierarchy shows relationships between fundamental objectives of a 
decision, sub-objectives, and measurable attributes that quantify the achievement of sub-
                                                
17 Decision analysis is applied normative decision theory (Edwards and von Winterfeldt 1986), where the 
goal is to produce mathematical and computational procedures that aid in quality decision-making. 
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objectives. The achievement of sub-objectives helps achieve fundamental objectives. A 
fundamental objective is a goal or objective O such that there is no further answer to the 
question “why is O important?” that is directly relevant to that decision. Although 
fundamental objectives are of course open to further scrutiny, and may be justified with 
reference to other values or objectives, to be “fundamental” to a decision in this sense just 
means that such further justification is not relevant to the decision, and that the 
alternatives open to the decision-maker are all relevant to the achievement of that 
objective.18 
Figure 1 below is an incomplete objectives hierarchy for a hypothetical 
conservation decision, including the fundamental objectives maintain biodiversity and 
minimize cost. Sub-objectives for maintaining biodiversity include maintaining species 
richness and protecting habitat for endemic species. One sub-objective for maintaining 
species richness is specified, namely to prevent the extinction of threatened species. Two 
sub-objectives for minimizing cost are also included. This objectives hierarchy is 
incomplete because measurable attributes that quantify the achievement of the sub-
objectives have not been specified. (The next chapter will discuss desirable properties of 
attributes.) 
                                                
18 In the terminology of Keeney (1992, 2007), the fundamental objectives should be “controllable” (the 




Figure 2.1. Incomplete Objectives Hierarchy for a Hypothetical Conservation Decision 
As mentioned above, maintaining biodiversity and minimizing cost, although 
fundamental for this decision, could of course be justified in terms of more fundamental 
objectives that may be relevant to other decisions. This would take us into the 
philosophical domain of axiology or value theory, where the merits of various accounts 
of intrinsic value are debated (Schroeder 2012). (The language of values may be 
translated into the language of objectives by adding verbs like “to pursue,” “to 
maximize,” “to minimize,” “to maintain,” etc.) These deeper justifications for 
fundamental objectives could be offered by appealing to the goals of mainstream ethical 
theories: the pursuance of pleasure and avoidance of pain, or satisfaction of human 
preferences, or the achievement of other kinds of valuable states of affairs (as in versions 
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reasonableness (as in versions of deontology), or the realization of virtues of character (as 
in virtue ethics), etc. 
However, one feature of the objectives hierarchy approach in practice is that it 
allows one to avoid philosophical disputes about the justification of fundamental 
objectives in contexts where those disputes make no difference to the outcome of a 
decision. Thus an anthropocentrist and a non-anthropocentrist in environmental ethics 
could still agree that, for a particular policy decision, minimizing cost and maintaining 
biodiversity are both fundamental objectives, even though they disagree about the 
ultimate justification for those, or disagree about their relative importance.19 
While objectives or goals should not be confused with values, fundamental 
objectives represent the decision-maker’s values in the sense that for each fundamental 
objective, a distinct value is at stake (e.g. the value of biodiversity or economic welfare). 
Clarifying the values at stake for a decision by constructing an objectives hierarchy may 
aid in choosing between alternatives based on how those alternatives perform on 
attributes associated with sub-objectives. However, this raises the problem of how to 
weigh and make tradeoffs between the multiple values at stake, the subject of this 
chapter. 
2.1.2. MULTIPLE VALUES AND CONSTRUCTING COMMENSURABILITY 
In philosophical discussions of decision-making with multiple values, most 
authors have focused on the question of whether competing values (e.g. the value of 
biodiversity and the value of economic welfare) are commensurable, implying that they 
                                                
19 This is one way of putting Norton’s “convergence hypothesis” (Minteer 2009), the idea that 
disagreement at the level of normative ethics or environmental ethics may disappear at the level of 
questions of sound environmental management. 
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may be traded off in a systematic way.20 This chapter presents an argument that for a 
certain class of multi-value decisions, using decision analysis to construct a common 
scale of value, or to construct commensurability, is a requirement of practical rationality 
in those decisions. Since my focus is on commensurability and practical rationality in a 
particular class of decisions, I do not take a stand on the issue of whether all values (or, 
which values) are commensurable.21 
The decision analytic technique for constructing common scales of value 
consistent with classical axiomatic decision theory, known as multi-attribute value theory 
(MAVT), has been available at least since the 1970s (Dyer and Sarin 1979).22 This 
technique allows decision-makers to think quantitatively about the acceptability of 
various tradeoffs between values, which, at least in principle, may be easily measurable 
(e.g. quantities of harvested timber) or more difficult to measure (e.g. the aesthetic value 
of intact woods). Additionally, this technique does not necessitate the use of money as a 
numeraire. Preferences over complex tradeoffs are constructed in a dynamic process that 
involves modeling, learning, and reflection. 
Discussion of this type of technique in the philosophical literature has been 
minimal, but has largely focused on its limitations.23 Most of these limitations will be 
                                                
20 See, for example, discussions in Anderson (1993), Chang (1997), Griffin (1997), Chang (2001), Milgram 
(2002), Sarkar (2005), Aldred (2006), Trainor (2006), Kelly (2008), and Ellis (2008). 
21For discussions of this issue, see especially the papers in Chang (1997). For a recent argument that all 
values are commensurable, see Kelly (2008). For arguments to the contrary, see Anderson (1993), Wiggins 
(1997), and Sarkar (2005). 
22 According to standard terminology, multi-attribute utility functions incorporate uncertainty, whereas 
multi-attribute value functions do not. 
23 For example, Anderson (1993, 49) discusses what she calls the “component value strategy” that 
“attempts to commensurate goods by representing the overall value of a good as an objective function of its 
component values.” While she claims that this strategy may work in some multi-value decision problems 
(she focuses on examples of athletic scoring), she points out several problems, including the well-known 
result that this technique breaks down when alternatives can only be ordinally ranked on component values 
(Arrow and Raynaud 1986). See also Kagan’s (1988) pessimistic discussion of additivity in ethics. For 
more technically sophisticated discussions, see Sarkar (2005) and Moffett and Sarkar (2006). 
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presented below, however I offer a more optimistic assessment of the technique, focusing 
on its ability to enhance practical rationality in the face of psychological biases, 
specifically tendencies to avoid tradeoff thinking and use simple decision rules with 
problematic implications. 
2.1.3. OUTLINE 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines comparability and 
commensurability, and identifies the class of decision problems with multiple values 
under certainty where comparability of alternatives on each value may not suffice for 
rational decision-making. These decision problems are characterized by complex 
tradeoffs between values. Section 3 introduces the simplest linear technique as a solution, 
enumerating assumptions and idealizations that limit its applicability. Section 4 contrasts 
the decision analytic approach with two other ways of interpreting preferences: 
preferences revealed by choice behavior and preferences elicited by verbal behavior. This 
lays the groundwork for Section 5, which presents the argument for the practical 
imperative of constructing commensurability for high-stakes decisions where the 
assumptions are met. 
 
2.2. Comparability and Commensurability in Multi-criteria Decisions 
2.2.1 COMPARABILITY 
Here, a decision problem under certainty with multiple criteria will be 
characterized by:24 
1. A finite set of alternatives A, where ai is alternative i; 
                                                
24 That a decision problem is under certainty could only be a plausible idealization. All decisions involve 
some form of risk or uncertainty. However we may abstract away from such considerations in cases where 
the uncertainty is sufficiently limited. 
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2. A finite set of criteria of evaluation C, where cj is criterion j; 
3. Each criterion of evaluation cj inducing a complete, transitive, weak ordering 
(≤j) over the alternatives in A such that: 
3.i. a1 ≤j a2 implies that a2 is at least as good as a1 on criterion j; 
3.ii. if both a1 ≤j a2 and a1 ≥j a2 hold, this implies they are equally good on 
criterion j; 
3.iii. if a1 ≤j a2 but it is not the case that a1 ≥j a2, then a2 is strictly better on 
criterion j (a1 >j a2). 
The third set of conditions defines comparability of alternatives on a criterion of 
evaluation. That is, a set of alternatives is comparable on a criterion of evaluation just in 
case the alternatives can be ranked ordinally by that criterion. The ordering is weak 
because ties are allowed, complete because all the alternatives are ranked, and transitive 
because aj ≤j ak and ak ≤j am implies aj ≤j am.25 
Comparability of alternatives on multiple criteria is often enough to eliminate 
some alternatives using the concept of dominance. An alternative dominates another just 
in case it is at least as good on all criteria and strictly better on at least one (Resnik 1987). 
For example, say a conservation organization is considering choosing one piece of land 
from an alternative set of two on three criteria of evaluation: species richness, ecological 
community uniqueness, and cost. The first piece of land is home to 150 species, but the 
ecological communities are not very unique, and the land is expensive. The second piece 
of land has roughly the same species richness and community uniqueness, but the land is 
less expensive. The second piece of land dominates the first on these three criteria of 
                                                
25 Comparability on a criterion should be contrasted with three kinds of incomparability: one in which it is 
false that any of the three possible value relations (‘better than’, ‘equally good’, ‘worse than’) hold (Raz 
1997); one in which it is true that all or more than one of the relations hold (Seung and Bonevac 1992); and 
one in which it is neither true nor false that any of the relations hold. 
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evaluation, since it is equally good on the first two and better on the third. Assuming the 
criteria are exhaustive for the decision (there are no other relevant considerations), the 
second piece of land is clearly the choice that best reflects what the decision-maker cares 
about. 
However, as the number of alternatives and criteria increase, dominance may only 
eliminate a few alternatives, and any alternative that is uniquely highest ranked on at least 
one criterion is ipso facto non-dominated.26 For example, consider the three areas ranked 









1 2 3 
Area 
B 
2 3 1 
Area 
C 
3 1 2 
Table 2.1. Difficult Decision Problem 
Area A is the most species rich area, but is the most expensive and its community 
uniqueness value lies somewhere in between the other two areas. Area B is the cheapest, 
but has middling species richness and is home to the least unique ecological community. 
Area C has the most unique ecological community but is not species rich, and its cost lies 
                                                
26 Thus as Sarkar and Garson (2004) point out, the number of non-dominated solutions tends to increase 
with the number of criteria. 
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between the other two areas. Since each alternative is ranked first on at least one 
criterion, all of them are non-dominated. (Recall, for an alternative to dominate another, 
it has to be at least as good on all criteria and better on at least one. Since each alternative 
area is uniquely best on one criterion, in this particular example the first condition for 
dominance cannot hold.) 
The next section characterizes in more detail why comparability of alternatives on 
criteria of evaluation, even along with comparability of the criteria themselves, may not 
be sufficient to make a choice that reflects the decision-maker’s values. 
2.2.2. COMPARABILITY OF CRITERIA 
In the decision problem posed above in Table 1, each area is non-dominated, so 
simple dominance analysis cannot be used to rule out any of the alternatives. One way to 
further enrich the basis for making decisions in these cases is to ordinally rank the criteria 
themselves in terms of importance. Thus a complete, transitive, weak ordering is induced 
on the criteria, implying that the criteria are comparable. This allows for use of the 
“Regime method” (Hinloopen et al. 1983), one of many proposed rules for multi-criteria 
decision-making that do not involve the construction of a common scale of value 
(Moffett and Sarkar 2006). The Regime method works as follows. For any two 
alternatives a1 and a2, let K+ be the set of criteria where a1 > a2 (a1 is strictly preferred to 
a2 on those criteria), and K- the set of criteria where a2 > a1. Say that a1 outranks a2 if and 
only if K+ is non-empty and there exists an injective (one-to-one) function where each 
criterion in K- is mapped to a more important (higher ranked) criterion in K+. This 
method yields as a solution the set of alternatives that are not outranked. 
Assume that for the decision problem in Table 1, Species richness is more 
important to the decision-maker than Cost, which is more important than Community 
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Uniqueness. Comparing Area A and Area B with the Regime method results in Area A 
outranking Area B, since Cost is the only member of the set K-, which can be mapped to 
Species richness in the set K+. Comparing Area B and Area C results in Area B 
outranking Area C, since Community Uniqueness is the only member of the set K-, which 
can be mapped to Cost or Species Richness in the set K+. Comparing Area A and Area C 
results in neither outranking the other. Thus the only remaining alternative is Area A, 
which is outranked by neither Area B nor Area C. This example shows that Regime’s 
outranking relation is not transitive in all cases, since in this case Area A outranks Area B, 
and Area B outranks Area C, but Area A does not outrank Area C. 
The intransitivity of Regime’s outranking relation is problematic if one takes 
transitivity to be a constraint on any rational ranking procedure for a single decision-
maker, as classical decision theory assumes for the preference relation. The usual 
argument for this is that intransitive preferences can lead one to take a series of trades 
such that one is guaranteed to lose value. Say I prefer A to B, and B to C, but I am 
indifferent between A and C. If I start with B, someone could sell me A, then trade me for 
C, since I am indifferent between A and C. But then someone could sell me B, since I 
prefer B to C. If I start with A, someone could trade me for C, then sell me B and then A 
again. If I start with C, someone could sell me B, and then A, but then trade me for C. In 
all of these scenarios I lose value and end up with the alternative I started with. 
Whatever one’s philosophical view on the desirability of transitivity in a ranking 
relation,27 more importantly Regime and other rules that do not involve constructing a 
common scale of value28 do not allow us to think quantitatively about the acceptability of 
                                                
27 See Anand (1993) for a discussion. Rachels (1998) discusses purported counterexamples to the 
transitivity of “better than.” 
28 See Moffett and Sarkar (2006) for a helpful review of many of these methods. Outranking methods such 
as PROMETHEE (Brans and Vincke 1985), where simple preference functions are constructed for each 
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tradeoffs between the values at stake. In this example, Area C outperforms Area A on 
both of the lower ranked (2nd and 3rd) criteria, but is outranked by Area B. Regime does 
not allow us to ask whether the superior performance of Area C on the two lower ranked 
criteria could compensate for its lower ranking on the most important criterion of Species 
richness in a pairwise comparison with Area A. Thus the choice of Area A may not reflect 
the values of the decision-maker. 
Choosing any of these areas clearly involves trading off certain values against 
others. Simple cases like this one may only necessitate qualitative thinking about 
tradeoffs. That is, it may not be necessary to arrive at quantitative valuations on criteria 
for Area A and Area C, and then aggregate this information, to decide the compensation 
question. However, as decisions become more complex, with more criteria and more 
alternatives, and if the stakes are sufficiently high, we should be willing to spend time 
and energy analyzing tradeoffs quantitatively. Assuming we do wish to spend this time 
and energy, we would need to construct a common scale to decide how much of one kind 
of value we are willing to trade off against another kind of value. 
To see more clearly why quantitatively analyzing tradeoffs might be desirable in 
this case, consider the following kind of argument. “Species richness is the most 
important criterion. Therefore we should choose the area that is highest ranked on species 
richness.” This corresponds in outline to a decision rule where the alternative with the 
highest rank on the most important criterion is chosen. If there are ties on this criterion, 
the second-ranked criterion is used to break ties, and so on.29 However there are many 
                                                                                                                                            
criterion and then a partial or total preorder is defined over alternatives by aggregation via a “preference 
index,” will not be discussed here. Unlike MAVT and MAUT, many outranking methods, including 
PROMETHEE, lack the axiomatic foundations of decision theory. 
29 Keeney and Raiffa (1993, pp. 77-78) call this a lexicographic ordering rule and argue on similar grounds 
that it is “rarely appropriate.” 
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cases in which this rule will not result in decisions that reflect the values of the decision-
maker, and others in which it won’t aid in decision-making at all. 
The first kind of case is one in which the range of species richness values is very 
small, whereas the range of, say, cost, varies widely. Thus, assuming the ordinal ranks on 
each criterion from Table 1, this decision rule entails choosing an area with an arbitrarily 
small positive difference in species richness value, but whose cost is also arbitrarily 
higher. Concretely, this decision rule would entail choosing an area with species richness 
of 151 that costs $1,000,000 over an area with species richness 150 that costs $10,000. 
Assuming the decision-maker cares about cost to some reasonable degree, this would 
likely be a choice that does not reflect the values of the decision-maker. This kind of case 
shows the importance of thinking quantitatively about tradeoffs, and that the 
“importance” of a criterion in a decision problem depends crucially on the range that the 
alternatives take on that criterion, a concept that will return below. 
The second kind of case is one in which comparability of the criteria hold, but 
each criterion is deemed just as important as the others. Then this simple decision rule 
and Regime cannot eliminate any of the alternatives. New modeling assumptions will 
have to be introduced in order to make sense of these tradeoffs in a way that will aid 
decision-making. 
2.2.3. CARDINAL VALUE FUNCTIONS AND COMMENSURABILITY BETWEEN CRITERIA 
The last sections showed that comparability of alternatives on each criterion of 
evaluation and comparability of the criteria themselves might not be enough when 
decisions involve tradeoffs between values. These are cases in which, in order to be 
confident that our decision will reflect our values, we must consider two questions. 
Firstly, can we quantify how much one alternative outperforms another on each criterion? 
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This would involve translating our ordinal scales on each criterion to interval scales. 
Secondly, can we quantify how important each criterion is relative to the others, given the 
range of values taken by the alternatives on each criterion? This would involve 
translating our ordinal scale of the criteria themselves to an interval scale.30 
We may answer the first question for alternatives x and y on some criterion of 
evaluation cj just in case a cardinal value function vj() can be constructed for that criterion 
such that (Dyer and Sarin 1979): 
(1) vj(x) ≤ vj(y) iff x ≤j y. 
(2) vj(x) < vj(y) iff x ≤j y and it is not the case that y ≤j x. 
(3) If w is strictly preferred on criterion j to x and y strictly preferred to z, 
then {w and x} is weakly preferred to {y and z} iff vj(w) - vj(x) ≤ vj(y) - 
vj(z). 
This means that the alternatives can be ranked ordinally and that one can place the 
alternatives on a scale such that one can say how much better or worse one alternative is 
relative to the other alternatives. 
If we performed this on all individual criteria, this may still not be sufficient to 
solve the difficult decision problem represented in Table 1. Even if we are able to say 
“how much more unique” the ecological community of Area C is relative to Area B and 
Area A, we still do not know how the consideration of ecological uniqueness is to be 
weighed against cost or species richness, given the ranges these variables take and how 
important differences within those ranges are to us. This requires commensurability of 
criteria of evaluation. 
                                                
30 Measurable value functions used here, in the sense of Dyer and Sarin (1979), are unique up to positive 
linear transformation, implying an interval scale of measurement. The use of ratio scales, although not 
formally ruled out by anything said here, imply the existence of a non-arbitrary zero point. 
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We may define commensurability of criteria by saying that criteria are 
commensurable if and only if an overall value function may be constructed that combines 
or aggregates the information contained in the value functions of individual criteria to 
produce a cardinal ranking of the alternative set. Decision analysts call this a multi-
attribute value function. As above, ‘attributes’ are measurable quantities associated with 
criteria of evaluation. This hypothetical function would, for better or worse, render 
numerically precise the tradeoffs between values the decision-maker is willing to accept. 
While numerical precision may be desirable for the sake of clarity or 
transparency, it may also raise several difficulties. The first may be due to judgments that 
appear arbitrary or insufficiently justified. For example, imagine being asked how much 
forest degradation, measured in parts per million of particulate pollution one would be 
willing to accept in exchange for a particular monthly discount in electricity costs due to 
the construction of a new coal plant. Making such a judgment in a reasonable and 
informed way would presumably require much information and reflection on the values 
at stake, including other relevant values like health impact. It is unclear whether anyone 
who is not an expert, or has not had much experience with this type of problem, would 
have well-formed preferences over such tradeoffs. 
The second problem may be due to ethical considerations that limit the scope of 
tradeoff thinking. For example, if a forest is home to a group of humans who have a 
legitimate legal and ethical claim to the land, we may judge that their individual or 
collective rights should not be traded off against potential gains to others, perhaps within 
a particular range of potential gains or losses avoided. 
As we will see in the next section, the construction of even the simplest multi-
attribute value function involves accepting strong independence conditions and a 
potentially complicated procedure of construction. 
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2.3. Multi-attribute Value Theory (MAVT): the Construction of a 
Common Scale 
2.3.1. THE ADDITIVE MODEL 
In the interest of focusing on the philosophical issues I only present the simplest 
kind of multi-attribute value function, namely one with an additive functional form, 
where the value of an alternative ai is a weighted sum of the values of ai on each criterion 
of evaluation cj: 
v(ai) = ∑j wjvj(ai) 
This says that the overall value of an alternative is a sum of the value of that 
alternative on each criterion of evaluation multiplied by a weight attached to that 
criterion. The weights wj, which by convention sum to one, reflect the tradeoffs between 
criteria of evaluation the decision-maker is willing to make, given the variation present in 
the alternatives on each criterion. Different functional forms, for example a multiplicative 
model, will also imply different tradeoffs. The next two sections (3.2-3.3) will focus on 
the formal independence and ethical assumptions necessary to use the additive model in 
the first place, while section 3.4 will give an overview of the process of constructing the 
value functions and weights. 
 
2.3.2. ETHICAL ASSUMPTIONS: TRADING, TRADING OFF, AND INCOMMENSURABILITY 
For such a model to usefully and accurately reflect the values of the decision-
maker, they must be willing to make tradeoffs between the values at stake. Consider the 
following example, similar to the example of the ethical impermissibility of tradeoffs 
given above. Expand the decision problem represented by Table 1 to include the criterion 
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of extinction prevention, and assume that only by prioritizing Area A can we protect a 
charismatic endangered species from extinction. Now assume that our decision-maker is 
a “no tradeoff absolutist” (Lemos 1994; Carlson 2001) about preventing extinction of 
charismatic species—we must prevent it at all costs. According to this no tradeoff 
absolutist, no world in which we allow this species to go extinct is more valuable than 
one in which we do not. Whether or not this is a reasonable view, this model cannot 
represent the values of our decision-maker, except trivially, by setting the weights of all 
other criteria to 0, and setting the extinction-prevention value of Area A to 1 and the 
extinction-prevention value of all other areas to < 1. The problem with this “trivial” 
formulation of the no-tradeoff view, however, is that it would presumably not reflect the 
decision-maker’s values in other cases, where tradeoffs between, for example, cost of 
land and species richness are permissible. Furthermore, if each alternative involves 
species loss, the no-tradeoff absolutist is forced to confront tradeoffs behaviorally.31 
There are several reasons why tradeoffs might be ethically problematic, and so 
commensurability between criteria compromised. However, it is important to distinguish 
the ethical acceptability of commensurability or tradeoffs in theory, as modeled by a 
multi-attribute value function, and substitutability or tradability in the market or a 
particular institutional or relational context. Trading certain goods may not be permitted 
in the open market (for example, we may think it is wrong to sell organs, sex, certain 
drugs or weapons, etc.), or within a certain institutional context (for example, we may 
think it is wrong to sell votes or good grades). Furthermore, certain goods may not be 
                                                
31 A more plausible model of the no tradeoff view involves modified lexicographic preferences with 
thresholds (Rosenberger et al. 2003; Georgescu-Roegen 1954), where tradeoffs are only permitted within a 
limited range of the relevant goods. For example, some minimum quantity of necessities (water, food, 
shelter, etc.) is necessary for life before any amount of those goods may be traded off. Similarly, there may 
be a threshold level of biodiversity such that our no-tradeoff absolutist allows tradeoffs above, but not 
below, that threshold. This threshold may be empirically tied to provision of necessary ecosystem services, 
but this would be controversial. 
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substitutable in the context of special relationships, for example a gift to my wife of a 
beautiful copy of her favorite book is not substitutable by its cash equivalent. 
Such transactions or substitutions may weaken important institutions or 
relationships by undermining their main purposes or the motivations involved in 
sustaining them. If good grades could be bought, grades would cease to have whatever 
meaning and informational content they currently have in the institutional context of 
education. A gift of cash may be a bad gift to a good friend because it shows that one did 
not spend sufficient time or energy (or that one does not possess the information) to 
choose a particular gift.32 More concretely, allowing trades between particular kinds of 
goods in the market may lower the quantity or quality of the goods provided. For 
example, Titmuss (1970) famously argued that allowing a market for blood could reduce 
the amount of blood available since it would crowd out people’s other-regarding 
motivations to give blood.33 
However, our judgments about inappropriate or unethical trades do not 
necessarily entail anything about the commensurability of the values at stake. 34 This is an 
important point that is missed by many philosophical commentators on the issue of 
commensurability, where there is an illicit slide from the inappropriateness of trading or 
market transactions to the general impermissibility of trading off.35 Several examples 
should illustrate this point. Even though good grades should not be traded in a market, it 
                                                
32 Although see Waldfogel (1993) for an amusing argument that “deadweight loss” during Christmas could 
be avoided if some people gave cash instead of gifts. 
33The empirical cogency of Titmuss’s argument is contested, however see Mellström and Johanneson 
(2008). This study found that the crowding out effect for blood donations was significant for populations of 
women but not men, and that giving subjects the opportunity to give their compensation to charity 
counteracted the crowding-out effect. The idea that other-regarding motivations might be crowded out in 
certain settings, for example in markets, does have some support. See the discussion of motivational 
crowding out in Chapter 4. 
34 This point I owe to Dancy (personal communication). 
35 See, for example, Anderson (1993) and Sunstein (1997). 
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is not unethical for a decision-maker to trade off money and the prospect of better grades, 
for example by taking into account the cost of hiring a tutor. (This is not to say that 
someone who does so is consciously or unconsciously applying the kind of tradeoff 
reasoning used in MAVT.) Similarly, even though a thoughtful gift to my friend might 
not be substitutable for its cash equivalent, this does not entail it is inappropriate to trade 
off the intangible properties of gifts (for example, thoughtfulness) with cash, when 
making a purchasing decision as the gift giver.36 
Certain limitations to tradeoff thinking, however, may derive from some of our 
deepest held ethical convictions whether or not they are reflected in legal restrictions on 
trading. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) review the anthropology and social psychology of 
“taboo tradeoffs,” arguing that distinct norms govern distinct types of social relations or 
“spheres of justice” (Walzer 1983). Tradeoffs are more likely to be perceived as 
inappropriate where they transgress these norms. For example, explicit discussion of 
quantitative tradeoffs in kinship and intimate relations governed by norms of communal 
sharing are likely to be perceived as inappropriate. In the context of conservation, human 
groups’ attachment to a place, with its particular geological, biological, historical, and/or 
cultural features, may be perceived by those groups as priceless. 
It is arguably fundamental to our understanding of many human rights (for 
example, rights not to be enslaved, killed, tortured, or raped) that they may not be traded 
off, at least against certain kinds of goods (U.N. 1948). This kind of view is implicit in 
                                                
36 The controversial case of prostitution is interesting, since one may hold one of several plausible 
positions where the ethics of trading and trading off come apart. The first is that it is in principle not wrong 
to tradeoff sex for money, but that allowing sex markets create various kinds of harm (for example, harm to 
more permanent valuable relationships), thus these markets should be made illegal. Conversely, one might 
claim that it is in principle wrong to tradeoff sex for money (perhaps for virtue-theoretic reasons), but that 
criminalizing prostitution creates such harm (by creating an unregulated black market) that such 
transactions should be legal and regulated. There are, of course, two more logically possible positions 
where the ethics of trading and trading off do not come apart. 
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most deontological theories of ethics. Kant (2002) famously distinguished things with a 
price (fungible commodities tradable in the market) with things with dignity (persons). 
However, it may be permissible, indeed necessary or required, in contexts like war, to 
trade off between violations of rights themselves. For example, it might be permissible or 
required for a military commander to accept an alternative that includes certain rights-
violations in order to avoid another alternative that includes even more rights-violations. 
2.3.3. INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS 
Besides potential ethical constraints, the additive model requires that the decision-
maker’s evaluations across criteria of evaluation are additive independent (Keeney 1992, 
134-138) in that, (i) for all criteria of evaluation j and k where j ≠ k and for all alternatives 
ai, vj(ai) does not depend on vk(ai); and (ii) for all criteria of evaluation j and k where j ≠ k 
and for all alternatives ai and am where i ≠ m, vj(ai) - vj(am) does not depend on vk(ai) or 
vk(am).37 This says that, for all alternatives and all criteria, the decision-maker’s evaluation 
of an alternative on a criterion (and the difference between two alternatives on a criterion) 
does not depend on the value of that (or those) alternative(s) on any other criterion. So 
tradeoff preferences cannot change depending on the levels of any of the individual value 
functions. For example, if the decision-maker is indifferent between two alternatives a1 
and a2 on three criteria j, k, and m where the values for alternative a1 on j, k, and m are 
{c,d,e} and the values for a2 are {c,d,e}, the decision-maker must also be indifferent 
between a1 and a2 when their values are {c,d,f} and {c,d,f}, for all f. This holds for weak 
preference and strict preference as well. 
Crucially, for any particular problem, additive independence is only required for 
the range of values obtained for the set of alternatives. This is important, since several 
                                                
37 See Dyer and Sarin (1979), Keeney (1992). 
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plausible lines of practical reasoning based on thresholds and holistic interaction effects 
violate additive independence. Consider a case where the level on one criterion of 
evaluation is so low, below some threshold of minimal acceptability, such that the values 
to the decision-maker on the other criteria of evaluation are significantly diminished. For 
example, if an area is degraded enough, it may not matter at all to a decision-maker 
interested in preserving biodiversity how cheap or politically feasible it is to acquire the 
land. This is a case where the evaluation of an alternative on one criterion, namely 
ecological quality, affects the evaluation of the alternative on other criteria, namely cost 
and political feasibility. If the ecological quality of the land were higher, cost and 
political feasibility would figure much more importantly in the decision-maker’s practical 
reasoning, violating the independence conditions above. 
Additive independence is violated in cases where the decision-maker’s holistic 
evaluations over the alternatives depend non-additively on considerations that interact in 
complex ways. In his philosophical work on moral particularism, Dancy (2004, 2009) has 
defended the “holism of reasons,” which holds, among other things, that the same reason 
may count in favor of an action in one circumstance but against it in another.38 To borrow 
one of Dancy’s examples, an action being against the law might in some cases be a 
reason to refrain from doing it whereas in some cases it might be a reason to do it, for 
example to protest the law. To use an example from conservation planning, species 
richness is often taken as a rough surrogate for the biodiversity value of a piece of land. 
But species richness may not matter as much relative to other considerations (in 
considering tradeoffs) in a circumstance where the species are neither endemic, rare, 
threatened, or endangered. Another example is the following. If local human settlements 
                                                
38 For another discussion of failures of additivity in moral reasoning, see Kagan (1988). 
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are considered threats to biodiversity due to sprawl or industrial or agricultural 
development, then conservation areas should be located as far away from human 
communities as possible. However, if local humans in certain settlements rely on natural 
resources as a buffer against poverty, perhaps the distance between these communities 
and the conservation areas should actually be minimized, not maximized.39 
The decision analyst may respond to these failures of independence in several 
ways. One unlikely strategy would be to attempt to accommodate such reasoning by 
constructing more complicated value models with appropriate functional forms (e.g. 
multiplicative or polynomial) to accommodate the holistic and dependence effects in the 
judgments of the decision-maker. Unfortunately added mathematical complexity would 
come at the price of the scrutability, mathematical tractability, and ultimately the 
usefulness of the model. As the model becomes more and more complex, it becomes 
harder and harder for the user to understand and thus control the model. 
The second, more plausible strategy is to restructure the problem such that the 
independence conditions can be said to hold, at least approximately, within the local 
context of the restructured problem. For example, additive independence may fail across 
the entire set of alternatives in the original formulation of the problem because some 
alternatives have a value on certain criteria below a minimum acceptable threshold. 
Simply removing these alternatives from the analysis may result in additive independence 
holding relative to the remaining alternatives. Additionally, if there are multiple 
measurable attributes that could be associated with a particular criterion, additive 
independence may fail for some attributes but not others. Dropping attributes for which 
additive independence fails may make the decision problem more tractable. 
                                                
39 See, e.g. Sarkar et al. (2011). 
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The restructuring strategy is perhaps the best response to the global holism of 
practical reasons: it is only in particular, local contexts that value is additive and all 
relevant values can be assumed to be additively independent. MAVT should not be 
interpreted as a global theory of practical reasoning about values, rather a locally useful 
way to think logically about permissible tradeoffs.40 The chapter now turns to a brief 
introduction to the operational process of constructing an additive value function. 
2.3.4. CONSTRUCTING AN ADDITIVE VALUE FUNCTION 
We assume that the decision-maker, whether an individual or a group acting as a 
single agency, has reflected on the values at stake in the decision, enumerated them, and 
constructed an appropriate objectives hierarchy like the one at the beginning of this 
chapter. The decision-maker accepts the permissibility of tradeoffs in this context. 
The decision-maker may ordinally rank each alternative on each criterion of 
evaluation, or directly move to the construction of value functions for each criterion of 
evaluation. This can be done in several ways. Perhaps the simplest way is to arbitrarily 
set the highest ranked alternative to 1, the lowest ranked alternative to 0, and ask the 
decision-maker to place the middle alternatives in-between, perhaps using a visual 
heuristic like a line segment. The analyst explains that these judgments should take into 
account the interval difference between the alternatives: if the value of x is 1, the value of 
y is .9, and the value of z is .6, then x is preferred to y more than y is preferred to z.  The 
analyst may also show various shapes the value function could take (e.g. linear, convex, 
                                                
40 All scientific models introduce idealizations or approximations. It is an interesting question whether the 
kind of idealizations present in MAVT and other decision analytic methods can be placed in the 
taxonomies offered by philosophers of science, for example Weisberg (2007). This, however, is outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
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concave) and ask the decision-maker to identify one, potentially facilitating direct 
assessment or interpolation.41 
At this stage the analyst should have verified whether the independence 
conditions associated with the additive model hold, by asking questions about whether 
the values assigned to alternatives on each criterion are independent of the other criteria. 
Depending on the purpose of the analysis, the weights associated with each value 
function can be assessed directly using the following “swing” procedure, via a statistical 
regression procedure on holistic judgments, as well as other methods. In the swing 
procedure, the decision-maker is asked to imagine a situation in which all value functions 
had their lowest value. They are then asked on which criterion of evaluation would a 
“swing” from 0 to 1 be most preferable. 
The swing weights crucially depend on the range of values taken by the 
alternatives on each criterion of evaluation. Even if species richness is intuitively the 
most “important” criterion for the purposes of planning for biodiversity conservation, the 
variation in species richness of the alternatives may be low enough within an acceptable 
range such that swinging from the worst to the best alternative is not as important as 
swinging from the worst to the best on, say, cost. The first-ranked criterion is then given 
a certain number of swing points, for example 100. The decision-maker then ranks how 
important each “swing” from 0 to 1 on each remaining criterion would be, relative to the 
first-ranked criterion, for example on a scale from 1 to 100, assuming none of the criteria 
should be given zero weight. The resulting scores are then normalized such that the 
                                                
41 Another way to directly assess the value of in-between alternatives is to use the von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) method of gambles: if x is the highest ranked alternative and z is the lowest ranked 
alternative, have the decision-maker choose a probability p such that, for alternative y, they are indifferent 
between y for sure and a gamble that returns x with probability p and z with probability 1-p. If the value of 
x is 1 and the value of z is 0, then the value of y is p. Other methods of indirect assessment or interpolation 
are available, for a review see Keeney and Raiffa (1993). 
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weight for a criterion is the swing points assigned to that criterion divided by the sum of 
all swing points. 
Once the value functions and weights are constructed, the additive value function 
may be used to calculate the aggregate value of each alternative. This is often the 
beginning of a long process of analysis and refinement. The model is subject to thorough 
sensitivity analysis, where the parameters of the model are adjusted in various ways to 
see how the outcome is affected by changing those parameters. For example, the analyst 
may ask the decision-maker to re-consider each value function and provide a range of 
“acceptable” interval rankings. Broome’s (1997) account of incommensurability as 
vagueness actually provides one underlying justification for sensitivity analysis: I may 
judge confidently that Area A has only a slightly more unique ecological community than 
Area B, whereas Area C’s community is much more unique than Area A’s. However, 
when asked to place these on an interval scale, I may find the following three value 
functions equally plausible (where {x,y,z} gives the community uniqueness values 
assigned to Area A, B, and C, respectively, and the ranking on this criterion is C, A, B): 
{.25, 0, 1}, {.3, 0, 1}, {.35, 0, 1}. 
Systematic sensitivity analysis should also be performed on the weights. For 
example, in their multi-criteria decision analysis of alternative conservation area 
networks in North-Central Namibia, Moffett et al. (2006) varied the weights for each 
criterion from 0 to 1.0, holding the relative weights of the other criteria constant, in order 
to see how variation in weights would affect the rank order of alternative conservation 
area networks. They also used simulation software to generate 10,000 random weights 
that preserved the ordinal ranking of criteria, and compared the resulting rankings of the 
alternative conservation area networks. The point is that a thorough sensitivity analysis 
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should systematically vary value functions and other parameters including weights that 
may be affected by vagueness in judgments. 
2.3.5. REVIEW 
So far, this chapter has (i) identified a class of decision problems where it may be 
desirable to construct a common scale of value; and (ii) introduced a simple mathematical 
model and a process of measurement that decision analysts have devised in order to do 
just that. The remainder of the chapter will offer a philosophical interpretation of this 
technique and consider the implications of this interpretation for practical rationality in 
decision contexts where the stakes are sufficiently high and tradeoffs must be considered. 
 
2.4. Interpreting MAVT: the Construction of Tradeoff Preferences 
2.4.1. PREFERENCES: REVEALED, ELICITED, AND CONSTRUCTED 
This section will distinguish three interpretations of preference, namely revealed 
preference, elicited preference, and constructed preference. The next section explains 
why one might want to construct a preference using decision analysis, specifically the 
presence of non-normative psychological biases. 
The standard economic view of preferences abstracts away from preference-
formation processes and the psychology and cognitive science of valuation. Preferences 
are modeled as static, complete and consistent ordinal or cardinal rankings over bundles 
of commodities or goods, or (more abstractly) states of affairs (Binmore 2008, Gintis 
2009). Rankings over bundles of goods imply tradeoff preferences via the construction of 
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indifference curves.42 Both cardinal rankings over bundles and indifference curves imply 
the commensurability of the relevant goods. 
While the theory of rational choice owes its historical origin to normative decision 
theory, most economists use rational choice models descriptively to predict behavior 
(usually in the aggregate), while decision analysts use the theory normatively to help their 
clients make better decisions (Edwards and von Winterfeldt 1986). According to the 
decision analysts, a decision by a client is better when it is informed and guided by the 
right process, which is identified with decision theory and its axiomatic apparatus of 
probability and utility (preference), often guided by heuristic aids like objectives 
hierarchies and influence diagrams. 
Just as it is irrelevant to logicians how people actually reason theoretically, it is 
irrelevant to normative decision theorists how people actually reason practically. That 
people often affirm the consequent (infer p from q and if p then q) is irrelevant to the 
logic of propositions; that people often commit themselves to intransitive preferences 
(ranking a > b > c > a) when asked to rank large sets of items is similarly irrelevant to 
the logic of preferences. However, the way people actually reason practically, and the 
psychological processes at work in valuation and preference, have important implications 
for applying decision theory. In particular, how the central notion of preference or utility 
is interpreted, and measured, depends on the application and use. 
Economists pursuing descriptive applications usually rely on purely behavioral 
measures, or revealed preference. The idea is that studying stable consumption behavior 
on the assumption that individuals or firms are maximizing a utility function may 
                                                
42 An indifference curve in two dimensions would map the amounts X and Y of two goods such that the 
agent is indifferent between all bundles that lie along the curve (Keeney and Raiffa 1993). Each bundle on 
the indifference curve is non-dominated by the other bundles on the curve, and each bundle on the curve 
dominates bundles directly to the left and/or below. 
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facilitate prediction of future consumption behavior.43 Other descriptive applications, for 
example contingent valuation surveys intended to measure humans’ economic valuations 
over goods and services that lack a market price (ecosystem services, the “existence 
value” of an endangered species, etc.), involve the elicitation of preference via survey 
techniques (Carson 2011). These surveys usually ask subjects what they would be willing 
to pay, or willing to accept as compensation, in a hypothetical exchange scenario. The 
first distinction is thus between revealed preference, measured by choice behavior, and 
elicited preference, measured by linguistic (verbal or written) responses to particular 
prompts or questions. 
While normative applications of decision analysis could in principle involve 
measures of revealed preference, they usually involve lengthy, complex processes of 
elicitation in conversation or dialogue, with significant interaction between the analyst 
and the client.44 The decision analyst hopes to help the client arrive at stable judgments 
they would endorse upon reflection, which are furthermore checked for consistency and 
modeled mathematically. Contingent valuation survey methods, on the other hand, do not 
usually involve this kind of process. This is the distinction between elicitation and 
construction of preference: the former assumes (perhaps falsely) that the subject has a 
stable preference that can simply be measured by asking the right questions; the latter 
assumes that the subject has “basic values” but must arrive at a judgment of preference 
through a process of reflection and inference, with external aids to ensure consistency and 
stability. The process of construction must include elicitation as a component, but it also 
                                                
43 Revealed preferences are often interpreted, after Samuelson (1937), as being mere descriptions of choice 
behavior, as opposed to explanations based on psychological states, although this interpretation is 
controversial (Rosenberg 2005, Hausman 2000). 
44 See, for example, the dialogues found in Keeney and Raiffa (1993) or Edwards and von Winterfeldt 
(1986). 
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includes various checks on the consistency of subjects’ responses, modeling and 
concomitant sensitivity analysis. This is because the constructivist assumes, consistent 
with behavioral research, that expression of preference can be highly contingent on the 
measurement procedure. Fischoff (1991, p. 835), describing this interpretation of value 
measurement associated with decision analysis, writes: 
[On this view,] people lack well-differentiated values for all but the most familiar 
of evaluation questions, about which they have had the chance, by trial, error, and 
rumination, to settle on stable values. In other cases, they must derive specific 
valuations from some basic values through an inferential process. 
Decision analysts take the plausible line, defended here for the case of tradeoffs, 
that this “inferential process” ought to be compatible with our best normative theories of 
decision-making. So the process of construction should be set up to avoid the 
psychological effects that have been shown to result in systematic preference reversals 
and other non-normative anomalies. Some of these anomalies are reviewed in the next 
section. 
2.4.2. CONSTRUCTED PREFERENCES AND NON-NORMATIVE BIASES 
The last section distinguished three ways in which preferences are measured and 
interpreted. The important distinction here is that between elicitation and construction. 
On the model of elicitation, stable preferences can be measured directly via linguistic 
behavior, responses to verbal questions or written surveys. However, depending on the 
circumstances, whether such stable preferences exist at all at the time the question is 
asked is unclear.45 The literature in the behavioral sciences showing the sensitivity of 
elicited preference to various strategically irrelevant factors is large and growing (Slovic 
                                                
45 Clearly one may easily elicit trivial preferences, for example that people prefer more money to less, or 
health to disease. 
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1995, Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006).46 For example, researchers have documented 
systematic preference reversals due to menu context (which items appear in a choice set) 
and framing effects (how a question is asked). 
In a famous experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked subjects to choose 
between two health treatments for 600 ill people, where option A will save 200 lives and 
option B has a 1/3 chance of saving all 600 and a 2/3 chance of saving 0 lives. They 
found that when framed in this way, a majority of subjects preferred A. However, when 
the same alternatives were framed in terms of lives lost (the first option loses 400 lives 
and the second has a 1/3 chance of losing 0 lives and a 2/3 chance of losing 600 lives), a 
majority of subjects preferred B. Similarly, Fischoff et al. (1980) found that a majority of 
subjects prefer a gamble that loses $200 with probability ¼ and returns nothing with 
probability ¾ to a sure loss of $50, but if the sure loss is framed as an “insurance 
premium,” subjects generally prefer the sure loss. 
The decision analytic response to these types of anomalies is to use our 
knowledge of normative decision theory in order to facilitate the construction of a stable, 
coherent, defensible, and reflectively endorsed preference structure (Payne et al. 1999). 
Rather than presenting the two treatment options in Tversky and Kahneman’s case in 
terms of a single frame (or the two gambles in Fischoff’s case), the decision analyst 
would present both frames to the subject, who would perhaps learn they are strategically 
equivalent. 
In the case of considering tradeoffs, it has been shown that subjects perceive 
judgments about tradeoffs as difficult, and the degree of difficulty can be systematically 
predicted based on properties of the task, like the categories of the items to be traded off 
                                                
46 A factor is strategically irrelevant if it does not affect the decision theoretic representation of the decision 
problem. One example of a strategically irrelevant factor is the order in which alternatives appear on a 
menu. 
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and the perceived moral nature of the problem (Beattie and Barlas 2001). This difficulty 
(both cognitive and emotional) can result in the use of non-normative decision rules, or 
else people simply avoid thinking about tradeoffs altogether (Luce 1998, Fiske and 
Tetlock 1997). For example, there is some evidence that in multi-criteria decision 
problems, as the number of alternatives increases people often use a choice heuristic 
similar to the one considered and rejected in section 2.2, which chooses the item with the 
highest rank on the most important criterion (Payne 1976). 
In their development of a provisional “building code” for constructed preferences, 
Payne et al. (1999) recommend the use of MAVT tools like the swing weight procedure 
in order to facilitate thinking about tradeoffs. They argue that the construction process 
should involve decomposing complex judgments about tradeoffs into simpler judgments, 
for example judgments about swing weights, and should include consistency checks and 
sensitivity analysis. 
The position taken here, consistent with psychological findings and the practice of 
decision analysts, is that the preferences over tradeoffs measured by the MAVT process 
are not elicited or measured directly, but rather constructed. The process of construction 
includes elicitation as a component, but it also includes modeling and model sensitivity 
analysis, as well as the use of consistency checks to avoid the effects of frame-
dependence and other systematic biases. This may seem a trivial point, but it has 
important normative implications. In particular, if having considered preferences over 
tradeoffs is a necessary condition for practical rationality in important decisions 
involving tradeoffs, and constructing commensurability is necessary to even have well 
defined, considered preferences over tradeoffs, then constructing commensurability is a 
rational requirement, at least for a certain class of decisions. The next section makes this 
argument in more detail. 
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2.5. Practical Rationality and Constructing Commensurability 
2.5.1. CONSIDERED PREFERENCES AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 
One conception of practical rationality implicit in decision theory is that rational 
choice maximizes expected utility; another, which assumes only comparability, is that 
rational agents choose an alternative that is at least as preferred as all other alternatives.47 
However, many philosophers, for example Norton (1984), Gauthier (1986), and Railton 
(1986) among others, have been attracted to the idea that a rational choice can only be 
made in light of “considered” preferences, or preferences that the agent would endorse 
upon reflection, perhaps given the best available information and integration with their 
other beliefs and values. 
Motivating this view is the fact that some agents act on desires that are formed 
under circumstances that are far from ideal, for example, involving highly addictive 
drugs, or complex and confusing circumstances. While such actions might be 
rationalizable according to some preference order, they are arguably not rational choices, 
since they do not reflect the agent’s considered preferences. Here the sense of ‘rational’ 
has shifted from implying simple standards of consistency to implying internal standards 
of reasonableness. While one could develop a theory of rationality for considered 
preferences themselves that discriminates preferences as unreasonable based on their 
content (e.g. ruling out various self-destructive preferences), here I am only interested in 
minimal standards required for an agent to have considered preferences over a set of 
alternatives in the first place. Minimally, an agent should be able to articulate their 
preferences by considering their valuations over the alternatives, and would endorse those 
                                                
47 As mentioned above, this notion of practical rationality may only be locally useful. 
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preferences upon reflection and further consideration of the consequences of those 
preferences. In the case of tradeoffs, the claim is that agents facing decisions with 
complex tradeoffs who have not considered the tradeoffs between the values at stake 
would not have the basis to make a rational decision. 
2.5.2. CONSTRUCTED PREFERENCES AND CONSTRUCTING COMMENSURABILITY 
Say that the constructivist interpretation holds for some agent A, set of 
alternatives O, preference PA, and process of construction C if and only if A would not 
have preference PA over the alternatives in O without engaging in process of construction 
C. A preference PA is an ordinal or cardinal ranking of alternatives in the set O. Processes 
of construction are meant to exclude the simplest elicitation procedures—we assume 
there is sufficient complexity that it is necessary to model the agent’s preferences. Thus 
the constructivist interpretation would not hold for my preference for more money to less 
money, or health to disease. 
Put simply, the constructivist interpretation of a preference holds when an agent 
would not have that preference without engaging in the process of construction. The 
psychological literature cited above supports this claim in the case of complex tradeoffs: 
people will usually lack well-defined preferences (let alone considered preferences) over 
alternatives involving complex value tradeoffs unless they are forced to consider them 
explicitly, for example in a process like MAVT. This is because people are likely to 
avoid tradeoff thinking due to its cognitive complexity and emotional difficulty, and 
when they do consider decisions with complex tradeoffs they are likely to use non-
normative decision rules.48 
                                                
48 See especially the papers in Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006). From the perspective of a practicing 
decision analyst, Keeney (2002) discusses common mistakes in making tradeoffs, including assessing value 
tradeoffs independent of the range of consequences and using threshold rules for eliminating alternatives 
without considering how those alternatives perform on other criteria. 
 70 
Recall that MAVT and MAUT (multi-attribute utility theory) methods are 
consistent with classical normative decision theory (Dyer and Sarin 1979, Keeney and 
Raiffa 1993), and the process of construction employed by decision analysts is meant to 
avoid psychological pitfalls while allowing for reflection (Payne et al. 1999). So the 
constructivist interpretation will hold for preferences constructed using MAVT, and 
furthermore will be compatible with our best normative theories of decision-making.49 
When used correctly, these methods lead to a satisfaction of the minimal requirements for 
considered preferences given above, namely that an agent should be able to articulate 
their preferences and would endorse those preferences upon reflection and consideration 
of their consequences. 
Putting the crucial claims together, the argument for the requirement of 
constructing commensurability goes like this: 
(1) Empirical claim: In important decisions with complex tradeoffs, we would not 
have considered preferences over tradeoffs without constructing 
commensurability. 
(2) Normative claim: Having considered preferences over tradeoffs is a necessary 
condition for practical rationality in important decisions involving complex 
tradeoffs. 
(3) Conclusion: Practical rationality in important decisions involving complex 
tradeoffs requires constructing commensurability. 
The first claim is supported by empirical psychology and the experience of 
decision analysts. The second claim is philosophical, and the best argument for it is 
                                                
49 The classic argument for the view that the axiomatic foundations of decision theory are constraints of 
rationality is the (diachronic or synchronic) Dutch book argument (Vineberg 2011). Different versions of 
this argument show that if one’s preferences or probability judgments are not consistent one can be offered 
bets such that one will take them and be guaranteed to lose value. While the cogency of this argument is 
contested, alternately we may assume that decision-makers have a preference for consistency. 
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simply to consider the alternative. Say there is a high-stakes decision with complex 
tradeoffs. Imagine a decision-maker who has simply not considered the relevant 
tradeoffs. It seems implausible that they could make a rational decision, especially in 
light of the empirical evidence on human judgment and decision-making cited above. The 
decision-maker might rely on their holistic judgment, but there is empirical support for 
the claim that in sufficiently complex cases, such judgments would likely result in a 
decision that would have counter-normative implications and would not be endorsed 
upon reflection. 
While this argument focuses on a necessary condition for synchronic practical 
rationality, it should also be noted that use of such decision tools could enhance 
diachronic practical rationality for adaptive management over time (Holling 1978; Norton 
2005). Wasting time and energy constructing new value models for similar decisions 
could be avoided, while common scales may be tuned or more fundamentally changed 
over time as new circumstances arise and priorities shift or new values must be 
incorporated. Use of such a system also facilitates post hoc assessment of decisions, since 
the values at stake and their tradeoffs are made explicit and transparent. 
Finally, the decisions to which the argument applies are identified as “important.” 
As the stakes of a decision rise, it makes sense to invest more time and energy into the 
decision-making process itself. One only ought to apply normative decision analytic 
techniques in cases where decisions are sufficiently complex, unfamiliar, or otherwise 
cognitively demanding, and where the stakes are sufficiently high. For example, one need 
not apply decision theory to help someone make better decisions about weekly grocery 
purchases, or other everyday transactions where people’s preferences have been settled 
after processes of learning. Keeney (2004) makes this point by imagining a set of 10,000 
decisions, where 7,000 have small consequences and 2,000 are “no-brainers.” Thus only 
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1,000 are worth thinking about at all, and of these, many can be resolved by clear, 
informal, holistic thinking. Of the decisions that receive systematic thought, some can be 
resolved by clear description of consequences or objectives. Others necessitate clear, 
systematic thinking about tradeoffs or uncertainty. 
 
2.6. Conclusion and Transition 
This chapter has presented a philosophical rationale for a decision analytic 
procedure for considering tradeoffs (multi-attribute value theory) by coupling a plausible 
empirical claim (that people lack preferences over complex tradeoffs but they may be 
constructed) with a plausible normative claim (that considered preferences are necessary 
conditions for practical rationality in choice). The next chapter will consider the 
application of multi-criteria decision analysis in biological conservation, focusing on the 
Land Acquisition Priority System (LAPS) developed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service to prioritize National Wildlife Refuges for budgeting purposes. 
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Chapter 3:  The Land Acquisition Priority System (LAPS): A Case 
Study in Constructing Commensurability for Conservation Prioritization 
3.1. Introduction and Overview 
The last chapter was concerned with the philosophy of decisions over alternatives 
with multiple criteria of evaluation. The main argument was that for a certain class of 
complex, multi-value decisions with high stakes, constructing commensurability is a 
requirement of practical rationality. This chapter develops a case study of the 
construction of commensurability for conservation prioritization, focusing on the Land 
Acquisition Priority System (LAPS) used by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to 
rank National Wildlife Refuges (NWRs) for budgeting purposes. LAPS is explicitly 
multi-criterial: an NWR’s LAPS score includes information about its fisheries and 
aquatic resources, endangered and threatened species, efforts toward bird and ecosystem 
conservation, and variables related to the status of the project on the landscape. However 
I will argue that it has several flaws and could be improved. 
Below I qualitatively and quantitatively identify and the values in the system and, 
along with more specific criticisms, advance three general criticisms of LAPS: (1) no 
complementarity: it does not take into account the marginal value of new acquisitions, 
only the value of each NWR as a whole; (2) well-roundedness: it prioritizes NWRs that 
are “well-rounded” potentially at the expense of important projects with more narrow 
focus; and (3) no social scientific data: it does not sufficiently take into account 
information about surrounding human communities, for example the existence of 
programs that involve the public, or data on threats due to development or local hostility. 
The first two problems relate to the kind of decision analysis performed by LAPS, whose 
purpose is to create a prioritized list or “portfolio” of refuges to aid funding decisions, not 
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to choose a single best alternative.50 This raises problems with using an additive 
evaluation model like LAPS, discussed in section 4 below. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces in outline the LAPS 
decision support system and FWS’s statutory responsibilities, and presents the 
methodology of the chapter. Section 3 breaks down each criterion in more detail, 
constructs an implicit objectives hierarchy for each criterion, and presents specific 
criticisms of each criterion. Section 4 presents the more general criticisms, and section 5 
connects the concerns of the last chapter to LAPS and transitions to the next chapter. 
3.2. LAPS: Prioritizing National Wildlife Refuges 
3.2.1. BACKGROUND: FWS AND LAPS 
FWS is a federal agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior tasked with 
protecting and conserving wildlife, plants, and their habitats within the U.S. Along with 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, FWS is the main federal agency 
responsible for implementing the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA).51 The NWR 
System Improvement Act of 1997 further expanded FWS’s statutory responsibilities to 
“ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of [ecosystems] 
are maintained.”52 
FWS’s National Wildlife Refuge system protects over 150 million acres of land in 
555 refuges and 38 wetland management districts. LAPS has been used by FWS to rank 
land protection projects for budgeting since 1987. Development of the current version 
began in 1998 and was used beginning in 2002. FWS currently uses LAPS to prioritize 
NWRs for receiving funding to buy private lands within their approved acquisition area 
                                                
50 For recent discussions of portfolio decision analysis, see Salo et al. (2011). 
51 ESA, 16 U.S.C. §1531 et seq. (1973). 
52 See Meretsky et al. (2006). 
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boundaries. LAPS only ranks refuges that have found willing sellers, and FWS will only 
approve acquisitions at a “fair market price.” According to FWS, 
[LAPS] is based on Service responsibilities and objectives for our Trust resources 
and legislated responsibilities. Biological priorities are generated using a 
compilation of 850 possible points, which have been assigned to a comprehensive 
series of questions. The questions and points assigned to the questions were 
developed to qualify, quantify, and prioritize Service land protection projects for 
budget development purposes.53 
As mentioned above, FWS official responsibilities are to protect and conserve 
endangered and threatened species, and manage wildlife and ecosystems for the benefit 
of current and future generations. 
Here “Trust resources” refers to trust species, defined by U.S. law as “migratory 
birds, threatened species, endangered species, interjurisdictional fish, marine mammals, 
and other species of concern.”54 This motley crew of biological systems (indeed, “species 
of concern” leaves its extension rather open-ended) reflects the fact (discussed in chapter 
1) that identifying biological units worth conservation effort is primarily a normative 
matter determined by cultural values and political discussion (Norton 1994, Sarkar 2008). 
LAPS is a ranking system assigning points to NWRs based on multiple criteria. 
Of the 850 possible points, there are five criteria, a project summary criterion worth 50 
points and four 200-point criteria: Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Endangered and 
Threatened Species, Bird Conservation, and Ecosystem Conservation. LAPS thus 
provides a way for FWS to construct a common scale (construct commensurability) to 
rank NWRs. Within each criterion are many sub-criteria related to the status of various 
species and ecosystems as well as the progress of land acquisition on the landscape. 
Almost all information pertains to features of the landscape located within the NWR’s 
                                                
53 FWS (2011). 
54 16 U.S.C. §3772 (1). 
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approved acquisition area, with two exceptions. Contiguous sites with national 
designations help an NWR’s score when those sites contribute to the biological 
conservation goals of that NWR (e.g. congressionally designated or proposed Wilderness, 
Ramsar sites, Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network sites, National Seashores, 
National Parks, National Monuments, Biosphere Reserves, etc.). Non-designated 
contiguous protected lands can also add to an NWR’s LAPS score. 
3.2.2. METHODOLOGY 
The structure of the descriptive analysis of the next section is as follows. For each 
criterion, I first describe the goals and values that FWS explicitly claims are associated 
with that criterion.55 I then present descriptions of each opportunity for an NWR to score 
LAPS points. An initial qualitative analysis categorizes points in terms of biocultural, 
ecological, and management categories.  For sub-criteria referring to particular species or 
ecological types and their properties, I give the classification at the scale of organization 
given by the LAPS forms. The term ‘biocultural’ is used here, because units of 
conservation concern are categorized according to membership in broad taxa (e.g. fish or 
birds) or non-taxa (e.g. “aquatic species”), along with cultural/legal classifications like 
“trust species,” as opposed to fine-grained strategies of biological taxonomy (e.g. 
cladistics). ‘Ecological’ categories include wetland type and habitat type, where the focus 
is not on single species. Some sub-criteria are non-biocultural and non-ecological, related 
to management issues like project status, uncertainties, and the like. 
There is no single way to place points in categories. For example, should wetland 
types of concern be distinguished from wetland habitat in general? Should management 
                                                
55 Recent LAPS documents (fiscal year 2008) were provided by Deborah Holle, manager of the Balcones 
Canyonlands NWR. According to LAPS team leader Andrew French (personal communication December 
8, 2011), the system has not been changed since then, so the documents are up to date. 
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actions to improve habitat connectivity in general be lumped together, whether for 
terrestrial or river systems? I have tried to be faithful to the scale of description given by 
FWS in the LAPS documents. Conservation of units in these categories do not represent 
fundamental objectives in the sense given in chapter 2, but rather sub-objectives to 
FWS’s fundamental institutional responsibilities and objectives, which are to conserve 
wildlife and habitat in general, focusing on “Trust species” or “species of concern” (i.e. 
species with special cultural, economic, or ecological significance). 
A table with the sub-criteria and their associated point values for biocultural, 
ecological, and management categories, is provided for each criterion as a summary. Two 
ratios (R1 and R2) are computed for each sub-criterion as a measure of the relative 
importance of each sub-criterion to its criterion (R1 = total possible sub-criterion points 
divided by total possible criterion points) and to the overall LAPS score (R2= total 
possible sub-criterion points divided by 850 total possible points). 
While chapter 2 focused on interval scale measurement of value functions, the 
point system of LAPS allows meaningful ratios to be computed and compared since there 
are only 850 possible points, and each criterion and sub-criterion has a maximum number 
of associated points. These ratios can be interpreted as weights for each sub-criterion, 
representing their relative importance to the final criterion score and final LAPS score, 
while point values for particular attributes can be interpreted as outputs of value 
functions. Since LAPS is additive, its implicit functional form is, as in the MAVT models 
discussed in the last chapter, a weighted sum of the value of each alternative ai on each 
criterion cj: v(ai) = ∑j wjvj(ai). 
For each criterion, I construct an implicit objectives hierarchy for that criterion. 
Terminal nodes of the hierarchy represent measurable attributes, in this case, 
opportunities to score points. These are associated with sub-objectives higher in the 
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hierarchy, whose achievement helps achieve FWS’s more fundamental objectives. 
(Objectives appear grey in the figures below, while attributes are white.) The complete 
objectives hierarchy for LAPS (not constructed here due to its size) would connect the 
objectives hierarchies associated with each criterion to a single fundamental objective for 
LAPS, which according to FWS is to protect and conserve endangered and threatened 
species, and manage wildlife and ecosystems for the benefit of current and future 
generations. 
A discussion of each criterion and its associated objectives hierarchy is included 
before moving to more general normative criticisms in section 4. In particular, I assess 
the opportunities for an NWR to score LAPS points by the following five desiderata of 
measurable attributes given in Keeney and Gregory (2005, 3): 
1. Attributes should be unambiguous: “A clear relationship exists between 
consequences and descriptions of consequences using the attribute.”56 
Attributes that are vague or imprecise are problematic according to this 
desideratum. Attributes should clearly describe the relevant consequences. 
2. Attributes should be comprehensive: “The attribute levels cover the range of 
possible consequences for the corresponding objective, and value judgments 
implicit in the attribute are reasonable.” Comprehensiveness actually contains 
two desiderata. The first is that attribute levels cover the range of possible 
consequences, which I will call comprehensiveness. The second is that value 
judgments implicit in attribute levels should be appropriate for the decision 
problem, which I will call appropriateness. 
                                                
56 All quotations from Keeney and Gregory (2005, 3). 
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3. Attributes should be direct: “The attribute levels directly describe the 
consequences of interest.” If an attribute describes a consequence that is only 
partially related to the consequence of interest, it is not sufficiently direct. 
4. Attributes should be operational: “In practice, information to describe 
consequences can be obtained and value tradeoffs can reasonably be made.” 
This desideratum states that the availability of data constrains possible 
attributes. If data is not available to describe a particular consequence, it 
should not be required by an attribute. 
5. Attributes should be understandable: “Consequences and value tradeoffs 
made using the attribute can be readily understood and clearly 
communicated.” In the interest of clear communication, attributes should be 
understandable by the decision analysts, decision-makers, and interested 
stakeholders. 
Keeney (1992) also distinguishes between natural, constructed, and proxy 
attributes. Natural attributes are physically measurable or countable quantities with a 
natural interpretation, for example bird species count or dollars spent. Proxy attributes are 
like natural attributes (they can be counted or physically measured), however they do not 
directly measure the achievement of associated objectives, but rather are sufficiently 
correlated with the objective’s achievement to serve as indicators. Thus there may be 
some uncertainty as to whether a particular proxy attribute is a good indicator of its 
associated objective, or multiple objectives.57 One example would be using the presence 
                                                
57 This kind of situation may motivate to a two-step multi-attribute analysis that takes into account both a 
decision-maker’s beliefs as to the ability of the attributes to indicate the achievement (or non-achievement) 
of objectives, and then their preferences about how to weight the achievement of such objectives. Butler et 
al. (2006) discuss this problem and use simulation to evaluate whether an error-prone two-step analysis is 
worse than an error-prone direct weighting of attributes, finding that the former led to better quality 
decision even when standard errors for the two-step analysis are twice as high. 
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of specific vegetation types known to reliably co-occur with a species of conservation 
concern as an indicator that that species is present. Proxy attributes may fail the 
desideratum of directness if they are not sufficiently correlated with the objective’s 
achievement. Constructed attributes may be either indices of natural or proxy attributes 
(like the indices of biodiversity that combine multiple measures discussed in chapter 1), 
or a constructed scale that measures in a step-wise fashion the achievement of an 
objective. For example, an ecosystem type in an NWR may be “threatened,” 
“endangered,” or “critically endangered” depending on its conservation status, where this 
categorization may be used as an attribute. These distinctions will be helpful below, 
particularly in considering questions of means and ends: some attributes in LAPS could 
be construed as proxy attributes for one objective, or natural attributes for another 
objective, depending on how the hierarchy is constructed. Where relevant, these issues 
will be noted below. 
As mentioned above, points scored by an NWR are added to produce their final 
LAPS score. Thus along with an evaluation of the attributes, criterion-specific discussion 
sections also include assessments of additive independence where appropriate.58 
 
                                                
58 Recall from chapter 2 the conditions for additive independence: (i) for all criteria of evaluation j and k 
where j ≠ k and for all alternatives ai, vj(ai) does not depend on vk(ai); and (ii) for all criteria of evaluation j 
and k where j ≠ k and for all alternatives ai and am where i ≠ m, vj(ai) - vj(am) does not depend on vk(ai) or 
vk(am). 
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3.3. Analysis of LAPS Criteria and Attributes 
3.3.1. FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES 
3.3.1.1. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Declared Values and Objectives 
The Fisheries and Aquatic Resources LAPS documents state the FWS’s 
commitment to aquatic habitat and aquatic species conservation and management as 
legislated responsibilities.59 Priority is laid on “indigenous or native species within their 
original ranges and habitats,” and aquatic resources and habitats that have been reduced 
or degraded to “suboptimal levels.” The sub-criteria below are all related to either 
protecting particular populations of fish or other aquatic species, or protecting aquatic 
habitat in general. 
3.3.1.2. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Sub-criteria 
Factor A: Aquatic Resources Population Information (100 points) 
A1. Population Status (50 points): Populations of aquatic trust resources in the 
FWS Fisheries program located within the NWR’s approved acquisition area are listed. 
For each trust species, the manager specifies if the species trend is unknown (0 points), 
sustainable (5), depleted and candidate (10)—i.e. candidate for listing under ESA, or 
proposed (15)—i.e. already proposed listing under ESA, for a maximum of 50 points. 
A2. Percentage of aquatic Trust species populations benefited by project (50 
points): A ratio of the number of species populations listed in A1 to the total number of 
                                                
59 FWS also discuss section 304 of the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, which authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to purchase wetlands of high conservation priority not covered by other legislation, 
e.g. the ESA or the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929. The law requires the Secretary to consider 
the “estimated proportion remaining” of wetland types compared to “the time of European settlement,” rate 
of loss and the threat of future losses of various wetland types, and contributions of these types to wildlife, 
fisheries, water quality, and recreation. 
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trust species populations on the list for the hydrologic unit60 in which the NWR is located, 
is calculated. This ratio is multiplied by 50 to arrive at the score for this sub-criterion. 
Factor B: Habitat (100 points) 
B1. Life cycles (12 points): Up to four trust species (fish) are listed, with 3 points 
awarded for life cycle events (nursery, spawning, migration, or wintering) taking place in 
the NWR. 
B2. Barrier removal or passage installation (8 points): If land acquisition will 
result in the removal of a barrier or installation of a passage that will improve habitat for 
nursery, spawning, migration, or wintering events for a trust fish species, 2 points each 
are awarded for improvements for each life cycle. 
B3. Free-flowing rivers (10 points): If the project area fully or partially protects a 
perennial, free-flowing river or a river longer than 125 miles, it receives 10 points. 
B4. Wetland types and trends (40 points): Percentage of decreasing wetland types 
and percentage of former wetlands that will be restored to wetland of a decreasing type 
found on the NWR are added and multiplied by 40, while percentage of stable wetland 
types are added and multiplied by 20.61 (The percentages are converted to ratios between 
0 and 1.) These two figures are added and rounded up to the nearest integer, for a 
maximum of 40 points. 
                                                
60 Hydrologic units correspond to the boundaries of water drainage systems identified by the United States 
Geological Survey. Hydrologic units are identified at several scales of classification. The level of 
classification (sub-region) used by FWS divides 21 regions (the largest classification based on drainage 
areas of major rivers) into 221 sub-regions.  Sub-regions include areas drained by a river system, a closed 
drainage basin, the extent of a river and its tributaries, or a group of streams in a coastal drainage area. 
61 Decreasing wetland types include varieties of inland, non-tidal wetlands (palustrine emergent, palustrine 
forested, palustrine scrub-shrub), some varieties of estuary (estuarine intertidal emergent, estuarine 
intertidal forested, estuarine intertidal scrub-shrub) and marine intertidal zones. Stable wetland types 
include non-vegetated intertidal estuaries, subtidal estuaries, intertidal, non-vegetated estuaries, sub-tidal 
estuaries, and lake wetlands. 
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B5. Wetland losses by state (30 points): A table is included of percent of wetland 
losses by U.S. state. If the NWR does not include wetlands, it receives no points. If it 
does, this number is divided by 10, multiplied by 3.25, and rounded to the nearest integer, 
for a maximum of 30 points. 
 
Table 3.1. Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Summary 
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Figure 3.1. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
3.3.1.3. Discussion: Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
The Fisheries and Aquatic Resources criterion attempts to take into account the 
value of specific populations of aquatic trust species as well as aquatic habitats in 
general, and wetlands and rivers in particular. Thus two main sub-objectives, “protect 
populations of aquatic species” and “protect aquatic habitats,” were placed in the implicit 




























































associated with measurable attributes. Several problems with these attributes are 
enumerated here, appealing to the desiderata for attributes given above as well as the 
definition of additive independence given in chapter 2: 
1. Attribute A1 specifies that populations of aquatic trust species whose 
status is unknown are worth 0 points, whereas populations whose status 
is known to be sustainable are worth 5 points, and more threatened and 
depleted populations are worth more points. Arguably this attribute is 
not appropriate in that the value judgment that a trust species whose 
population status is unknown is worth less than a sustainable population 
(indeed, not worth anything) in the context of this analysis is 
questionable. We know that such populations count positively for 
attribute A2; indeed, for attribute A2 all populations of trust species are 
counted equally in computing the ratio representing local proportional 
representation of aquatic trust species. While it is reasonable to assess 
population status in determining the value of a trust species (with more 
vulnerable populations getting priority), it is unclear why a species 
whose status is unknown would be worthless here. This is especially 
puzzling given that in the Endangered and Threatened Species criterion, 
endangered and threatened species whose population status is unknown 
are worth more points than those with stable populations; see below. 
2. Attribute B3 fails the desiderata of comprehensiveness, for the reason 
that no significant range of values of the objective (protect river 
habitats) is covered by the attribute, since partial or full protection of a 
perennial, free-flowing river is given the same number of points. The 
same number of points is given to protection of any river over 125 miles 
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long. A more comprehensive attribute, which would also be operational, 
since data would be readily available, would quantify points based on 
the quantity of river habitat protected by the NWR. 
3. Recall from chapter 2 the conditions for additive independence, 
informally that for all alternatives and all criteria, the decision-maker’s 
evaluation of an alternative on a criterion (and the difference between 
two alternatives on a criterion) does not depend on the value of that (or 
those) alternative(s) on any other criterion. This is potentially 
problematic for the separation of aquatic habitat values (e.g. the value 
of intact rivers or wetlands) and aquatic trust species values, since the 
biological conservation value of an NWR for its habitat presumably 
depends on the occurrence of various species in that habitat. (The issue 
of additive independence is relevant because the point values of these 
sub-criteria are added to produce an overall criterion score.) While it 
may be valuable to maintain viable habitat in the absence of trust 
species occurrence, the value of the former at one level is presumably 
higher with species occurrence. Additive independence may still hold 
within the range of habitat and species values relevant to this analysis, 
however. Assessment of FWS managers’ judgments within the range of 
values for habitat and species sub-criteria would have to be performed 
to verify local additive independence. 
4. Finally, in the hierarchy above attribute B1 related to life cycles was 
attached to the objective “maximize number of life cycle events 
protected,” on the assumption that this sub-objective helps achieve the 
more general sub-objective of protecting specific populations of aquatic 
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trust species. Construed this way, B1 is a natural attribute for this sub-
objective. However it could also be taken as a proxy attribute for an 
objective that is less directly related, for example protecting aquatic 
habitat or protecting specific populations, on the assumption that 
decision-makers do not care directly about maximizing life cycle events 
that take place in NWRs. However, such concern is not unreasonable in 
this context, since the more life cycle events that take place in a 
protected area, the more overall protection is afforded to the relevant 
populations. 
3.3.2. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES 
3.3.2.1. Endangered and Threatened Species Declared Values and Objectives 
The Endangered and Threatened Species LAPS documents state the FWS’s goals 
(1) “to conserve and recover listed, and proposed species”; (2) “to protect habitats on 
which listed and proposed species depend”; and (3) “to restore depleted populations 
and/or habitat to preclude the necessity for listing actions.” As mentioned above, FWS is 
the main federal agency charged with implementing ESA. 
3.3.2.2. Endangered and Threatened Species Sub-criteria 
Extinction prevention/de-listing (200 points): If an NWR will prevent the 
extinction of any listed species, or would effectively recover a listed species such that it 
may be de-listed, that NWR is rewarded the maximum 200 points for this category. These 
claims require extensive documentation and support from managers in charge of 
implementing recovery plans. 
For factors A-C, managers give all listed species in the NWR that do not qualify 
for extinction prevention/de-listing status. 
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Factor A: Population Information (16 points maximum per species) 
A1. Listing status (2 points): Endangered or proposed endangered species are 
given 2 points, threatened or proposed threatened species get 1 point. 
A2. Population trend (4 points): Species with declining populations get 4 points, if 
the trend is unknown it is given 3 points, for stable trend 2 points, and increasing 0. 
A3. Recovery achieved (4 points): Percentage of species recovery objectives 
achieved determines points: 0-25%: 1 point; 26-50%: 2; 51-75%: 3; 76-100%: 4. 
A4. Recovery priority number (6 points): Since 1983, the FWS has had a recovery 
priority system to rank listed species. The rank determines points: 1-3: 6 points; 4-6: 4; 7-
12: 2; 13-18: 1. 
Factor B: Habitat Use Description (5 points per species) 
B1. Habitat use: If a species is resident, it is given 5 points. If seasonal, 3 points. 
If occasional, 0 points. 
Factor C: Rationale (11 points per species) 
C1. Population goal (2 points): If an NWR maintains a project to maintain the 
population, it is given 0 points. If the project serves to increase population, it is given 2 
points. 
C2. Completion of recovery plan objectives (5 points): 5 points for completion of 
at least one objective in recovery plan. 
C3. Habitat restoration need (4 points): None: 4 points; Low: 3; Moderate: 2; 
High: 0. 
Factor D: Additional Information 
D1. If the project is part of another listed species’ historical range suitable for 
reintroduction, 2 points per species are awarded. 
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D2. If the project addresses needs of species identified in the Candidate Notice of 
Review (candidates to be listed), 5 points per species are awarded. 
Table 3.2. Endangered and Threatened Species Summary (x = number of endangered and 
threatened species; y = number of other listed species targeted for 
reintroduction; z = number of candidates for listing.) 
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Figure 3.2.b. Sub-objectives and Attributes Related to Improve Population Status and 









































3.3.2.3. Discussion: Endangered and Threatened Species 
The Endangered and Threatened Species criterion takes into account an NWR’s 
endangered and threatened species, especially whether an NWR will prevent extinction of 
an endangered species or will lead to a species being de-listed, since NWRs preventing 
extinction or leading to a de-listing earn all 200 possible points for this criterion. 
Potential problems with the implicit objectives hierarchy for this criterion include the 
following: 
1. The attributes for the prevention of extinction and de-listing represent failures 
of comprehensiveness and appropriateness. Firstly, the range of values at 
stake is not represented by the range of values of the attributes, since only one 
extinction prevention or de-listing can earn the maximum LAPS points for 
this criterion, whereas it is conceivable that de-listing and extinction 
prevention, or multiple de-listings, or multiple extinction preventions could 
occur at a single NWR. As the system stands, these more favorable outcomes 
would only be eligible for the same number of points. Secondly, the value 
judgment implied by the same number of points being given to extinction 
prevention and a de-listing is questionable in this context. Other attributes of 
LAPS prioritize species that are more rare (e.g. in the fisheries and aquatic 
resources sub-criteria). Even within this criterion, A1 gives more points to 
endangered than threatened species, and A2 gives more points to species 
whose populations are declining. This would seem to imply that de-listings 
should be given fewer LAPS points than the prevention of extinctions. 
2. The Population Information and Rationale sub-criteria (represented in the 
objectives hierarchy as “improve population status” and “improve 
management status”) contain redundant attributes, since A3 and C2 both 
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measure the achievement of recovery plan objectives. A3 is more 
comprehensive, since it covers a wider variation in the achievement of 
recovery plan objectives, while C2 only awards points when at least one 
objective is achieved. Redundancies lead to failures of additive independence, 
since the score on one attribute is not independent of the score on another. The 
system could also be made simpler and more understandable if redundancies 
were removed. 
3. Other potential failures of additive independence should be noted, particularly 
between attributes under population status. Listing status, population trend, 
and recovery number are assumed to be additive independent here. But the 
value of a threatened or endangered species could depend non-additively on 
its population trend and/or how its recovery has been prioritized by FWS. For 
example, population trend points are the same for threatened or endangered 
species. Thus an endangered species that is declining gets the same points for 
that decline as a proposed threatened species. Again, additive independence 
may still hold for these particular ranges of values. 
3.3.3. BIRD CONSERVATION 
3.3.3.1. Bird Conservation Declared Values and Objectives 
The Bird Conservation LAPS documents state that the Bird Conservation 
category points are intended to measure the importance of an NWR to bird species of 
conservation concern and to avian diversity in general. Lists of bird species of 
conservation concern at the national and regional levels (“Bird Conservation Regions” or 
BCRs) are compiled every few years by FWS. This component of LAPS is supposed to 
determine “the importance of an NWR to populations, species, and diversity” of birds at 
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these regional and national levels. Listed birds are not included in this section, as they are 
covered by the Endangered and Threatened Species criterion. 
3.3.3.2. Bird Conservation Sub-criteria 
Factor A. Importance to Specific Populations (100 points) 
A1. 100 points if an NWR supports at least 50% or more of the overall population 
for any bird species in North America (except listed species) for at least one life cycle 
period. 
A2, A3. For an NWR that supports 5-49% of the overall population of a bird 
species in North America (except listed species) for at least one life cycle period, if that 
species is recognized by FWS as a bird species of conservation concern for that BCR, 40 
points, if not, 20 points. 
Factor B. Importance to Priority Species (80 points) 
B1. A “species importance value” is calculated by dividing the number of species 
on the regional BCR list that use the NWR as habitat for at least one life cycle period by 
the total number of species on the list, and multiplying this ratio by 80. 
Factor C. Avian Diversity (20 points) 
C1. An avian diversity score is calculated by dividing the number of bird species 
on the national BCR list that use the NWR as habitat for at least one life cycle period by 
the total number of species on that list, and multiplying this ratio by 60, for a maximum 
of 20 points. 
Table 3.3. Bird Conservation Summary 
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Figure 3.3. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Bird Conservation 
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3.3.3.3. Discussion: Bird Conservation 
The Bird Conservation criterion takes into account an NWR’s bird populations, as 
well as proportional representation or diversity of birds of conservation concern. It is a 
much simpler criterion than the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources criterion since it does 
not also attempt to take habitat into account, and there are no management objectives or 
considerations of uncertainty. However, the following problems should be noted: 
1. The “species importance value” and “avian diversity score” attributes depend 
on the same type of ratio being computed, namely a ratio between the number 
of birds on the national or regional BCR list, respectively, that use the NWR 
for at least one life cycle and the total number of birds on the regional or 
national BCR list. Since both of these ratios describe avian diversity at 
different scales, they were placed under the sub-objective “Maintain avian 
diversity” in the objectives hierarchy above. In order to improve 
comprehensibility, these attributes should be renamed in a uniform way, for 
example “regional avian diversity score” and “national avian diversity score.” 
Species on the national list also appear on regional lists, so those particular 
species are counted twice for NWRs where they occur. The rationale for this 
double counting is that these ratios take into account the NWR’s contribution 
to regional and national avian diversity, which may be different. (Contribution 
to regional avian diversity is weighted more than contribution to national 
avian diversity: 80 versus 20 possible points.) 
2. Here and elsewhere in the system (e.g. in wetland type and trends in the 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources criterion), ratios are multiplied by a certain 
number of points in order to arrive at a final score for that attribute. Here, the 
maximum points possible for each attribute add up to more than 200, so the 
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maximum number of points achievable for the ratio-computed attributes must 
be lower than the numbers multiplied by the ratios. (In the case of regional 
and national avian diversity, these numbers are 80 and 60.) This makes the 
range of values one would expect for these attributes obscure. A more 
comprehensible attribute would display the range of possible ratios and 
associate each with appropriate point values. 
3.3.4. ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION 
3.3.4.1. Ecosystem Conservation Declared Values and Objectives 
The Ecosystem Conservation LAPS documents state that the category points are 
intended to measure “opportunities to effectively conserve and protect endangered and 
threatened ecosystems, and large, intact habitats, as a means of promoting and 
perpetuating the Service’s trust resources.” Thus FWS Trust resources (species) are 
conceived as the relevant value and ecosystem conservation as a means. 
3.3.4.2. Ecosystem Conservation Sub-criteria 
Factor A – Landscape (60 points) 
A1. Size of landscape effort (55 points): This may include land owned by private 
partners, for example private landowners with conservation easements, or other public 
agencies. Conservation projects up to 50,000 acres get 0 points. 50,000-125,000 acres: 5 
points; 125,000-200,000: 10; 200,001-275,000: 15; 275,001-350,000: 20; 350,001-
425,000: 25; 425,001-500,000: 30; 500,001-575,000: 35; 575,001-650,000: 40; 650,001-
725,000: 45; 725,001-800,000: 50; 800,001- : 55. 
A2. Partnerships: Land protection partnerships earn 5 points. These are 
quantifiable commitments to land protection made by partners (e.g. states or non-
governmental organizations). 
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Factor B: Ecosystem (75 points) 
For this factor, published work on the conservation ecology of the United States 
(for example, Noss et al. 1995 or the works cited therein) may be used to cite critically 
endangered (greater than 98% decline, 25 points each), endangered (85-98% decline, 20 
points each), and threatened (70-84% decline, 15 points each) ecosystems within an 
NWR’s approved acquisition area, for a maximum of 75 points. For example, if an NWR 
contained three critically endangered ecosystems, it would score the maximum 75 points, 
whereas if it contained one endangered and one threatened ecosystem type it would score 
35 points. 
B1. Critically endangered ecosystems: 25 points each. 
B2. Endangered ecosystems: 20 points each. 
B3. Threatened ecosystems: 15 points each. 
Factor C: Site (65 points) 
C1. Project size (45 points): The greater the NWR acreage within the whole 
landscape effort, the more points it scores. 0-9,999 acres: 0 points; 10,000-19,999: 5; 
20,000-24,999: 10. Points increase linearly by 5 points per 5,000 acres (e.g. 40,000-
44,999 acres is worth 30 points, 45,000-49,999 acres is worth 35 points) until they 
increase 10 points for projects ≥ 50,000 acres, worth the maximum 45 points. 
C2. National designations: If an NWR is part of, or contiguous to a site that has 
been designated of national importance and that biologically contributes to the objectives 
of the project, 5 points are awarded for each designation. These include congressionally 
designated or proposed Wilderness, Ramsar sites, Western Hemisphere Shorebird 
Reserve Network sites, National Seashores, National Parks, National Monuments, 
Biosphere Reserves, etc. 
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Table 3.4. Ecosystem Conservation Sub-criteria Summary (a = number of critically 
endangered ecosystems; b = number of endangered ecosystems; c = number 
of threatened ecosystems). 
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Figure 3.4. Implicit Objectives Hierarchy for Ecosystem Conservation 
3.3.4.3. Discussion: Ecosystem Conservation 
The Ecosystem Conservation criterion takes into account imperiled (threatened, 
endangered, or critically endangered) ecosystems contained in an NWR, the total size of 
the landscape effort and the size of the NWR, and partnerships across the landscape. 
Issues with this criterion include the following: 
1. One potential failure of additive independence should be noted, namely that 
FWS’s valuation of the size of the landscape effort and size of the project may 
depend non-additively on the occurrence of imperiled ecosystems, or the 
occurrence of species of conservation concern from other criteria (larger 
species generally require larger areas of contiguous habitat). A very large 
NWR that does not contain any imperiled ecosystems will receive the same 

































ecosystems. Again, this is only a potential failure since additive independence 
may still hold within the range of values taken by these attributes. 
2. The attribute for imperiled ecosystem types fails of comprehensiveness, since 
the point values do not take into account the range of consequences, namely 
quantities of the imperiled ecosystems. An NWR with a large intact tract of 
critically endangered habitat will receive the same number of points as an 
NWR with a relatively smaller intact tract of critically endangered habitat. 
This information may not be contained in the general information about the 
project size and the size of the total landscape effort. 
3. One last minor issue related to the structure of the objectives hierarchy should 
be mentioned. The attributes related to national designations and partnerships 
were placed under the objective “promote landscape partnerships,” which in 
turn contributes to the objective “maintain large habitats.” While it is true that 
landscape partnerships contribute to large habitats, they may have value 
independent of this contribution, since they engage other stakeholders, 
including federal agencies, conservation organizations, and private 
landowners. For example, promotion of such ties to other stakeholder groups 
helps distribute the benefits and burdens of conservation more widely across 
government and society generally. This issue will be discussed below, where I 
argue that more detailed social scientific information could usefully be 
incorporated into LAPS. 
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3.3.5. PROJECT SUMMARY 
The Project Summary component contains “bonus” points for the completion of 
projects. It gives 50 points to NWRs that have acquired more than 95% of their land, 25 
points to NWRs that have acquired 90-94.9% of their land, and 10 points for 80-89.9%. 
Since this is only a single attribute I do not construct a Project Summary 
objectives hierarchy. 
Table 3.5. Project Summary 








50 1 .059   Completion of 
acquisition. 
 
3.3.6. LAPS CRITERIA GENERAL DISCUSSION 
3.3.6.1. Additive Independence 
Since LAPS points are added across criteria and sub-criteria to produce a final 
score, additive independence should hold between them along the ranges given in the 
attributes. If additive independence fails, FWS’s preferences cannot be represented by an 
additive function like the one implied by LAPS. Several potential failures of additive 
independence were noted above, based on plausible lines of practical reasoning derived 
from valuations implicit in LAPS. However it should be stressed that without more 
information about FWS managers’ valuations over variations in the attributes, no firm 
conclusions about additive independence can be made, since additive independence is 
only required within the given ranges of the relevant attributes. 
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3.3.6.2. Management and Non-management Attributes 
The four main sub-criteria are capped at the maximum of 200 points, meaning 
that considerations involving fish and aquatic resources, birds, threatened and endangered 
species, and ecosystems cannot count for more than 23.5% (200/850) of total points each. 
Within these four categories (800 points), however, management variables related to the 
size of the project, partnerships, completion of management goals, national designations, 
etc. (excluding extinction preventions and de-listing actions) account for at least 172 
points, or roughly 20% of total points. Including the 50-point project summary, 222 
points or 26% of total points are specifically related to these management variables, 
which are only indirectly related to particular taxa or ecosystems. The only criterion that 
does not include any management variables is the Bird Conservation criterion, whose 
sub-criteria are only related to bird species richness and diversity. It would be consistent 
with the implicit valuations in LAPS if management attributes relevant to bird 
conservation were included in the Bird Conservation criterion. 
3.3.6.3. Variability in Species’ Value 
In LAPS, there is very high variability in the value of species. As mentioned 
above, a single bird species the population of which resides almost completely in an 
NWR (but is not endangered or threatened) can be worth 100 points (11% of total points), 
whereas a bird that is not of regional conservation concern may be worth 20 points (2% 
of total points). If an NWR is preventing the extinction of a listed species, or delisting a 
species, 200 points are awarded (23.5% of total points). However, for endangered or 
threatened species that are not eligible for de-listing or extinction prevention, each 
species listed is worth at most 32 points (including related management variables, 
roughly 4% of total points). It does not seem consistent with other aspects of LAPS that a 
bird of conservation concern that is not listed could be worth more than three times as 
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many points as a listed species not eligible for delisting or extinction prevention. On the 
other hand, a fish trust species may be worth as little as 8 points (just below 1% of total 
points) if its population is sustainable and it completes only one life cycle stage in the 
NWR. Much of this variability likely reflects legitimate variability in FWS managers’ 
and biologists’ valuations of these species. However, some of it might be an artifact of 
the system’s construction. Since there is no method internal to LAPS that justifies 
individual species’ contributions to an NWR’s conservation value, one can only 
speculate. 
3.3.6.4. Population Trends 
The Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and Endangered and Threatened Species 
criteria both include information about the trends of populations. More points are 
awarded for NWRs with species on the decline. For Endangered and Threatened Species, 
only 4 points for each species relate to population trends. For Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources, depleted trust species receive 10 points each. No information about 
population trends appears in the Birds criterion. If population trend data is available for 
birds on the BCR lists, it would be consistent with the implicit valuations in LAPS’s 
other criteria to include this information in the Bird Conservation criterion. 
3.4. Normative Criticisms of LAPS 
3.4.1. CRITERIA AND POINT VALUES 
Inspection of the LAPS documents themselves does not reveal the method by 
which points were allocated to the different sub-criteria and attributes, and the method by 
which the sub-criteria were constructed for each criterion is equally unclear. However, 
according to FWS LAPS team leader Andrew French, the method used to assign point 
values was consensus between representatives of the nine regional FWS offices, and 
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values were assigned on the basis of importance of the particular criterion to 
accomplishing the overall objectives and statutory responsibilities of FWS.62 According 
to French, at least 25 people were present at these meetings, and sensitivity analysis was 
performed to make sure that the overall rankings produced by the system made intuitive 
sense to those present. 
However, some arbitrariness in the assignment of points can be seen in the 
variability in the value of particular species, ranging from 8 points to 100 points for non-
threatened or endangered species, and 200 points for species on the brink of extinction. 
Except for certain obvious rules, for example that rarer species are worth more points 
than less rare ones or that individual bird species are usually worth more than fish 
species, it is difficult to discern any patterns of point-assignment within or between 
categories. Complicated rules for calculating point values (see, for example, the 
calculation of points for wetland losses by state) exacerbate this problem. 
One more note about point values concerns means and ends. In the LAPS 
documents for the Ecosystem criterion, FWS state that ecosystem conservation is a 
means to conserve trust species. If this is so, then habitat conservation variables should be 
included in each of the criteria dealing with trust species. However, given the points 
awarded to rare and declining ecosystem types, independent of the presence of particular 
trust species, this does not seem to be the case. 
3.4.2. NO COMPLEMENTARITY 
Although it is intended to rank NWRs for the acquisition of lands within their 
approved acquisition area boundaries, LAPS only performs an overall assessment of the 
NWR. Thus the marginal benefit to biological conservation of a new acquisition, or its 
                                                
62 Personal phone interviews with Andrew French, December 8, 2011 and January 17, 2012. 
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complementarity value to the network of NWRs (Margules and Sarkar 2007, Sarkar 
2012b), is not calculated by the system. This means that an NWR with high overall value 
that is proposing to purchase degraded land may be prioritized over an NWR with low 
overall value that is proposing to purchase a parcel of land with much higher biological 
value. By hypothesis, the marginal benefit to conservation of the latter purchase would be 
higher than the former, however the system is set up such that the former would be 
prioritized for acquisition. Furthermore, since “fair market prices” for real estate will 
differ greatly in different parts of the country, a criterion of cost along with 
complementarity value is necessary for economical prioritization. 
3.3.2. WELL-ROUNDEDNESS 
Because each criterion includes a maximum number of points, the system rewards 
NWRs that are well-rounded, or do well enough on all categories. However, this 
precludes the possibility that NWRs may have more focused priorities, for example on 
ecosystem-type or bird conservation. It is possible that FWS’s institutional objectives 
may best be served by investing in several projects that would have very high values on 
particular sub-criteria were those scores not capped, but whose overall score is lower than 
others with those maxima in place. One of the main purposes of constructing a common 
scale is to identify situations like this, where low rankings on one criterion may be traded 
off against larger benefits in other criteria. The structure of LAPS precludes this for 
certain ranges of biological and ecological value. It could be the case that the system was 
designed to prevent this by making it nearly impossible to score the maximum points. A 
perusal of the rankings for 2013 Fiscal Year indicate that although this is true for the Bird 
and Fish criteria, 200 points were scored by 13 NWRs in the top 30 for Endangered and 
Threatened Species criterion, and 200 points were scored in the Ecosystem criterion by 8 
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NWRs in the top 30. If those NWRs were allowed to score more than 200 points in those 
categories, their rankings may have been different. 
3.4.4. LAPS AND PORTFOLIO SELECTION 
The problems highlighted in the previous two paragraphs are both related to the 
fact that LAPS was not designed to choose one best NWR to fund a single land 
acquisition project, but rather to produce an overall ranking of NWRs to assist in the 
prioritization of many possible land acquisition projects. The overall decision problem 
actually faced by FWS is thus best represented as a “portfolio selection problem” (Salo et 
al. 2011), where a finite subset of alternatives is chosen from a larger set of alternatives.63 
LAPS does not solve the portfolio selection problem on its own, since it does not 
calculate the marginal value of acquisitions or provide a way of choosing a subset. 
However it should be noted that problems arise for the use of MAVT in the portfolio 
selection problem, in particular for the use of additive models like that in LAPS, due to a 
failure of additive independence.64 Evaluating an alternative for inclusion in the portfolio 
(the preferred subset of projects that will be pursued) will not in general be additive 
independent of the valuations of other alternatives in the portfolio. In the context of 
FWS’s decision problem, the marginal value of a new acquisition, or its complementarity 
value to the network of NWRs, will in most cases depend on the value of other 
acquisitions being pursued. For these reasons, LAPS alone cannot be used to select a 
                                                
63 Salo et al. (2011) provide background and several applications of decision analysis applied to the 
portfolio selection problem. For an early application of MAVT to the portfolio selection problem, see 
Golabi et al. (1981). For a review of quantitative models of project selection (in the context of research and 
development projects), see Heidenberger and Stummer (1999). 
64 See also Clemen and Smith (2009), who show that, in applying MAVT to the portfolio selection 
problem, different ways of defining the baseline valuation for the status quo, or not pursuing a project, can 
affect which projects are prioritized in ways that may not reflect the decision-makers’ valuations. 
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portfolio of land acquisition projects, but must be supplemented by other decision support 
tools. 
3.4.5. NO SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC DATA 
With the notable exception of the partnerships sub-criterion in the Ecosystem 
criterion (only worth 5 points or 0.5% of total points), there are no criteria that take social 
scientific data into account, related to risks (from economic development, pollution, or 
local hostility) or benefits to surrounding communities (education, outreach, economic 
impact, or other stakeholder involvement). There are ethical and practical arguments for 
including latter, positive aspects of stakeholder involvement. The ethical argument is that 
citizen stakeholders fund FWS for the purpose of serving those stakeholders and future 
generations. FWS’s mission statement explicitly assumes this ethical responsibility. The 
practical argument refers to the possibility that some NWRs may have lower needs to 
purchase land if private landowners may be trusted to manage their land in accordance 
with FWS objectives. Social scientific data on conservation attitudes and knowledge 
would be useful here.65 On the other hand, data on threats would also be useful, since the 
success of an NWR’s biological conservation goals often may depend on these factors 
(e.g. the presence of polluters or rural land development, or local hostility toward the 
refuge’s goals). 
3.5. Conclusions and Transition 
3.5.1. LAPS AND CONSTRUCTING COMMENSURABILITY  
The last chapter made an argument that constructing commensurability, or 
constructing preferences over alternatives in the presence of complex tradeoffs between 
values, is a requirement of practical rationality for important decisions. The decisions 
                                                
65 For an example of this kind of study, see Knight et al. (2010). 
 109 
LAPS was designed to help FWS deal with are good examples of decision problems 
where the requirement of constructing commensurability holds. Prioritizing NWRs for 
land acquisition budgeting must take into account FWS’s many institutional 
responsibilities and objectives that correspond to many different values. The stakes are 
high, so it makes sense for FWS to spend time and energy systematically prioritizing 
NWRs. LAPS provides a way of constructing commensurability between, for example, 
the value of preventing the extinction of an endangered species and the value of 
maintaining intact wetland habitats. 
Most of the numerous value judgments implicit in LAPS’s tradeoffs between the 
values at stake were not examined here, however my discussions above noted areas 
where LAPS seemed inconsistent in its valuations. A more comprehensive normative 
assessment of LAPS would thoroughly examine all implicit value judgments, including 
tradeoffs. Apparent inconsistencies may be due to the fact that FWS managers and 
biologists devised LAPS without the consultation of decision analysts. Thus while it 
could be interpreted as a multi-attribute value function, LAPS’s system for assigning 
points was not constructed with full consideration of the constraints on such functions 
given in chapter 2, in particular additive independence. However, before a multi-attribute 
value function could be constructed, FWS would need a clear and unambiguous 
objectives hierarchy including attributes that better satisfy the desiderata enumerated 
above. The construction of such a revised objectives hierarchy would be a worthwhile 
project for future research, but would require extensive consultation with FWS managers 
and biologists. 
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3.5.2. FROM DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE VALUES TO DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE 
AGENTS 
One reason given for the use of social scientific data in LAPS was that the actions 
of local landowners and other agents in communities surrounding NWRs affect 
conservation outcomes, whether positively or negatively. When multiple agents’ actions 
affect an outcome of a decision, it is not sufficient for rational choice under certainty to 
consider merely one’s own valuations over alternatives. Agents must develop 
expectations of what other agents will do under the assumption that other agents have 
their own values and are similarly developing such expectations. This kind of strategic 
thinking is formalized in the theory of games. While this chapter and the last were 
concerned with normative applications of multi-attribute decision theory in conservation 
problems with multiple values, the next chapter will identify a normative role for game 
theory in conservation problems with multiple agents. 
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Chapter 4: Conservation Dilemmas: Game Theory, Group Decisions, and 
the Limits of Mechanism Design66 
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. A NORMATIVE ROLE FOR GAME THEORY 
Biological conservation efforts require several normative commitments. First, as 
discussed in chapter 1, operationalizing the concept ‘biodiversity’ involves choosing taxa 
and measures of heterogeneity that contribute to our goals and values. Second, the goal of 
biological conservation must be negotiated with other normatively salient social goals 
such as economic welfare, public health, etc. In these and other cases, there is much 
potential for conflict. When these conflicts occur for a single agent (individual or 
organization), decision support tools based on multi-criteria analysis, like those discussed 
in chapter 2, can provide useful insight (Moffett and Sarkar 2006). When these conflicts 
involve multiple groups or agents, game theory can play a parallel role. 
In conservation contexts, two potential roles for game theory should be 
distinguished. The first role, well understood in evolutionary theory and economics, is 
descriptive. Evolutionary games model frequency-dependent selection; in economics, 
traditional game theory is used to explain macro-behavioral outcomes by appealing to the 
equilibrium of some underlying game (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, Gintis 2009). 
Game theory can similarly be used to describe conservation conflicts. 
However, the focus here will be on a second, normative or prescriptive role of 
game theory: identifying “dilemma” conflicts with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria67 
                                                
66 Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.1, and 4.3.3 of this chapter are based on joint work with Sahotra Sarkar, see Frank 
and Sarkar (2010). 
67 Throughout I will use the following standard definitions of Nash equilibrium and Pareto-efficiency. An 
outcome is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can do better by unilaterally deviating from the current strategy: 
each agent's action is a “best response” to the actions of the other agents. An outcome is Pareto-efficient if, 
relative to the other possible outcomes, no agent can be made better off without making at least one agent 
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can enable constructive action in order to achieve (closer to) optimal conservation 
outcomes, whether by familiar mechanism-design-style policy solutions or otherwise.68 
Indeed, attaining cooperative outcomes need not proceed via formal institutional 
arrangements at all, but may be achieved through group deliberation and the creation of 
reciprocal relationships of trust. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that, in certain 
cases, mechanism-design solutions may backfire (Bowles 2008). At the very least game 
theory provides a precise analytical framework that can be used to recognize the sub-
optimality of certain conservation situations relative to a well-defined set of assumptions, 
while pointing towards possible solutions. 
4.1.2. OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter first presents three case studies of conservation dilemmas modeled 
using game theory in section 2. Section 3 discusses the empirical basis for the feasibility 
of informal solutions to these types of dilemmas that rely on members of the community 
to deliberate and enforce norms. Results from behavioral economics are marshaled to 
support the feasibility of these types of solutions, and to argue that in some situations, 
traditional solutions appealing to material incentives may backfire. Section 4 concludes 
by responding to Norton’s (2005) critique of the use of game theory in environmental 
decision contexts. 
                                                                                                                                            
worse off. An outcome is Pareto-inefficient if there exists some other outcome such that at least one agent 
is made better off while no agent is made worse off. 
68 Mechanism design, often called “reverse game theory,” is the theory of designing games (rules, 
contracts, structures of incentives, etc.) such that a particular result is achieved (Myerson 2008). 
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4.2. Conservation Dilemmas 
4.2.1. WILD DOGS AND LOCAL VILLAGERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.2.1.1. Background 
In South Africa, endangered carnivorous wild dogs (Lycaon pictus) were re-
introduced into conservation areas in 1980–1981, and again in 1997 and in the early 
2000s (Creel and Creel 2002, Gusset et al. 2008). The conservation plan analyzed here 
involved re-introduction of the species to the 900 km2 Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park in eastern 
South Africa (Maddock 1999), notable for attracting many South African and 
international visitors, primarily ecotourists. The park contained numerous large 
carnivores, including spotted hyaena (Crocuta crocuta), black-backed jackal (Canis 
mesomelas), cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus), lion (Panthera leo), and leopard (Panthera 
pardus). Conservation proponents intended to create meta–populations of Lycaon pictus 
that would be managed with occasional translocation between sub–populations to 
facilitate gene flow (Lindsay et al. 2004). By 2004, after more than 20 years of sporadic 
conservation measures, it was reported that the park itself supported nearly 50 dogs living 
in six packs, with an unknown number living in the surrounding unprotected areas. 
Both conservation proponents, concerned that only about 6,000 individuals of this 
species remained in the wild, and the ecotourism industry, which found that tourists rated 
seeing the wild dogs quite highly, had an interest in promoting the re- introduction and 
translocation policies (Lindsay et al. 2005). However, rural herders and game farmers had 
an interest in the safety of their livestock or game populations, and many of them adopted 
a policy of killing wild dogs and other carnivores that escaped from conservation areas. 
Although the local farmers, herders, and gamekeepers on private land, as well as 
Zulu villagers on communal land, were partly protected by the Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park’s 
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electric perimeter fence, many of the large carnivores, especially the wild dogs, were 
known to escape from the park. Local community members held wild dogs responsible 
for roughly 15% of the annual livestock loss (Gusset et al. 2008). In response, 
conservation proponents accompanied the re-introduction and translocation policies with 
a public–relations campaign and a conservation education program for surrounding 
communities from 1999 to 2000. Results were assessed for program effectiveness in 
2003. While ecotourists consistently reported positive attitudes toward seeing the wild 
dogs, and were willing to pay up to $150 for a chance to see them, villagers’ attitudes 
toward the conservation program became more negative between 1999 and 2003. 
Furthermore, among those with limited educational background, misconceptions about 
the wild dogs and the goals of biological conservation were found to be widespread, and 
escaped dogs continued to be occasionally killed despite legal protection. 
4.2.1.2. Game Theoretical Analysis 
The game represented in Table 1, which has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD), can be used to represent the conflict between the conservation proponents (row) 
and local herders (column). Conservation proponents and the ecotourism industry are 
treated as one agent, A, because of their common shared interest; in the analysis below 
they will be referred to as conservation proponents. Each action available to A 
corresponds to a row of Table 1: these are to continue the re-location and translocation 
policy (T) or not do so (-T). Similarly, the herders and game farmers are treated as one 
agent, B, and will be referred to jointly as local herders. The actions available to B 
correspond to the columns: these are to have a policy of killing escaped dogs (K) or not 
do so (-K). The numbers represent ordinal rankings of the outcomes, where 1 is the best 
outcome, 2 is the next best outcome, and so on, and are given <Row, Column> with the 
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first entry indicating the rank for A and the second the rank for B. The standard 
assumptions of one-stage games are applicable: each agent has full knowledge of its 
preference structure and is a competent maximizer over its own preference ordering. 
 
Table 4.1. Two-Agent Game with Pareto-inefficient Nash Equilibrium 
 K -K 
T 3,3 1,4 
-T 4,1 2,2 
 
Obviously, the best outcome for B is <-T, K>, while the best outcome for A is 
<T,-K>. The worst outcome for B is clearly <T, -K>, assuming the wild dogs are 
responsible for significant livestock loss. The worst outcome for A is <-T, K>, since no 
conservation translocation is pursued while B’s policy threatens the feasibility of future 
conservation programs. The second– and third–best outcomes for A are <-T , -K> and 
<T, K>, respectively, on the assumption that the translocation policy comes at significant 
cost, and if killing takes place the cost of the translocation program would not be worth 
the little conservation value it would generate. The second- and third-best outcomes for B 
are <-T, -K> and <T, K>, respectively, on the assumption that without a translocation 
policy fewer wild carnivores threaten their livestock, while killing the escaped wild dogs 
is itself costly. 
For A, T is preferred to -T, since whatever B’s policy, the outcomes in which 
translocation policies are pursued are ranked higher: 3 as opposed to 4 and 1 as opposed 
to 2. The same reasoning on preferences shows, for B, K is preferred to -K. The unique 
Nash equilibrium is thus <T, K>, since neither agent can do better by unilaterally 
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deviating from the strategy already being followed. (In pure strategies each of the agents 
only uses one of the available options and does not mix them in some proportion.) This 
equilibrium outcome, however, is Pareto-inefficient, since <-T, -K> is ranked 2 for both 
agents as opposed to 3. While <-T, -K> is not the unique Pareto-efficient solution, since 
<-T, K> and <T, -K> are most preferred by B and A, respectively, and ipso facto Pareto-
efficient, these latter two outcomes are unattractive solutions as they are the least 
preferred by some agent. 
4.2.1.3. Discussion 
Gusset et. al. (2008) have analyzed this conflict in some detail but did not note its 
relation to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Besides documenting the existence of the conflict 
between conservation proponents and local herders, they provided insight into possible 
solutions that prioritize conservation (and thus assume that T is necessarily preferred to -
T). These solutions include continuing programs of conservation education, 
compensation measures for livestock loss, and participatory management policies (Ogada 
et al. 2003). Modeling the situation as a game provides additional insight. Any 
conservation-prioritizing solution to the conflict must either alter the payoffs for the local 
stakeholders (the herders), by deincentivizing K or incentivizing -K, via conventional 
mechanism-design solutions involving (effective) law enforcement and/or financial 
incentives, or else directly alter the preferences of the locals, which was presumably the 
goal of conservation education. Gusset et. al. noted that most of the locals had generally 
negative views of wild dogs. This suggests that improved husbandry practices combined 
with conservation education may be the most cost-effective solution. 
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4.2.2. RAPTORS AND RED GROUSE IN SCOTLAND 
4.2.2.1. Background 
In Britain, in the 1990s, the relationship between raptors and their avian prey 
emerged as one of the more contentious issues in discussions of natural habitat 
conservation and management (Thirgood et al. 2000, Thompson et al. 1995). Whereas 
many raptor species' populations had begun to recover from their earlier pesticide-
induced low levels of the 1970s, their prey species' populations were often in decline. 
Thirgood et al. (2000) reviewed how this conflict was being played out in the case of the 
Hen Harrier (Circus cyaneus) and Red Grouse (Lagopus lagopus scotius) on heather 
moorlands dominated by Ling Heather (Calluna vulgaris). The present distribution of 
these heather moorlands is largely limited to Britain and Ireland with smaller areas 
elsewhere in Europe. Consequently, in Britain, retention of these moorlands was 
considered to be of high conservation priority. 
Heather moorlands supported unusually high populations of Red Grouse. Though 
many other bird species also utilized this habitat, Red Grouse was the only species 
entirely restricted to it. However, for most of those who wanted to preserve the 
moorlands, their retention was motivated not by concern for the ultimate survival of this 
species but, rather, because Red Grouse shooting was central to local economies. The 
primary aim of Red Grouse management had always been to maximize the number of 
individuals available for shooting every fall. Gamekeepers attempted to achieve this aim 
through the control of parasites and predators of Red Grouse populations. Among birds, 
three raptor species were among the implicated predators: the Hen Harrier, the Golden 
Eagle (Aquila chrysaetos), and the Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus). The most 
important of these (by far) was the Hen Harrier. Hen Harriers, in turn, were prey for 
Golden Eagles. Though Golden Eagles presumably also preyed on Red Grouse, their role 
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in controlling grouse populations was presumed to be minor compared to that of Hen 
Harriers. 
Thirgood et al.’s review of the raptor-grouse conflict identified three potential and 
actual actions that would affect conservation prospects of the three species: 
K: Hen Harriers could be culled to control their populations.  The expected result 
would be increases in Red Grouse populations and the economic benefits associated with 
it. Culling was already taking place through hunting, which, though technically illegal, 
was nevertheless apparently widely practiced. 
D: Diversionary feeding (e.g. carrion) could be introduced for Hen Harriers. This 
was believed to be able to decrease the predation pressure on Red Grouse though not to 
the same extent as K. It is assumed in this analysis that this action would to some extent 
benefit Hen Harrier populations at least so long as culling (K) is not undertaken. If 
culling were introduced, it is likely that D would have very little, if any, effect. 
I: Golden Eagles could be introduced into Hen Harrier habitat. It is assumed (as 
was very likely) that the benefit to Red Grouse due to Golden Eagle predation of Hen 
Harriers outweighs the loss due to predation of the Red Grouse. (The analysis below will 
make the same assumption.) 
It is next shown that each of these potential actions falls under the jurisdiction of a 
unique agent (an interest group consisting of an easily distinguished set of stakeholders). 
4.2.2.2. Agents and Goals 
From Thirgood et al.’s description, there were many stakeholders involved in the 
dispute. However, it turns out that these varied stakeholders can be naturally organized 
into interest groups, each coupled to one of the actions identified above. The principle 
used for this grouping is that members of each group strongly share interest in some 
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action that the group would encourage and different groups disagree on what that action 
is. 
Thus, each of the following three interest groups will be treated as a single agent 
in the game theoretic analysis below: 
A1: Gamekeepers and others who were economically dependent on Red Grouse 
hunting and wanted their populations to be as large as possible so as to maximize profits 
from hunting.  It is unproblematic to expect that A1 would have control over K since it is 
in its interest to cull Hen Harriers. 
A2: Hen Harrier conservationists who were concerned primarily with the welfare 
of that species, in part because they had once disappeared from all of Britain with the 
exception of the Scottish islands of Orkney and the Hebrides. A2 would presumably have 
almost complete control over D, since that action has some potential to help the Hen 
Harrier population at least when culling does not occur. 
A3: Golden Eagle conservationists who were similarly primarily concerned with 
the welfare of that species.  Presumably A3 would have sole control over I because of its 
expense, and in spite of probable reservations of A2, because in carrying out I, A3 would 
have at least some support from A1. 
In one respect this characterization of the interest groups may be slightly artificial 
since Thirgood et al. do not distinguish Hen Harrier and Golden Eagle conservationists 
quite as sharply. However, it is useful to distinguish them because of the potential for 
conflict between Hen Harrier and Golden Eagle conservation due to the former being a 
potential prey of the latter, a problem that Thirgood et al. do note. 
 120 
4.2.2.3. Preference Analysis 
Table 2 below shows the rank order of the preferences of the agents for each of 
the eight possible sets of three actions that can be taken by the agents. These form the set 
of alternatives in this decision analysis with each action, K, D, and I (performing it or 
not) being an available option for the agent associated with that action. This means that 
A1 can only choose between K and -K, A2 between D and -D, and A3 between I and -I.  
An outcome consists of one action each from each of the three agents, and the complete 
preference structure consists of an ordinal ranking of the entire outcome set by each of 
the agents, ties allowed, with 1 being the most preferred, and so on. 
Table 4.2.  Preference Structure 
Outcome A1 A2 A3 
K, D, I 1 7 3 
K, D, -I 2 5 5 
K, -D, I 3 6 3 
K, -D, -I 4 4 5 
-K, D, I 3 2 1 
-K, D, -I 5 1 4 
-K, -D, I 5 3 2 
-K, -D, -I 6 2 4 
 
For A1, clearly (K, D, I) is the best outcome (that is, it has rank 1), because each 
of these actions benefits Red Grouse. Assuming that Red Grouse predation by Golden 
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Eagles does happen to some extent (though it is not as serious as culling), the next best 
outcome is (K, D, -I). Both (K, -D, I) and (-K, D, I) are ranked 3, assuming that the 
combined effect of diversionary feeding and predation and the crucial fact that no effort 
is expended by A1 in the latter case cancels out the effect of culling in the former case. 
Since culling Hen Harriers is potentially a very effective way to reduce Red Grouse 
mortality (K, -D, -I) is ranked as 4. There is probably not much to distinguish (-K, D, -I) 
and (-K, -D, I)—these are both ranked as 5. (-K, -D, -I) is the worst because no action at 
all is taken to augment Red Grouse populations. 
Agent A2's concerns are limited to Hen Harriers. Diversionary feeding, along 
with no culling and no predation, that is, (-K, D, -I), is the best option. Keeping the other 
two acts as they are, while not introducing diversionary feeding, that is, (-K, -D, -I) 
comes in at 2 as, from the same type of reasoning, does (-K, D, I). By losing diversionary 
feeding, (-K, -D, I) gets rank 3. It is assumed that when culling (K) occurs, diversionary 
feeding (D) does little to augment Hen Harrier populations, but predation (I) still has a 
small negative effect on them. Moreover, A2 presumably does not want to waste effort in 
performing D if it does not help Hen Harriers. Thus, taking wasted effort into account, 
(K, -D, -I) is given rank 4, (K, D, -I) rank 5, and (K, -D, I) rank 6.  The situation is worst 
when both culling and predation occur, and A2 also wastes effort, that is, (K, D, I). 
Turning to A3, the best outcome for Golden Eagles is clearly (-K, D, I), when the 
species is being introduced in Hen Harrier habitat and the main prey species is being 
encouraged to grow by no culling and diversionary feeding. For Golden Eagles, the 
outcome is only slightly worse if Hen Harriers lose diversionary feeding: (-K, -D, I) has 
rank 2. Beyond these two cases, assuming that diversionary feeding is not very important 
for Hen Harrier populations, the ranks A3 gives will be neutral with respect to D and -D. 
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Both (K, D, I) and (K, -D, I) will be ranked 3. Next come (-K, D, -I) and (-K, -D, -I). The 
worst scenarios are (K, D, -I) and (K, -D, -I). 
4.2.2.4. Game Theoretical Analysis 
The decision scenario discussed above can be modeled as a 3-agent game with 
each agent, A1, A2, and A3 having control over one action: K, D, and I, respectively. As 
noted earlier, this is a simplifying but plausible assumption in this context.  Agents’ 
preferences over the eight possible outcomes are enumerated in Table 2. 
This game will be analyzed to determine which outcomes, if any, are Nash 
equilibria and which are Pareto-efficient. In Table 3, it is shown that there is a unique 
Nash equilibrium, which is the outcome, (K, -D, I). In Table 4 it is then shown that there 
are four Pareto-efficient outcomes, (K, D, I), (K, D, -I), (-K, D, I), and (-K, D, -I). In 
other words, the Nash equilibrium, (K, -D, I), is a Pareto-inefficient outcome. In fact, it is 
Pareto-inefficient relative to (-K, D, I), which would leave no agent worse off and A2 and 












Table 4.3.  Nash Equilibrium Analysis 
Outcome Stability Analysis 
K, D, I Unstable A2 can unilaterally deviate to (K, -D, I), ranked 
6 instead of 7. 
K, D, -I Unstable A2 can unilaterally deviate to (K, -D, -I), 
ranked 4 instead of 5. A3 can unilaterally 
deviate to (K, D, I), ranked 3 instead of 5. 
K, -D, I Stable No agent has an incentive to deviate 
unilaterally. This is the Nash Equilibrium. 
Consider each agent’s possible unilateral 
deviations. A deviation by A1 would result in (-
K, -D, I), ranked worse, 5, instead of 3. A2’s 
deviating would result in (K, D, I), ranked 
worse, 7, instead of 6.  A deviation by A3 
would result in (K, -D, -I), ranked worse, 5, 
instead of 3. 
K, -D, -I Unstable A3 can unilaterally deviate to (K, -D, I), ranked 
3 instead of 5. 
-K, D, I Unstable A1 can unilaterally deviate to (K, D, I), ranked 
1 instead of 3. 
-K, D, -I Unstable A1 can unilaterally deviate to (K, D, -I), ranked 
2 instead of 5.  A2 can also unilaterally deviate 
to (K, -D, I), ranked 1 instead of 4. 
-K, -D, I Unstable A1 can unilaterally deviate to (K, -D, I), ranked 
3 instead of 5.  A2 can also unilaterally deviate 
to (-K, D, I), ranked 2 instead of 3. 
-K, -D, -I Unstable A1 can unilaterally deviate to (K, -D, -I), 
ranked 4 instead of 6.  A2 can also unilaterally 
deviate to (-K, D, -I), ranked 1 instead of 2.  A3 
can also unilaterally deviate to (-K, D, I), 








Table 4.4.  Pareto-efficiency Analysis (I: Pareto-inefficient; E: Pareto-efficient) 
Outcome Efficiency Analysis 
K, D, I E Since this is A1’s unique best outcome, 
switching outcomes could only make other 
agents better off by making A1 worse off. 
K, D, -I E A1 and A3 would be better off by switching 
to (K, D, I), but this would make A2 worse 
off.  Any other switch would make A1 worse 
off. 
K, -D, I I A switch to (-K, D, I) would make A2 and A3 
better off, while leaving A1 with the same 
rank of 3.  Note that this is the unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
K, -D, -I I All agents could be made better off by 
switching to (-K, D, I): A1 from rank 4 to 3, 
A2 from rank 4 to 2, and A3 from rank 5 to 1. 
-K, D, I E It is A3’s unique best outcome, so by the 
same reasoning as above, it is trivially Pareto-
efficient. 
-K, D, -I E This is A2’s best outcome. 
-K, -D, I I A switch to (-K, D, I) would make everyone 
better off: A1 from rank 5 to 3, A2 from rank 
3 to 2, and A3 from rank 2 to 1. 
-K, -D, -I I A switch to (-K, D, I) would make everyone 
at least as well off: A1 from rank 6 to 3, A2 
stays at rank 2, and A3 from rank 4 to 1. 
 
4.2.2.5. Discussion: Raptors and Red Grouse 
The assumptions about group decisions that are made in computing the set of 
Pareto-efficient outcomes were minimal. It is only assumed that the outcomes have a 
complete ranking with ties allowed (a complete weak ordering) on the basis of each 
agent's preferences. There was no assumption made about whether the outcomes can be 
given quantitative (cardinal) values. If there were more information available on agents’ 
preferences, more structure can be given to the set of Pareto-efficient outcomes. 
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An important limitation of this analysis is the restriction to pure strategies: agents 
do not have the option of mixed strategies in which they sometimes carry out one action 
and sometimes do not. Moreover, a problem remains: there are four Pareto-efficient 
outcomes: (K, D, I), (K, D, -I), (-K, D, I), and (-K, D, -I) and only one of these can be 
implemented. The set of Pareto-efficient outcomes may have to be analyzed further to 
come up with a credible policy recommendation. There are at least two options available 
at this stage. 
Additional assumptions about agents' preferences can be introduced to compound 
them to produce unique results. Methods range from simple voting to aggregating 
individual utility functions into a group utility function. None of these methods is devoid 
of conceptual problems. For example, using the kind of method discussed in chapter 2 
assumes that tradeoffs between the utilities of individuals are acceptable. This assumption 
may not hold, especially when people believe that control of their land, for example, is a 
non-negotiable right. 
Sorting out the Pareto-efficient alternatives may be handed over to a deliberative 
process in which the agents discuss these outcomes. Though not immune to the charge of 
being ad hoc, some criteria that may be used have some reasonable intuitive support. For 
instance, any extremal outcome (an outcome that is the most preferred by any of the 
agents) will always be Pareto-efficient no matter how poorly it is ranked by all other 
agents. It may, therefore, be reasonable to drop most of such extremal outcomes: in the 
case study of this paper, (K, D, I), (-K, D, I), and (-K, D, -I) would be dropped leaving 
only (K, D, -I) as a policy recommendation. Another method may be to deliberate on the 
values of all agents. In the case study here, it is reasonable to suppose that A2 and A3 
may have moral scruples about killing animals. Thus, they may want to drop (K, D, I) 
 126 
and (K, D, -I) and then agree to choose (-K, D, I) over (-K, D, -I) because that is in 
accord with A1's preferences. 
4.2.3. THE N-AGENT DILEMMA: REEF FISHERMEN IN THE PHILIPPINES 
4.2.3.1. Background 
Coral reefs, especially those in the southern Philippines and central Indonesia, are 
widely regarded as biodiversity “hotspots” of high conservation priority (Roberts et al. 
2002). These rich marine ecosystems are home to hundreds of thousands of fish, bivalve, 
gastropod, cephalopod, crustacean, echinoderm, algae, and other species, many of which 
are typically micro-endemics. While human activities on land contribute to reef 
degradation via the downstream effects of agricultural and logging activities, industrial 
run-offs and other pollutants, in the marine arena, overfishing and destructive fishing 
techniques (e.g., those using improvised explosives or sodium cyanide) have also been 
centrally implicated in reef destruction (Roberts et al. 2002). These reefs are often vital to 
local economies. In the Philippines, for example, over-crowded coral fisheries support an 
economic livelihood for over a million fishers (White et al. 2000).  The destructive 
ecological effects of overfishing on coral reefs are well documented. Two examples will 
help set the context (McManus 1997): (i) in the Philippine coral reef system of Bolinao, 
overfishing led to near extinction for the sea urchin (Tripneustis gratilla), which had been 
formerly quite abundant in the reef’s seagrass beds; (ii) in Kenya reefs were threatened 
by overfishing because the removal of high-level predators led to a dramatic increase in 
populations of drupellid snails which feed on coral. 
According to McManus et al. (1997), roughly 350 marine species from the 40 km2 
Bolinao reef area are sold in local markets. In spite of the practice being banned in 1979, 
fishers continue to use explosive fishing techniques and have a strong financial incentive 
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to do so: dangerous homemade bombs are cheap to produce at U.S. $1-2 and can generate 
a catch worth U.S. $15-40 while the average fisher, using non-destructive techniques, 
generates only about U.S. $1 a day. They report that informal surveys of the reef area in 
the mid-1980s showed that 60% of scleractinian coral was dead, much apparently due to 
fishing with explosives. Furthermore, their simple models indicated that fishing with 
explosives may have reduced the growth capacity of scleractinian coral by a third or 
more, with predictably negative effects for biodiversity. 
Game theoretical analyses have been used in many analyses of fishing policies 
(Sumaila 1999). The open-access version of the n-agent game described below 
corresponds to the classic “tragedy of the commons.” While the analysis is simple, it 
captures the dynamics of overfishing in coral reefs in Bolinao where the resource is over-
exploited because of no clear established rights of use. The Nash equilibrium outcome of 
collective over-exploitation of fish and the use of destructive fishing techniques is both 
economically undesirable (because of Pareto-inefficiency), as well as a major threat to 
healthy reefs and, thus, to sustainability and the conservation of biodiversity. However, it 
is then shown that, even in a closed-access n-agent gave, there can be a conflict between 
resource management policies based on “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) and 
biological conservation. In this case, due to the ecological interactions between the 
exploited fish and other reef species of high conservation priority, MSY harvest levels for 
the exploited species may lead to a decline of other species targeted for conservation as 
important components of biodiversity. The analysis assumes that, in the long run, this 
trend leads to a decline in the exploited species because of mutualistic interactions—
however, this part of the analysis should be regarded as a conceptual exercise rather than 
an exploration of the data. 
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4.2.3.2. Game Theoretical Analysis. 
The Gordon–Schaefer model of open–access fisheries (Gordon 1953, 1954), as 
well as Hardin’s (1968) less formal ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ model of common pool 
resources, predict overfishing when individual or collective access/property rights to 
fisheries are ill-defined. The “bionomic equilibrium” is the point at which the population 
is so depleted that even minimal harvesting effort is not worth the expected return 
(Ludwig 2001). 
This situation can also be represented as an n-agent PD, with the payoffs for 
agents along the rows as given in Table 5. The payoffs are symmetric for all agents, in 
the sense that all agents find themselves in the situation described by the payoff matrix. 
The non-cooperative action, D, is to harvest as much as possible now (or, in the case of 
overfishing in Philippine reefs, use destructive fishing methods like dynamite or 
cyanide). ND denotes the number of agents who play D, the non-cooperative harvesting 
effort, and t ≤ N is some threshold value (‘‘tipping point’’) such that, where t or more 
agents defect, the outcome shifts from the left to the right column: the common–pool 
resource is overexploited and fishing is not worth the effort. We assume the cooperative 
action C is to restrain harvesting effort to a level such that, if ND < t, the population is 
sustainable over time. 
Table 4.5. Open-access n-agent Game. Agents: n fishers in an open-access fishery. 
Strategies: D: Harvest as much as possible now; C: restrain harvesting effort 
to maximum sustainable yield levels. ND: number of agents who play D. t is 
tipping point where harvesting effort exceeds maximum sustainable yield 
levels. It is assumed that T > R > P > S for each fisher. 
 ND < t ND ≥ t 
C R S 
D T P 
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For the preference structure, we assume T > R > P > S. This means that the worst 
case for each agents is to restrain harvesting effort while others overexploit the fish. The 
best case is for an insignificant number of others (< t) to defect while agents harvests as 
much as possible. The second-best case for agents is to cooperate while all (or a 
significant number) of others cooperate by restraining harvesting effort. The third-best 
case for an agent is to defect, achieving a short-term gain while the fish population 
reaches bionomic equilibrium: enough agents defect such that the population is over-
exploited in a short time. An agent does better by defecting no matter what the others do, 
since T > R and P > S. The Nash equilibrium solution of this game is the situation in 
which all defect, and the fish are overexploited. This is each agent’s third-best outcome, 
whereas if everyone cooperated they would have achieved their second-best outcomes, 
and the exploited population of fish would persist at a sustainable level. 
In this case, biodiversity values and economic values both prescribe conservation 
action. Economically, the open-access Nash equilibrium is inferior to the cooperative 
outcome for every agent: the latter is strictly preferred to the former by every agent. 
Furthermore, the destructive fishing techniques and overfishing that characterize the 
open-access equilibrium clearly threaten reef integrity and biodiversity. 
However, a second n-agent PD may arise that pits economic and conservation 
values against one another in the short term. Consider the situation in which the open-
access problem (the “tragedy of the commons”) for some reef fishery has been solved by 
privatization, government control, or community management, such that a resource 
management plan for “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) of the fish has been instituted. 
We still assume there are a number of agents extracting fish, but in this game the Nash 
equilibrium is for the agents to restrain their harvesting effort to the MSY level. 
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Crucially, we make an assumption about the ecological interactions between the 
exploited fish and the surrounding reef ecosystem: the MSY harvesting effort will, over 
time, lead to a slow decline in some endemic species of high conservation priority. As the 
population of this second species declines, the population of the exploited species will as 
well, such that the “MSY” harvesting effort is actually unsustainable. (For a partial 
justification of this assumption, see the cases described by Redford and Feinsinger 2001.) 
This second, parallel n-agent PD is represented in Table 6. In the open-access n-
agent game, we assumed that some policy similar to MSY harvesting was the 
“cooperative” option. In the closed-access case, the cooperative action will be denoted by 
BCE, for biodiversity conservation effort, and the non-cooperative option is the more 
intensive MSY harvesting, denoted by MSY. Otherwise, the preference structure is 
exactly parallel. The Nash equilibrium solution sustains the fish species in the short term, 
but as the second species slowly declines, in the long run, catches of the economically 
valuable fish decline in turn. Thus the Pareto-efficient solution involves each agent 
restraining harvesting effort beyond the short-term MSY point. 
Table 4.6. Closed-access n-agent Game. Agents: n fishers in a closed-access fishery. 
Strategies: MSY: harvest at maximum sustainable yield levels. NM: number 
of agents who play MSY; t is tipping point where harvesting effort leads to 
eventual decline in yield due to ecological interaction with species of 
conservation value. It is assumed that T > R > P > S for each fisher. 
 NM < t NM ≥ t 
BCE R S 
MSY T P 
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4.2.3.3. Discussion: Fish and Corals in Southeast Asia. 
Overfishing in coral reefs is both an economic and biodiversity conservation 
issue, especially in cases like that described by White et al. (2000), in which fish levels in 
some areas of the Philippines have dropped below those necessary to sustain healthy 
coral reefs. They report that while healthy reefs can sustainably produce 20 ton/km2/year 
of edible products, reefs degraded due to overfishing or cyanide use produce less than 4 
ton/km2/year. Other economic benefits attaching to the preservation of biodiversity in 
reefs include revenue from tourism: reef diving, tour fees, etc. 
Admittedly, the closed-access n-agent PD is only a speculative ecological model, 
but it brings into focus the need for conservation and resource management planners to 
take long-term ecological interactions into account in assessing solutions to conservation-
relevant economic conflicts. In particular, it shows that appeal to theories of sustainable 
exploitation may at best produce short-term Pareto-efficient outcomes. 
The formal mechanism-design solution to the n-agent PD alters the behavior of 
each agent via material incentives or the threat of punishment by defining clear use 
rights. It is well-known that enforceable government ownership, group ownership, or 
individual ownership can go a long way towards preventing over-exploitation of 
resources (Ostrom et al. 1999). Even in closed-access fisheries, however, further 
regulations and incentives may be necessary to ensure sustainability when multiple users 
compete (OECD 1997). While such formal solutions can be effective, two comments are 
in order. First, as discussed in the next section, resource users can and do develop 
informal networks of trust and reciprocity norms that can solve open access dilemmas 
(Pinkerton 1989). Second, appealing solely to agents’ self-regarding preferences can be 
counterproductive. In the next section evidence is presented that suggests limitations of 
such narrow mechanism-design solutions. 
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4.3. Cooperation and The Limits of Mechanism Design 
4.3.1. COOPERATION IN CONSERVATION DILEMMAS 
What should happen when Nash equilibria are Pareto-inefficient, like in the cases 
presented above? It is easy to say that agents should cooperate, and very broadly, there 
are two ways this could happen. The first is via the intervention of a third party, whether 
a government or a hired mediator, who alters the incentives that led to the dilemma in the 
first place. A government or hired third party (Ostrom 1990) could police the reef fishery, 
for example, restricting the access of fishers to prevent overfishing in the open-access n-
agent dilemma above. This often-preferred type of solution will be called the ‘mechanism 
design’ solution, after the branch of game theory that studies the implementation of 
outcomes via the design of rules and the alteration of incentives (Myerson 2008). These 
types of solutions assume that the government or third party can be trusted to provide 
adequate incentives for cooperative behavior in a way that does not lead to inefficiencies 
(e.g. enforcement that is too costly to be worth the investment) or other problems (e.g. 
abuses of power).69 
In the absence of policies that provide third party enforcement of cooperative 
strategies, willingness to cooperate in repeated interactions depends on the level of trust, 
more specifically, the degree of confidence an agent has that another agent will not 
unilaterally change strategy. There are various ways that such trust could be built. The 
obvious suggestion is more discussion and deliberation and, especially, repeated 
interactions where agents have an opportunity to build and enforce norms of cooperation 
themselves. In environmental decision contexts, given that few agents actively claim an 
                                                
69 For example, Ostrom et al. (1999) discuss the government-owned Chiregad irrigation system in Nepal, 
which replaced irrigation systems owned and managed by farmers themselves. Apparently the 
government’s system, although technologically more sophisticated, did not take into account the local 
norms that had been used to allocate use rights in the older system, resulting in less use of the new system 
and lower agricultural productivity. 
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explicit desire to harm environmental goods and services, collective decision-making 
through deliberation is one plausible recommendation to begin articulating these norms 
(Fiorinio 1990). 
In the South African case study, the pursuit of such deliberative strategies should 
presumably include conservation education and credible plans from conservation 
proponents to offset costs incurred by herders and game farmers due to predation by wild 
dogs. This recommendation is easier to make in this case because only two “agents” 
(groups) are involved. The situation in the British example is more complex, requiring 
reciprocal commitments between gamekeepers and the two classes of raptor 
conservationists. For instance, if each of the three agents agreed to drop a policy which is 
deemed best by only one agent, there would remain only one outcome, (K, D, -I), on 
which they would have to agree. In the case of overfishing on coral reefs in the 
Philippines, collective deliberation would presumably have to take place through public 
forums or community groups because of the number of agents that are involved. 
However, because the number of agents is so large, the opportunities for these agents to 
agree on and collectively enforce norms to avoid the dilemma in the absence of external 
enforcement is more difficult, especially since larger groups have trouble effectively 
monitoring each other and excluding outside agents who do not have use rights (Ostrom 
1990). 
Again, the contrast here is with the mechanism-design strategy for achieving 
Pareto-efficient outcomes that relies on alteration of material incentives by a third party. 
Usually, advocates of this approach assume agents are narrowly self-interested, and 
advocate policies that assume agents will act rationally according to self-interested 
preferences (Gintis 2000, Henrich et al. 2005). Bowles (2008) has noted this mechanism-
design view makes strong and controversial foundational assumptions. Narrow self-
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interest is presumed to be the basis for social institutions and resulting institutional 
arrangements. Institutional policies are supposed to work best when designed for 
“knaves.” 
While policies based on third-party alteration of material incentives have some 
record of success, experimental results in psychology and behavioral economics show 
that there are significant limitations to narrow mechanism-design solutions that are 
particularly relevant in planning for environmental values, including biodiversity 
conservation. Firstly, a significant body of experimental work in behavioral game theory 
shows that humans have dispositions to initially cooperate and enforce norms of 
cooperation at a cost to themselves in dilemma-style games with Pareto-inefficient Nash 
equilibria. Secondly, independent streams of research in psychology and economics 
suggest that in certain types of situation mechanism-design solutions might backfire, by 
undermining the “moral sentiments” or other motivations that can contribute to 
cooperative behavior. In short, appeal to narrow (material) self-interest may “crowd out” 
other–regarding motives (Frey 1987). The next section discusses relevant results from 
behavioral game theory and the subsequent section discusses evidence for crowding out. 
4.3.2. THE BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY OF DILEMMAS 
In this section I summarize evidence from behavioral game theory that suggests 
that people have social or other-regarding preferences, including preferences for 
reciprocity and the enforcement of norms. This evidence suggests that agents reciprocally 
cooperating over time can solve many dilemmas, especially where some agents are 
willing to “pay” to enforce norms that maintain such cooperation. 
For each game, I give a description of the rules and monetary payoffs, the Nash 
equilibria, the observed results, and how they deviate from money-maximizing Nash 
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equilibria. The experiments are designed to be anonymous to both the players and the 
experimenters: individuals do not know who they are playing against, and experimenters 
do not know which individuals play which strategies. The games also have finite 
horizons: they are either one-shot or finitely repeated. These are meant to control for 
reputation effects and indefinitely repeated game strategic play. 
A crucial finding is that populations are heterogeneous: while individuals 
exhibiting cooperative behavior have been found to make up a significant proportion 
(sometimes a majority) of individuals in experiments, it is likewise found that a 
substantial proportion of individuals do indeed behave as rational money-maximizers 
(see, e.g. Fehr et al. 2002, Ostrom 2005). 
4.3.2.1. One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
The game is shown in table 7 below, and shares the structure of the 2-agent 
conservation dilemma from South Africa presented above. Two players decide whether to 
cooperate (C) or defect (D), where the payoff to a lone cooperator (CD) is the lowest, 
followed by the payoff to mutual defection (DD), followed by the payoff to mutual 
cooperation (CC), followed by the payoff to lone defection (DC): CD < DD < CC < 
DC.70 
Table 4.7. One-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. ‘C’ is the cooperative action, ‘D’ is defection. 
Payoffs are for row player; see text for preferences (same for row and 
column). 
 C D 
C CC CD 
D DC DD 
                                                
70 The game is played once, making strategically irrelevant the usual stipulation that 2CC > DC + CD. 
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Defection dominates cooperation, since whatever column player does, row player does 
better by defecting, and vice versa, since DC > CC and DD > CD. By this line of 
dominance reasoning, mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium, but the mutually 
cooperative outcome is Pareto-efficient, since CC > DD. In the laboratory, subjects 
cooperate about half the time. Since defection dominates cooperation, rational money-
maximizers should always defect in the one-shot game. When given time to play the one-
shot PD repeatedly, subjects generally converge to the Nash outcome (Sally 1995, 
Ledyard 1995). 
4.3.2.2. Public Goods Game 
N players decide how much to invest ci from their initial endowment ei in a 
“public good” fund, whose proceeds are shared equally by all, that pays m per unit of 
investment, where m < 1 and i is an index for the players. Payoffs for each individual i 
are thus: Pi = ei − ci + m(Σk ck)/N. Since m < 1, there is no individual incentive to invest, 
however mN > 1, so everyone would benefit from full investment. The game is equivalent 
to an n-player prisoners’ dilemma, and is played repeatedly over a series of r rounds. The 
Nash equilibrium outcome in the one-shot game is zero investment, and the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium (where agents act in equilibrium for each sub-game) in the finitely 
repeated game predicts zero investment, although there is some controversy over the 
relevance of sub-game perfection in experimental settings (Camerer 2003). 
In the laboratory, in the first few rounds of the finitely repeated game in 
industrialized populations, mean investment is about half of initial endowment, with a 
roughly bimodal distribution, i.e. roughly half of the individuals invest their entire 
endowment and half invest nothing (Camerer 2003, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Ledyard 
1995). This leads to a sharp decline in investment over the course of the game. 
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4.3.2.3. Public Goods Game with Targeted, Costly Punishment 
This game is nearly identical to the public goods game as described above, but 
adds the following complexity. After each round, players may choose to pay to target 
particular players for punishment (e.g. those that defected). Parameters vary between 
experiments, but usually the cost of punishment is less than the amount taken away from 
the player punished. Again, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game 
iterated a finite number of times is zero investment. Similarly, the introduction of costly 
punishment creates a “second-order” public goods dilemma such that the sub-game-
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is that no one should pay to punish. The idea here is 
that the provision of punishment to sustain the Pareto-efficient outcome is itself a public 
good. In the laboratory, adding the opportunity for targeted, costly punishment can 
sustain investment at high, efficiency-promoting levels. Furthermore, subjects are willing 
to engage in third-party punishment of individuals that do not directly affect their income, 
and are also willing to punish non-contributors on the last round of play, when such 
punishment could not affect future contributions (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004, Ledyard 1995). 
4.3.2.4. Public Goods Game with Targeted, Costly Punishment and Intergroup 
Conflict 
Sääksvuori, Mappes, and Puurtinen (2011) recently devised a version of the 
public goods experiment looking at the effects of inter-group conflict. The rules are the 
same as the public-goods game described above, except the experimenters devised 
several new experimental treatments relating to competition between groups. The 
experimenters ran two symmetric competition treatments, one in which both groups were 
given the opportunity to punish non-contributors at individual cost, and one in which both 
groups were not given this opportunity. They also ran an asymmetric competition 
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treatment, where one group was able to punish and another was not. In these group 
competition treatments, round-by-round payoffs for each group were public knowledge. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome would result in no one contributing and 
no one punishing. 
In the laboratory, levels of contribution and punishment in control treatments 
were similar to those described above. Punishment opportunity led to significantly higher 
levels of contribution to the public good in the asymmetric and symmetric group-
competition treatments when payoffs were public knowledge. When groups were 
isolated, the effect was only marginally significant. Net payoffs to punishing groups were 
significantly higher in asymmetric group conflict. However, in the absence of group 
conflict there was no statistically significant difference between net payoffs for punishing 
and non-punishing groups (the costs of punishment canceling out the benefits of 
cooperation). If individuals were rational money-maximizers playing subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibria, they would neither contribute to the public good nor pay to punish, and 
the effects of group conflict are irrelevant to monetary payoff, so would not affect play. 
4.3.3. THE LIMITS OF MECHANISM DESIGN 
The folk theorem of repeated games (actually a class of theorems) states that 
rational agents can achieve Nash equilibrium outcomes that are not available as equilibria 
in one-shot games (e.g. mutual cooperation in the PD) when those games are (infinitely 
or indefinitely) repeated, since the opportunity for endogenous enforcement of such 
outcomes is available (Gintis 2009). For example, if the PD were repeated, the 
respondent may “punish” a non-cooperator by not cooperating in the next round. This 
behavior may furthermore be rational, since sufficiently forward-looking agents care 
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about their income stream from future interactions: foregoing a positive but low payoff 
today may be rational if it causes the receipt of a larger payoff every day next week. 
However, the results from behavioral game theory above show that people are 
often willing to cooperate reciprocally and enforce norms at a cost when faced with even 
single-shot or finitely iterated dilemmas. Thus mechanism-design solutions beyond 
processes of group deliberation may in some cases simply be unnecessary. Additionally, 
mechanism designers interested in designing institutional arrangements that result in 
Pareto-efficient Nash equilibria should take into account psychological complexities, lest 
their policy prescriptions backfire. Bowles (2008) discusses several reasons why such 
policies might backfire. 
Framing and informational effects: Where cooperation is “framed” (in the 
psychologist’s sense) as required by regulation or law, and enforced, for example, by a 
fine, this may actually undermine cooperative behavior over time. It may be better to 
frame cooperation in the context of group decision-making amidst informal networks of 
communication, appealing to agents’ other-regarding motives (Cardenas et al. 2000). 
Further, material incentives may send a negative signal to the agents that can motivate 
defection, for instance, because they may indicate a lack of trust (Fehr and Rockenbach 
2003). 
Learning effects: Incentives may provide an environment in which agents “learn” 
to be more self-interested, and their preferences shift over time to become less other-
regarding. For example, in the experiment of Falkinger et al. (2000), subjects who had 
played a public goods game in the presence of material incentives later played the game 
without incentives and contributed 26% less to the public good than subjects who had not 
played the game with incentives. 
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Overdetermination: A significant body of psychological research on “intrinsic” 
motivations suggests that, when agents are offered financial incentives for actions for 
which they are already intrinsically motivated (e.g., because they are pleasurable), 
intrinsic motivation may decrease significantly (Wiersma 1992, Deci et al. 1999, Gneezy 
and Rustichini 2000). Bowles and Hwang (2008) consider theoretical models where 
moral sentiments and material interests are either complements or substitutes, showing 
that a “naïve” social planner interested in maximizing aggregate utility who presupposes 
agents are purely self-interested may mistakenly advocate policies where incentives are 
too small or too large. 
When these kinds of situations obtain, deliberative solutions that engage the moral 
sentiments and other-regarding motives of the agents are likely to better achieve the goals 
envisioned by them. Encouraging agents to communicate and reach agreements on 
behavior, for instance, through credible promises of future behavior to each other, may be 
sufficient. If agents are sure that others will not unilaterally change their actions, the Nash 
equilibrium of the static game becomes irrelevant. 
4.4. Concluding Discussion: Norton’s Critique 
This chapter has been concerned with using game theory to identify dilemmas 
where each individual or group acting in their own interest results in an outcome that is 
worse for everyone. Thus game theory can serve a normative role for group decision-
making. I conclude by considering Norton’s (2005) critique of game theory in 
conservation contexts, arguing that his notion of an irreducibly communal good is not 
necessary to account for environmental values like those involved in the biological 
conservation dilemmas considered here. Furthermore his pragmatism about the formal 
tools of decision science suggests a weaker characterization of methodological 
 141 
individualism than he provides, which is not necessarily incompatible with 
methodological holism. 
Norton’s (2005, 232-242) main claim about the uses of game theory in 
conservation contexts is that contemporary economists’ commitment to methodological 
individualism precludes an engagement with environmental values he calls “communal.” 
Whether or not Norton’s notion of an irreducibly communal good is necessary to 
characterize environmental decision contexts (and I give some reasons to doubt this 
below), I agree with Norton that the utility, scope, and limits of decision tools like game 
theory for environmental decision contexts are ultimately to be determined empirically. 
According to Norton, environmental problems stem largely from conflicts 
between individual goods and communal goods. Individual goods are the fungible, 
relatively short-term goods that concern economists. A communal good is supposed to 
emerge at the spatiotemporal scale of a whole community over time, the 
multigenerational time scale wherein “a human community finds its proper niche in an 
ecological system” (2005, 241). Crucially, communal goods are not supposed to be 
reducible to an aggregation of goods accruing to individuals. Environmental values like 
common-pool resources (e.g. clean air and water) and biodiversity are exemplars. Norton 
claims, for example, that a community may be worse off due to the destruction of a 
pasture whether or not any individual in the community prefers to work the pasture as a 
herder. Without the pasture, members of the community lose a feasible option for 
productive work and an alternative way of life. 
The example is suggestive but the notion of an irreducibly communal good is 
problematic, since someone interested in accommodating what Norton calls communal 
goods in terms of aggregations of individual goods have several plausible options. In 
Norton’s example of the pasture, individuals could have (revealed, elicited, or 
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constructed) preferences over which lifestyle options should remain feasible for future 
generations. If no individual in the current generation or in future generations prefers to 
be a herder, perhaps due to cultural transmission of non-herder values, it is far from clear 
whether this community is worse off if the pasture is destroyed. Preferences over which 
options remain feasible whether or not future individuals pursue those options could be 
elicited, as individuals in this community could aggregate their preferences by voting to 
indefinitely conserve the pasture,71 or revealed via market behavior or via community 
action to conserve the pasture. If individuals were not given an opportunity to express 
such preferences and the pasture were destroyed, the community may be said to be worse 
off because a large enough majority or perhaps plurality of individuals would have 
preferred to indefinitely conserve the pasture. Here we do not appeal to communal goods, 
but an aggregation of individual (elicited or revealed) preferences to support the claim 
that the hypothesized community is worse off. 
Two other options are open which avoid the notion of an irreducibly communal 
good. Norton could appeal to his own notion of a considered preference (Norton 1984), 
arguing that while the community could be better off according to an aggregation of their 
“felt” or revealed preferences if the pasture were destroyed (since no one currently wants 
to be a herder while they believe they would immediately benefit from conversion of the 
pasture to an alternative use), they are also worse off according to their considered 
preferences, on the assumption that in ideal circumstances most individuals would 
reflectively endorse the preference for the herder lifestyle option being left open. Perhaps 
less plausibly, Norton could appeal to a purely objective notion of well-being that leaves 
the economist’s subjectivist preference-based conception of value behind, claiming that 
                                                
71 The problem of aggregating individual preferences in voting systems is non-trivial, however the 
impossibility results of Arrow’s theorem do not apply to binary choices, e.g. a choice between conserving 
and not conserving a pasture (Arrow 1951). 
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individuals are better off the more options they have, whether or not they ever wish to 
pursue them. 
Philosophically, it is contemporary economists’ supposed commitment to 
methodological individualism that Norton finds problematic, since it seems to preclude 
communal goods by definitional fiat. Methodological individualism is a research tradition 
with a long and complex history in philosophy and social science (Udehn 2001), arguably 
beginning with Hobbes’s account of the social contract. It is unclear whether 
methodological individualists’ opposition to so-called “organicism” or “holism” can be 
cashed out non-trivially. Norton glosses methodological individualism as the claim, “the 
legitimate object of social scientific study is ultimately the individual human being,” 
(2005, 238) but his interest is particularly in economists’ definition of social or 
communal goods as ultimately composed of (reducible to) aggregations of goods that 
accrue to individuals. His argument is that economists are involved in a kind of semantic 
sleight of hand by defining out of existence any kind of good that cannot in principle be 
reduced to individual goods. 
An economist might argue, perhaps along the lines given above, that goods that 
emerge on a multigenerational scale can in principle be reduced to goods accruing to 
individuals over time. I do not think that it is a non-starter: many of the agents in the 
game theoretical representations of the conservation dilemmas offered above can 
plausibly be said to have preferences over multigenerational outcomes. For example, the 
agents in the case from Scotland have preferences for the persistence of bird populations 
beyond the current generation; in the case from the Philippines, presumably fishers have 
some preference for the persistence of the reef that gives them a livelihood. Of course, 
the agents’ revealed, elicited, and constructed (or considered) preferences might come 
apart, as agents may act myopically in their short-term interest at the expense of future 
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generations, but would not endorse these revealed preferences upon reflection. Thus any 
particular model of these agents’ multigenerational preferences may be descriptively 
adequate but normatively inadequate, or vice versa. 
Whether or not Norton’s notion of an irreducibly communal good is coherent, it is 
not clear that game theory need be methodologically individualist in Norton’s sense at 
all: the two- and three- agent examples above illustrate that groups can be modeled as 
single agents when interests are shared. Groups of individuals (firms, committees, 
government agencies, etc.) that interact in ways that allow them to aggregate their 
preferences, for example by voting, may also be treated as agents with a group 
preference. A better view of methodological individualism, more compatible with 
Norton’s pragmatism, casts it as a research strategy that is not necessarily incompatible 
with methodological holism. An explanation is methodologically individualist if it 
explains social phenomena by appealing to properties of individuals and their 
interactions, for example explaining the outcome of a social interaction as the equilibrium 
of a game between individual agents. In this sense, insofar as game theory can treat 
groups as agents in some circumstances, it is also a methodologically holist tool. 
The examples and models considered here, and throughout the dissertation, 
support Norton’s pragmatism about the formal tools of decision science. He writes that 
we should “consider the multiple techniques of decision analysts to be useful tools within 
a larger process that is based in experience and a commitment to experimentalism.” (261) 
That is, whether and how game theory (or multi-attribute value theory) will prove useful 
for environmental decision contexts is an empirical question that cannot be settled a 
priori. The case studies presented above show that game theory can inform group 
decisions in biological conservation and other contexts in which environmental values are 
at stake. However, they do not support the claim that a notion of communal goods that 
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Chapter 5: Ethical Dilemmas in Biological Conservation and the Limits 
of Decision Science 
5.1. Introduction: Connecting Commensurability and Cooperation 
While the first chapter discussed how values play a necessary but often obscure 
role in applied conservation science due to inductive and definitional risks, the previous 
three chapters showed how modeling tools from decision science, particularly multi-
attribute value theory (MAVT) and game theory, could be used to make the valuations of 
decision-makers explicit, in order to construct common scales of value to analyze 
complex tradeoffs (chapters 2 and 3) and facilitate cooperation in “dilemma” situations 
(chapter 4). Since the focus here is on prescriptive or normative applications of the 
decision sciences, it is worth stepping back to discuss the limitations of such applications, 
particularly in the resolution of ethical dilemmas in biological conservation. 
This chapter discusses ethical aspects of the problems of tradeoffs between 
multiple values and cooperation between multiple stakeholders, enumerating further 
assumptions that must hold for these kinds of decision theoretic arguments to be 
successful. Case studies and ethical reflection reveal that decision science cannot provide 
guidance without additional normative assumptions that: (1) identify legitimate 
stakeholders and rights holders, defining the circle of concern and allocating decision-
making authority amongst groups with different interests; and (2) delimit reasonable 
tradeoffs, deciding which biological or ecological units should be protected and at what 
cost, and whose rights are non-negotiable constraints. 
The especially difficult problem of non-negotiable constraints connects the 
problems of commensurability and cooperation: people who believe their rights or 
interests to be incommensurable with the interests of others, in the sense that they should 
lexicographically trump them or place hard constraints on decision-making, are generally 
 147 
more likely to act uncooperatively when those rights or interests are at stake. This applies 
to both conservation proponents, for example Wood (2000), who argues for the 
lexicographic priority of biodiversity protection in land use decisions,72 and those who 
oppose conservation measures. Insofar as the herders in the South African wild dogs case 
from chapter 4 believe that their right to violently protect their herds from wild dog attack 
is simply non-negotiable, and thus will not accept some form of compensation in 
exchange for giving up this right, they will be less amenable to solutions that protect the 
endangered dogs. 
While commitment to non-negotiable rights may lead to land use conflict in 
biological conservation scenarios, resulting uncooperative behavior may be ethically 
justified when vulnerable populations face mistreatment and injustice at the hands of 
conservationists and governments (Dowie 2009, Chapin 2004), or other resource users 
like extractive corporations (Okonta and Douglas 2003). On the other hand, accepting 
that at least some tradeoffs are unavoidable in land use decisions for conservation 
requires reasonable constraints on claims of incommensurable, non-negotiable rights. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Decision analysis for biological conservation 
often begins by identifying relevant decision-makers and stakeholders, and section 2 
enumerates normative problems for stakeholder methodologies: determining ethically 
legitimate stakeholders, dealing with asymmetries of power and concerns for social 
justice, and weighing the rights and interests of various stakeholder groups. The last issue 
provides a natural transition to a discussion of the ethics of tradeoffs in section 3, which 
describes a case study of introduced North American beavers and local biodiversity in 
Navarino Island, Chile. The case study illustrates the weaknesses of the decision theoretic 
                                                
72 Studies such as Spash and Hanley (1995) and Rosenberger et al. (2004) show that it is possible to elicit 
lexicographic preferences for environmental goods from significant proportions of student populations. 
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methods described in earlier chapters for making normative arguments in ethically 
disputed territory. Section 4 concludes by discussing the value of decision science to 
logically clarify these disputes, but not resolve them without further normative inquiry. 
 
5.2. Normative Problems for Stakeholder Methodologies 
5.2.1. LEGITIMATE STAKEHOLDERS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Decision analysis of the sort discussed in chapters 2-4 begins by explicitly or 
implicitly identifying relevant decision-makers and agents affected by outcomes of 
decisions. Freeman’s (1984) influential, very broad definition of ‘stakeholder’ is anyone 
who can affect or is affected by a decision. Two central normative issues for the 
stakeholder approach, which remain largely unresolved, are (1) what it takes for an 
individual or group to count as an ethically legitimate stakeholder; 73 and (2) how such 
methodologies should account for asymmetries in power between stakeholder groups. 
Many definitions of ’stakeholder’ relevant to firms have been offered in the 
business and management literature.74 They range from very inclusive (anyone affected 
by the firm’s activities) to very restrictive (anyone with a legal obligation to or claim on 
the firm). Most analyses categorize stakeholders on at least two dimensions: decision-
making power and potential costs and benefits borne or received (“urgency”).75 Figure 1 
depicts this commonly used conceptual model, with urgency on the x-axis and decision-
making power on the y-axis. 
Figure 5.1. Stakeholder Categories in Terms of Urgency and Power  
                                                
73 This question is stressed by Sarkar (2012a). 
74 See, for example, Freeman (1984) and Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
75 For example, Mitchell et al. (1997). 
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This conceptual model is inadequate to answer the normative question of who counts as a 
legitimate stakeholder, however, since decision-making power itself may be 
(normatively) legitimate or illegitimate, and an interest group may use its power to pursue 
its own interests at the expense of other stakeholders. Furthermore, how the “urgency” of 
various claims is to be compared is a normative question: a real estate developer may 
have millions of dollars at stake in a land use decision, whereas conservationist groups 
may oppose the development on the grounds that it will threaten an endangered or 
endemic species.76 Both groups would describe their interests as urgent, but how these 
stakeholders’ claims should be weighed is a significant further question. These issues 
lead authors like Mitchell et al. (1997), Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001), Halim et al. (2008) 
and others add legal/ethical legitimacy as a third dimension of stakeholder identification, 
but this is to name the problem rather than solve it. Furthermore, ethical and legal 
legitimacy may come apart, creating further difficulties.  
The question of legitimacy is often ignored or placed in the background by 
authors in the social science and management literatures who discuss stakeholder 
                                                
76 Laura Dunn’s 2007 documentary The Unforeseen describes just such a conflict surrounding proposed 
development around Barton Springs in Austin, Texas, a local landmark and home to the endemic Barton 
Springs Salamander (Eurycea sosorum). 
Decision-making power 
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High urgency, low 
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approaches. Grimble and Wellard (1997) provide a review of stakeholder methodology in 
the related field of natural resource management. Stakeholders are distinguished in terms 
of a continuum of spatial and temporal scale: “micro” stakeholders range from current 
local to regional interests while “macro” stakeholders range from national and 
international interests to the interests of future generations. Conflicts within a single 
stakeholder’s goals (termed tradeoffs) are distinguished from conflicts between the 
diverse stakeholders and stakeholder groups (termed conflicts). Despite the interest and 
usefulness of these particular distinctions, the normative question of legitimacy is 
avoided altogether. 
More recently, Reed et al. (2009) reviewed methods of stakeholder identification, 
stakeholder categorization, and the investigation of relationships between stakeholders. 
However, the focus was on strengths and weaknesses of various social scientific 
methodologies, for example, the use of focus groups, structured interviews, or snowball 
sampling to identify stakeholders. Little to no attention was paid to normative issues, 
although Reed et al. do note, for example, that some methods are more likely than others 
to exclude marginalized groups. Specifically, the use of influence-interest matrices, 
similar to the influence-urgency diagram in Figure 1, which categorize stakeholders 
according to how much they are influenced by a decision and how much they are 
interested in the outcome, may lead to biased consultation with more influential groups. 
However, how or why marginalized groups should be included, or whether interest or 
influence alone could make one a legitimate stakeholder, or whether a combination of 
interest and influence are required, are not discussed. 
Stakeholder methodologies often treat each interest group as roughly equal, an 
assumption challenged by Singleton (2009) in her examination of the role of indigenous 
groups in debates over marine protected areas in Washington State (U.S.A). Singleton 
 151 
argues that the role of political institutions in generating asymmetries of power and 
influence is often obscured by stakeholder methodologies that make this equality 
assumption. She stresses that the establishment of marine protected areas has important 
effects on the allocation of fisheries resources, as tradeoffs benefit some stakeholder 
groups at the expense of others. 
The particular legal and historical context is especially salient here: a U.S. federal 
court ruled in 1974 (in United States vs. Washington) that treaties from the mid-19th 
century entitled the 12 signatory tribes to 50% of Washington’s harvestable salmon 
stocks in their “usual and accustomed” fishing areas; this ruling was extended to shellfish 
in the 1990s. The ruling has allowed these tribes to develop significant power in 
Washington’s politics of natural resource management. However the strained historical 
relationship between the U.S. government and Washington tribal groups still affects 
negotiations over marine protected areas, where fishing is legally limited. 
Tribal fishermen harbor resentment towards conservationists due to past abuses 
by the government: according to Singleton, “[in] the decades leading up to the U.S. vs. 
Washington case, tribal fishermen were prosecuted, jailed, and their equipment seized or 
destroyed—ostensibly on the grounds of conservation” (Singleton, 2009, 426). Tribes are 
especially concerned that the benefits and burdens of marine protected areas will not be 
shared equitably. They claim that marine conservation proponents are using conservation 
as a pretext for what is actually resource allocation, since tribal fishing rights are place-
specific, whereas non-treaty fishing rights are not. The argument is thus that the burdens 
of conservation are not distributed equitably. 
One might argue that the tribes deserve special status as stakeholders due to the 
historical injustices they have faced, from which many still suffer. As Singleton points 
out, it may appear fair to limit all fishing (tribal and non-tribal) in marine protected 
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areas, but tribal fishermen are arguably affected more than others, due to place-specificity 
of their fishing rights and the special role fishing plays in tribal life. Furthermore 
Washington state has allowed economic activity that indirectly affects salmon stocks, for 
example by allowing water to be diverted for hydroelectric power generation, without 
tribal approval. On the other hand, one might argue that the tribes’ current legal and 
political power is adequate compensation for historical injustice, and so the tribes should 
be treated just as any other stakeholder in negotiations surrounding marine protected 
areas. Either way, this case illustrates that power asymmetries and historical context 
complicate the stakeholder approach, which on its own cannot deal with questions of 
social justice and the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens. 
5.2.2. MORAL STATUS, STAKEHOLDERS, AND RIGHTS HOLDERS 
Another problem with the stakeholder methodologies is that they seem to rule out 
certain groups, particularly non-human animals and future generations, who many regard 
as having moral status. What is usually meant by the question of moral status is whether 
someone or something’s interests should “count” morally. Environmental ethicists who 
advocate for the moral status of non-humans, for example sentientists77 like Singer 
(1975), would object to the implicit anthropocentrism of the stakeholder literature, which 
always assumes stakeholders are humans. If a land use decision would result in a large 
population of sentient animals being killed or driven from their habitat, the sentientist 
would argue that it would be morally wrong to ignore this consideration, and would 
probably place these animals in the “high urgency, low power” stakeholder category in 
Figure 1. 
                                                
77 A sentientist believes that sentience, or the capacity to feel pleasure or pain, is sufficient for moral status. 
Another way of putting this is that all pleasure and pain interests should be taken into account in moral 
decision making. 
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There are practical reasons for the restriction to humans, since stakeholder-
oriented approaches in biological conservation often seek to identify stakeholders in 
order to include them in processes of planning and decision-making (Reed 2008), or else 
simply to identify their interests in order to be prepared to deal with potential conflicts. 
For obvious reasons it is difficult to include non-human animals, or future generations of 
humans for that matter, in processes of decision-making, and these groups have little or 
no power to resist decisions once made. 
Furthermore, someone may have moral status in the philosopher’s sense, but not 
be an ethically legitimate stakeholder for a particular land use decision, since we would 
not accept that their relevant interests should be taken into account at all in that particular 
decision. The simplest examples here are humans with unsavory preferences, for 
example, people interested in killing individuals belonging to an endangered species for 
sport. While conservationists would be inclined to ignore this particular preference in a 
land use decision involving the endangered species for ethical reasons, this does not 
imply that the hunters lack moral status. 
This suggests two distinctions. Firstly, a distinction between the question of moral 
status “full stop,” whether someone or something’s interests is morally considerable and 
thus should be taken into account by decision-makers at all, and more complex evaluative 
questions of moral status, which concern how one ought to weigh these various claims 
and interests. For any particular case, how to weigh the interests of “micro” versus 
“macro” stakeholders, for example the interests of current local residents versus the 
interests of future generations, just is the relevant normative question. For example, 
environmental ethicists advocating environmental justice often focus on cases where the 
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relevant agents are all assumed to be legitimate stakeholders to some degree, but there are 
unjustified asymmetries in decision-making power and/or environmental outcomes.78 
Secondly, ethicists would draw a further distinction between stakeholders as 
merely interested parties and rights holders, whose rights claims, where legitimate, 
should be respected even when a violation of that right could be traded off against 
significant gains to other interests (Dworkin 1984, Wenar 2011). For example, perhaps 
the interests of vulnerable populations of traditional resource users with unique cultures 
and legitimate claims to land should in some cases trump the interests of land-
development capital or conservation scientists (Dowie 2009). Such rights could be 
justified on a social contractarian basis (Rawls 2001), as following from rules we would 
all agree upon in a fair decision procedure, or else on a consequentialist basis (Kagan 
1997), as their respect may lead to better consequences than situations in which they are 
not respected. 
Whether such purported rights are absolute, implying that their violation should 
never be traded off against any gains, or they admit of lexicographic threshold effects 
such that some amount of gains could be traded off against the violation of the right, they 
should be distinguished from fully commensurable values which may be traded off in the 
manner of MAVT. However, deciding in practice whether such rights exist and how they 
should be weighed against other interests and considerations constitute significant 
challenges. The next section discusses tradeoffs in conservation planning and a case 
study of difficult tradeoffs, focusing on a case where animal welfare claims must be 
weighed against multiple and competing biological values. 
                                                
78 See, for example, Schrader-Frechette (2002), Estrella-Luna (2010), and Nadasdy (2005). 
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5.3. Weighing Multiple Values: Ethics and Difficult Tradeoffs in 
Biological Conservation 
5.3.1. TRADEOFFS IN CONSERVATION PLANNING 
Biodiversity conservation planning, for example within the Systematic 
Conservation Planning protocol (Margules and Sarkar 2007), necessitates the 
identification of biodiversity constituents and/or surrogates. Biodiversity constituents are 
the aspects of the biota that are deemed worth preserving (they may be species but need 
not be), while surrogates are putatively correlated measures of those constituents used for 
planning purposes. As discussed in chapter 1, the identification of biodiversity 
constituents is primarily a normative question about society’s values, and will necessarily 
imply tradeoffs, since resources are scarce, for conservation and otherwise. 
While tradeoffs between aspects of the non-human biota at various scales are 
inevitable when deciding what to actively conserve or manage, perhaps the most ethically 
interesting and problematic tradeoffs are those between biological or ecological units and 
human welfare interests (McShane et al. 2010), where concerns for social justice meet 
environmental ethics (Brechin et al. 2002). The best examples of conservation planning 
exercises, where areas are prioritized for conservation management as opposed to 
extractive use, attempt to explicitly account for these tradeoffs. 
For example, consider the conservation plan for Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
proposed by Faith et al. (2001). Planners prioritized areas by incorporating data on other 
land uses, particularly agriculture and forestry, as well as population density and 
previously conserved areas. Opportunity costs were integrated into the selection process 
by using indices of timber volume and agricultural potential: the PNG Forest Authority 
provided planners data on timber volume, and the PNG Department of Agriculture and 
Livestock proposed a simple model of agricultural potential based on slope and drainage 
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classes. In the selection process, preference was given to units having low agricultural 
potential and timber volume, and planners “masked out” or excluded units with high land 
use intensity. Conservation Needs Assessment high priority areas79 were also given 
preference, as were areas with low human population density, while previously conserved 
areas were automatically incorporated into the final plan. Planners computed the most 
economical set of planning units using these multiple criteria. 
The PNG planners incorporated data on opportunity costs and tradeoffs at the 
beginning of the process. Ethical reasons to consider such tradeoffs stem from concern 
for the humans who live there. 37% of PNG’s extremely culturally diverse population 
lives below the poverty line, and 85% of the population make a living by subsistence 
agriculture (CIA 2009). Thus a refusal to select biological conservation priority areas by 
incorporating economic, especially agricultural, tradeoffs would arguably be unethical. 
While it is easy to say that the mere consideration of tradeoffs is an ethical 
imperative in the presence of scarce resources, actually weighing and trading off multiple 
values in an ethically acceptable way is more difficult. The following case study deals 
with introduced North American beavers in Navarino Island, Chile. Here several 
questions arise. The first is one of identifying valuable biodiversity and trading off 
different biological units: should the beavers be considered a threat to “native” 
biodiversity, or a potential asset? Furthermore, how should the beavers’ welfare rights 
weigh (if at all) in determining a management strategy? Finally, how should the values of 
conservationists, many of whom advocate total extirpation of the beavers, be weighed 
against local people who may have different values? 
                                                
79 These areas were identified by conservation biologists commissioned by the government of PNG in the 
early 1990s, and included “sites of high endemism, high species richness, and unusual ecosystems and 
habitats” (Swartzendruber 1993, ix). Thus an argument could be made that these conservation biologists, 
while they did take into account economic tradeoffs, did not take into account the values of the people of 
PNG vis-à-vis biological priorities. 
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5.3.2. BEAVERS AND ECOLOGICAL TRADEOFFS IN NAVARINO ISLAND, CHILE 
5.3.2.1. Background and Multiple Values 
Consider the case of the introduced North American beaver (Castor canadenis) 
on Navarino Island in southern Chile. The beaver, whose original range spanned from 
northern Mexico through most of North America, was introduced to Tierra del Fuego 
Island in 1946 and quickly became established there, the mainland, and Navarino, Picton, 
Lennox, Nueva, Dawson, and Hoste islands. According to Skews et al. (1999), 
approximately 20,000 beavers occupied Navarino Island in the year 2000, at a density of 
1.1 colonies per km2. Worries about the significant ecological effects of beavers’ felling 
trees and constructing dams have motivated concern among some conservationists and 
residents, while others see the beavers as a potential environmental and economic asset. 
Alternative management plans under consideration include eradication of the 
entire beaver population, favored by the Argentinean and Chilean governments and many 
conservationists, which would constitute the largest official eradication program by land 
area in history (Choi 2008). Alternatives short of complete extirpation include some 
degree of control of the beaver population, perhaps with the establishment of some no 
hunting zones to protect a small population of beavers (Schüttler et al. 2011). This 
decision raises normative questions about the value of the beavers and the habitat 
changes they cause, as well as questions of how we ought to treat or humanely kill the 
beavers, which like all rodents are generally accepted to be sentient. 
Haider and Jax (2007) summarize many arguments from anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric points of view, in terms of material costs and benefits and non-material 
values like beauty, rarity, and species richness. They cite the fact that the beavers have 
been known to occasionally cause damage to roads, irrigation channels, sewers, and other 
infrastructure, as well as soil erosion and increased sedimentation by felling trees. On the 
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other hand, beaver fur, meat, and secretion products have potential economic and cultural 
value, and apparently the beaver has become something of a mascot for some local 
residents.80 The effects of the beaver on economic benefits from tourism are less clear. 
Beaver dams impede hiking, but may attract some tourists interested in the beaver’s role 
as ecosystem engineer. Aesthetic appreciation of the beaver’s engineered habitat may 
have value to some, but others, including the Chilean government’s Agricultural and 
Livestock Service, see the beavers as invasive pests. 
In their qualitative interview study of local attitudes toward the beaver and other 
populations of non-native species on Navarino, Schüttler et al. (2011) discovered that 
local people associated the beaver with several categories of positive values, including 
(using the classification in Kellert 1996) utilitarian (consumptive), naturalistic 
(satisfaction through experiences with beavers), ecological-scientific, aesthetic, symbolic 
(particularly as a “mascot”), and humanistic (emotional attachment and identification 
with beavers, and keeping them as pets). However they were also identified as pests by 
some interviewees, while others reported being disgusted by them. 
Ecologically, beaver dams and their resulting riparian zones may be leading to the 
elimination of southern beech (genus Nothofagus) populations (Pastur et al. 2006). 
However the beavers’ activities have resulted in increased habitat and breeding ground 
for exotic trout species (Oncorhynchus mykiss and Salmo trutta) as well as some 
waterfowl species (e.g. Ashy-headed goose [Chloephaga poliocephala] and Yellow-
billed teal [Anas flavirostris]). Furthermore, Wright et al. (2002) argue that the beaver’s 
role as ecosystem engineer can increase plant species richness at the scale of an entire 
                                                
80 In their interview study of local perceptions of the beaver Schüttler et al. (2011, 179) quote one resident 
as saying, “It is like our mascot,” and a member of the Navy as saying “…you see a beaver and suddenly 
you feel happy…especially in winter times when there is an ice cap, and you see them swimming 
underneath.” 
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landscape (i.e. an area with several patch types) by enhancing habitat heterogeneity. 
Abandoned beaver ponds are often succeeded by meadows, precipitated by dams trapping 
nutrient-rich sediment. So beavers might be taken as a surrogate for plant biodiversity, 
although a surrogacy analysis has not been performed on these populations. Either way, 
evaluating the outcomes where the beavers are left alone, their population is significantly 
controlled, or they are extirpated, will necessitate considering these ecological tradeoffs. 
5.3.2.2. Ethical Aspects 
From an ethical point of view, the case of Castor canadenis in southern Chile is 
not as clear-cut as it would seem listening to passionate opponents of invasive species, 
like those quoted in Choi (2008).81 The beavers’ recent introduction, and “invasive” 
ability to reproduce and disperse throughout the archipelago in the absence of predation, 
is not a sufficient reason to call for their extirpation, since, at a certain scale, this 
argument would equally apply to Homo sapiens. However the ability of the beaver to 
quickly reproduce and disperse is an important instrumental concern that has implications 
for the costs of extirpation or management, as complete extirpation may not actually be 
feasible. 
It is easy to say that an effective argument for extirpation would have to show that 
the harm beavers cause to the human population and native biodiversity outweighs the 
significant financial, logistic, and ethical costs associated with this plan. Even if the 
beavers’ activity causes decline in populations of certain native species, it remains an 
open question whether these native species are worth saving at the cost of removing the 
beavers. Indeed, some may welcome landscape change and the resulting shift in local 
                                                
81 For example, Choi quotes one American ecologist saying that the destruction to the forest caused by the 
beavers is “like bulldozers steamed through.” 
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biodiversity, advocating control of the beaver population falling short of complete 
eradication. 
According to Schüttler et al. (2011, 180), moderate population control is the 
majority position amongst local people interviewed, who were concerned with the costs, 
feasibility, and ethicality of extirpation. Nature conservationists were apparently an 
exception, most of whom favored extirpation. A game theoretical analysis of the situation 
on Navarino could illuminate potential strategic interactions between these groups, 
especially if some individuals concerned with the beavers were willing to act to save 
some, thwarting attempts at complete extirpation. Say that such an analysis identified a 
situation structured like the ones discussed in chapter 4, where individuals acting 
rationally according to their own interest cause a situation that is worse for all agents. For 
example, consider a situation in which conservationists and the government invest 
significant resources in a massive extirpation project, but the project fails due to the 
actions of a few local people. This outcome might be preferred less by all agents than a 
situation in which local people exert moderate local control over beaver populations, 
leaving larger populations of beavers but costing much less. However, from an ethical 
point of view, this would not constitute a successful normative argument for cooperation 
between these groups on its own, since this would require the assumption that all agents’ 
preferences are reasonable, and the cooperative outcome is ethically realized. 
Additionally, while MAVT would be useful for explicitly considering these 
tradeoffs quantitatively, in the absence of agreement amongst stakeholders over relevant 
criteria of evaluation, their weights, and method of aggregation, these models can provide 
little guidance. Schüttler et al. (2011, 182) recommend collaborative stakeholder 
workshops in the absence of shared values; however as argued above, identification of 
the relevant stakeholders also raises questions about the legitimate roles of local and 
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national stakeholders in making decisions, and how participation of stakeholders should 
take place in negotiation with scientific expertise is an ongoing and controversial area of 
research.82 
Ethical problems associated with eradicating the beavers raise further difficulties 
for an analysis of tradeoffs. Any extirpation plan would obviously involve causing 
suffering and death to a large population of sentient mammals. The beavers are usually 
trapped using steel conibear traps, which are designed to kill animals quickly by snapping 
down on the neck or head, usually closing the trachea and/or fracturing the spine. 
However these traps can also accidentally kill other animals like large birds or dogs. 
While sentientists would likely be willing to trade off pleasures to humans and 
pains to beavers (and perhaps would also be willing to trade off the pain of the beavers 
for the “higher” pleasures enjoyed by humans who enjoy native biological diversity), 
they would not accept that the beavers could be killed merely for the benefit of non-
sentient native trees like the southern beech. Stronger advocates of animal rights would 
perhaps contend that the right of the beavers not to be killed strongly trumps the removal 
of inconveniences to humans. How these concerns for animal welfare and/or rights 
should be weighed against the damage the beavers cause to the ecosystem and human 
infrastructure, for example, is an ethical question that cannot be resolved through 
decision analytic techniques alone, whose purpose is to elicit or construct preferences 
whose content may or may not lead to ethical decisions. 
This case illustrates the point that identifying biodiversity constituents and 
determining a management strategy involves trading off parts of the biota. If the 
ecosystem engineering beavers are removed, the fish and bird species that benefit from 
                                                
82 See, for example, Chess and Purcell (1999), Beirle and Konisky (2001), and Reed (2008). 
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beaver habitat will also decline, whereas southern beech and other populations will 
benefit. The beavers will no longer cause damage to human infrastructure, but the costs 
of extirpation are also significant. The question of how to manage beaver populations in 
southern Chile cannot be resolved by simply considering a single dimension of value, and 
the use of formal tools like MAVT for the analysis of tradeoffs would have to weigh the 
rights and interests of numerous stakeholders and rights holders, potentially including 
humans and non-humans. Game theoretical analyses like those of chapter 4 may be useful 
for revealing strategic interactions between stakeholder groups, but the argument from 
cooperation implicitly assumes that the preferences of the relevant agents are reasonable 
and the cooperative outcome is not only Pareto-efficient, but better all things considered. 
 
5.3. Concluding Discussion: The Value and Limits of Decision Science 
As long as we accept some justification for biological conservation, then trading 
off other goods for conservation is unavoidable in a world of scarce resources. 
Furthermore, as the example from conservation planning in PNG illustrates, explicit 
consideration of these difficult tradeoffs and conflicts is ethically preferable to obscuring 
or ignoring them. However, biological conservation contexts reveal tradeoffs that are 
particularly troubling ethically: we are forced to weigh goods as distinct as biodiversity 
and social justice, or biodiversity and human or non-human animal welfare. 
Problems with his overall position notwithstanding,83 Rolston’s (1996) infamous 
claim that nature reserves should sometimes be prioritized over rescuing starving humans 
just follows from a point of view that does not see saving starving humans, despite its 
obvious ethical importance, as lexicographically more preferred to all other pursuits. 
                                                
83 For apt critiques, see especially Guha (1989) and Siurua (2006). 
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Anyone who believes it is morally acceptable to donate money to a university or an art 
museum when that money could go to save a starving child implicitly accepts this point 
of view. As Rolston puts it (2006, 265), “Human rights to development, even by those 
who are poor, though they are to be taken quite seriously, are not everywhere absolute, 
but have to be weighed against the other values at stake.” 
The main strength of the formal tools of decision science explored in this 
dissertation is that they allow decision-makers to make the multiple values at stake in 
biological conservation decisions more explicit. The problem identified in chapter 1 was 
that there are multiple ways ‘biodiversity’ can be construed and biological diversity 
measured, and which definition or measure used in applied context will depend on the 
values of the investigators. However, such values are often implicit and thus obscure. The 
resulting transparency from applying decision theory allows decision-makers to think 
about the logical consequences of their values and the values of other agents, whether by 
considering tradeoffs as in chapters 2 and 3 or in interdependent decisions as in chapter 4. 
This transparency also facilitates reflection, as decision-makers are forced to confront 
difficult conflicts of values by constructing preferences over tradeoffs, and multiple 
agents may realize that while their individual strategies seem rational, they will lead to 
outcomes that are worse for everyone. 
Of course, while decision theory places logical constraints on the structure of 
values (for example transitivity of preferences), it does not place any constraints on their 
content. While some attempts have been made to add axioms to standard decision theory 
to accommodate the structure of particular ethical theories,84 the resulting axiom systems 
simply add more definitions and structural constraints, for example by defining utilitarian 
                                                
84 For a recent attempt, see Colyvan et al. (2010). 
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social welfare functions as an equally weighted sum of individual utility functions.85 
Thus for the argument from commensurability or the argument from cooperation to be 
normative, further ethically substantive assumptions must hold. Construed as normative 
ethical arguments, the argument from commensurability and the argument from 
cooperation are both consequentialist (Kagan 1997), although the latter has social-
contractarian aspects (Gauthier 1986).86 The argument from commensurability 
recommends weighing multiple values and choosing an alternative whose consequences 
achieve the best balance of these values. The argument from cooperation recommends 
negotiating an agreement or social contract to achieve an outcome that has better 
consequences for all parties concerned than the outcome in the absence of such an 
agreement. Both types of argument, to have normative force, rely on several further 
assumptions of ethical reasonableness, enumerated in the next paragraphs. Here, by ‘x is 
ethically reasonable’ I just mean that x would not be ruled out by ethical reflection, 
potentially including but not requiring input from ethical theories. 
The argument from commensurability assumes that all relevant values can be 
specified, and those values are ethically reasonable. It also assumes that those values can 
be placed on a common scale, weighted, and aggregated, and that the judgments on 
weights and aggregation represent ethically reasonable judgments about tradeoffs 
between the multiple values. It further assumes that rights claims and other lexicographic 
priorities can be respected, perhaps as constraints on the alternatives considered, or else 
are absent. 
                                                
85 Normative questions raised by defining such a function include: Whose utility functions? How should 
they be calibrated? Should they be based on subjective welfare or an objective list of goods that satisfy 
basic human needs? 
86 Whether the latter is best construed as consequentialist or contractarian depends on the justification for 
the social contract, whether good consequences (consequentialist) or some form of consent or as the 
outcome of a fair decision procedure (more along the lines of traditional social contractarianism). 
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The argument from cooperation assumes that all agents relevant to an 
interdependent decision can be specified, and their values are ethically reasonable. In the 
original formulation of the prisoner’s dilemma, two criminals are trying to escape jail 
time. If both cooperate, they will escape jail, but each has an individual incentive to 
defect. While the argument from cooperation shows that a cooperative social contract 
would be instrumentally rational for the prisoners, society would rightly object on ethical 
grounds: the argument is normative only for agents with ethically reasonable preferences. 
Furthermore the argument assumes that agents will be able to formulate a social contract 
in an ethically reasonable way, either through intervention by a third party, or through 
repeated interactions and reciprocity. 
As mentioned in the introduction, models from decision science cannot bypass 
informal deliberation or ethical reflection. These are required for inputs to the models to 
be ethically reasonable and thus for the arguments to be normative. However it does offer 




Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
The arguments of this dissertation have largely been concerned with the scope and 
limits of normative applications of models from the decision sciences in complex 
decisions in biological conservation characterized by multiple values and multiple agents. 
The first chapter motivated the use of multi-criteria approaches to decision-making in 
biological conservation by analyzing the concept of biodiversity, arguing that while it is 
often taken as a general goal of biological conservation, its meaning is often obscure, 
especially since its most catholic usage refers to “the variety within and among living 
organisms, assemblages of living organisms, biotic communities, and biotic processes” 
(DeLong 1996). Several things could be meant by ‘biodiversity’ and biological diversity 
can be measured at many scales, so the determination of its meaning in applied scientific 
contexts (for example, as measured by species richness) where conservation goals are 
pursued carries risks that some relevant biological values (for example, endemism) will 
be excluded. Here I also suggested that the value of biodiversity is dependent on facts 
about biological composition, calling into question the idea that maintaining or 
conserving biodiversity per se should be the main goal of conservation biology as 
opposed to one of many goals. 
The solution canvassed in chapter 2 is to make multiple values explicit and to use 
techniques from decision analysis, particularly multi-attribute value theory, to weigh 
these multiple values and to allow for quantitative consideration of complex tradeoffs. 
Here I argue that constructing preferences over complex tradeoffs (“constructing 
commensurability”) can be a practical imperative due to the existence of psychological 
tendencies to avoid tradeoff thinking and use simple heuristics with non-normative 
implications. However, technical and ethical limitations constrain the use of such 
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approaches. Chapter 3 contributed a case study of constructing commensurability, where 
I examined the system used by the Fish and Wildlife Service to rank National Wildlife 
Refuges for budgeting purposes. Several flaws of this system were identified, including 
potential failures of the assumptions discussed in the previous chapter that are required 
for the use of additive value functions. 
A normative role for game theory is identified in chapter 4, which discusses 
biological conservation decisions where multiple agents interact. While formally 
isomorphic to decision problems with multiple values, in practice these problems are very 
different, since multiple agents determine an outcome by autonomously acting in their 
own interests. Here I identify cases where decision-makers acting in their own interests 
cause an outcome that is worse for everyone relative to a situation in which they 
coordinate their behavior. I argue that while multiple solutions to such problems of 
cooperation exist, solutions should take into account results from behavioral game theory, 
which show that people are often willing to cooperate in reciprocal relations over time 
and enforce norms of cooperation at their own expense. 
The final chapter discusses ethical dilemmas and normative problems for 
analyzing biological conservation decisions, arguing that the models from decision 
science discussed earlier cannot work without input from normative and applied ethics. 
Here I enumerate ethical assumptions that must hold for the arguments from 
commensurability and cooperation to have normative force, particularly that the input 
valuations should be ethically reasonable, and identify problems for stakeholder 
methodologies in identifying and weighing the interests of multiple agents. 
The main conclusions of this dissertation are: 
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1. The multiplicity of meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological 
diversity raise risks for conservation biology and motivate multi-criteria 
approaches to conservation decision-making; 
2. Constructing commensurability between multiple values to explicitly and 
quantitatively analyze tradeoffs is a practical imperative in biological 
conservation decisions with high stakes and complex tradeoffs, but 
applications should be wary of the limitations of such techniques, particularly 
their strong ethical and technical assumptions; 
3. Game theory can play a normative role in biological conservation decisions by 
identifying situations where individuals acting independently in their own 
interest cause an outcome that is worse for everyone relative to cooperative 
outcomes, but potential solutions to such dilemmas should not ignore 
empirically established human dispositions to enforce norms and cooperate in 
repeated interactions; 
4. Decision science can aid in making values explicit, facilitating reflection and 
learning, but cannot resolve ethical dilemmas on its own without input from 
normative and applied ethics, particularly in identifying legitimate 
stakeholders and weighing multiple biological concerns against concerns for 
rights, welfare, and social justice. The arguments from commensurability and 
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